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Introduction
Mark Wheeler
Western Michigan University

"To understand the Great Depression is the Holy Grail of macro
economics" (Bernanke 1995, p. 1). It can be argued that understanding
the Great Depression is the Holy Grail of all economics. The econom
ics profession has paid much attention to the Depression years. As
Stephen Cecchetti notes in this volume, "EconLit, the CD-ROM index
compiled by the Journal of Economic Literature, lists over 400 articles
on the Great Depression that have appeared since 1969 alone." How
ever, as the various chapters demonstrate, the complexity of the subject
warrants further investigation.
Drawing on a wide variety of subdisciplines within economics, the
six authors in this volume explore the immediate effects of the Great
Depression, the dramatic fall in output, and the legacy of the Great
Depression's monetary policy.
In the first chapter, Margo examines the impact of the Great
Depression on labor and labor markets. Unlike most previous studies,
Margo analyzes labor during the Depression at both the macroeconomic and microeconomic levels. The main focus of the chapter is the
microeconomic level.
Margo draws heavily on the public use microdata sample (PUMS)
to examine the Great Depression. Drawing on his previous research
(Margo 1988, 1991), he notes that "the unemployed were dispropor
tionately young or older and tended to have fewer skills and less educa
tion than employed persons. These differences were starker comparing
the employed with the long-term unemployed ... or ... with persons
on work relief."
In addition, Margo notes that the PUMS is useful in examining
New Deal work-relief programs. A particularly interesting question,
which Margo also addressed in a series of previous papers (Margo
1988, 1991, 1993), concerns the impact of work relief on labor supply.
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Conventional wisdom holds that the Great Depression helped pro
duce a more equal income distribution. Margo examines this conven
tional wisdom and finds that the data do not support it. He finds that,
"What appears to have happened is that wage differentials between
skilled and unskilled labor widened in the early years of the Depres
sion." Margo further states, "The wage structure snapped back, how
ever, and by 1939 it appears to have been little different from its
counterpart in the late 1920s." Margo goes on to note that the Great
Compression of the 1940s "produced a substantial narrowing in wage
inequality."
Margo also examines self-employment during the Great Depression
and concludes, "Although there is much more work to be done, clearly
it seems that self-employment was an option for many of the jobless ..."
In the second chapter, Heim explores the effects of the Great
Depression on different industries, regions, and nations. As Heim
notes, "the impact of the Great Depression was highly uneven. . .
Although one-quarter of the U.S. labor force was unemployed at the
low point in 1933, those who kept their jobs saw their purchasing
power increase as prices fell."
Heim examines the impacts of the Depression on different regions
in the United States and the United Kingdom. She concludes that the
Great Depression worsened the problems of the older industrial areas
in the United Kingdom. In the United States, government policies that
resulted from the Great Depression had positive long-run impacts on
the South. Most important among these policies were the New Deal
agricultural and minimum wage policies, which helped link southern
labor markets with those in the rest of the U.S. economy.
Heim shows that in both the United Kingdom and the United
States, some industries were much more affected than others. For
example, Heim notes that shipbuilding in the United Kingdom fell by
90 percent during the 1929-1932 period. However, during the same
period, output in the United Kingdom actually rose in industries such as
paper and printing, leather, and food (Aldcroft 1970). Heim states that
in the United States, "Throughout the 1930s, the food, leather, petro
leum, and tobacco products sectors were relatively 'depression-proof.'"
Heim notes that industrialization accelerated in many less-devel
oped countries during the Great Depression and subsequent decades.
She concludes that this industrialization resulted from the less-devel-
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oped countries being delinked from the international economy. This
delinking caused countries in parts of Latin America, Africa, and Asia
to shift production away from exports such as agricultural products and
minerals and toward production of manufactured goods.
Bernstein provides an interesting mix of economic history and his
tory of economic thought in the third chapter. Bernstein views the
Great Depression through the eyes of several authors who, over the
years, have tried to explain the event. Bernstein's analysis contains a
summary of the well-known views of such macroeconomists as Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Keynes (1964), and Temin (1976). How
ever, Bernstein's major contribution is an analysis of the views of
economists who attempted to examine the Great Depression outside
the realm of what we now consider standard macroeconomic theories.
In this analysis, Bernstein draws on a rich body of economic theory.
Bernstein notes that Harris (1948) and Sweezy (1939, 1968)
argued that the distribution of income had become increasingly skewed
in the 1920s. This, they argued, decreased the average propensity to
consume and reduced national income. Other economists, such as
Kindleberger (1973) and Lewis (1950), "focused on a secular shift in
the terms of trade between primary products and manufactured goods,
due to the uneven development of the agricultural and industrial
nations."
Bernstein also notes that industrial organization economists, such
as Means and Berle (1968), "sought an explanation of the Depression
in the increasing extent of imperfect competition in the American
economy of the early 20th century." Schumpeter (1939, 1946), on the
other hand, "held that the inter-war period was an era in which three
major cycles of economic activity in the United States (and Europe)
coincidentally reached their nadir." Bernstein goes on to discuss
Steindl's (1945, 1966, 1976, 1984) ideas on economic maturity.
In the fourth chapter, Fackler reviews and tests theories of the
propagation of the Great Depression. The money view, due to Friedman and Schwartz (1963), argues that inappropriate monetary policy
played a key role in the propagation of the Great Depression. The
autonomous spending view of Temin (1976) argues that a fall in auton
omous consumption was the major cause of the decline in output dur
ing the Depression. Fackler also draws on the recent work of Romer
(1988) who argues that "uncertainty effects due to stock market van-
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ability can explain most of the unusual behavior of consumer spending
on durable and semidurable goods in the first year and a half of the
Great Depression." Fackler also examines Bernanke's credit view and
the debt-deflation hypothesis. As Fackler notes, "The credit view
model demonstrates how a deflationary shock can disrupt the credit
intermediation process and cause a sustained decline in output."
Fackler constructs an econometric model to examine the degree to
which the various theories explain the path of output during the
Depression. The model is an IS-LM, AD-AS model augmented to
incorporate the various theories of the propagation mechanism. 1 Fack
ler finds that for the entire Depression period, there is not "a single,
dominant explanation of the Depression." However, shocks to the IS
curve best capture the characteristic phases of the Great Depression.
Furthermore, the credit view works well in explaining the fall in output
over the period of the stock market crash and around the bank panics in
the early 1930s.
In the fifth chapter, Wheelock maintains that the Great Depression
caused lasting changes in monetary institutions that ultimately gave
monetary policy an inflationary bias. 2 Wheelock goes on to argue that
the Federal Reserve's inflationary policy led to the collapse of the Bretton Woods System and abandonment of international linkages alto
gether. A key event in the collapse of the Bretton Woods System was
President Nixon's 1971 decision to suspend the convertibility of the
dollar into gold in response to the increasing balance of payments defi
cit in the United States.
Wheelock outlines the institutional reforms, enacted during the
Great Depression that have the most important consequences for
present monetary policy. Wheelock notes that the most significant
reforms were
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1932, which permitted the Federal
Reserve to use government securities to back its note issues;
suspension of the international gold standard by executive
order on March 6, 1933 (ratified by Congress on March 9); the
Thomas Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1933, which, among other things, permitted the Federal
Reserve to adjust commercial bank reserve requirements; the
Gold Reserve Act of 1934, which authorized the president to
fix the dollar price of gold and established the Treasury's
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Exchange Stabilization Fund; and the Banking Act of 1935,
which markedly altered the structure of the Federal Reserve
System and expanded the Fed's authority to adjust reserve
requirements.

According to Wheelock, these reforms, together with the rise of
Keynesian policymaking, led to the Fed's inflationary bias.
As Wheelock notes, permitting Federal Reserve notes to be backed
by U.S. government securities enhanced the Federal Reserve's ability
to monetize government debt and removed a major constraint on mon
etary policy. Suspension of the gold standard made possible the rising
balance of payments deficit, as well as Nixon's response to it.
In the final chapter, Cecchetti spells out lessons for current policy
that can be gained from examination of monetary policy during the
Great Depression. Cecchetti begins by examining four common
beliefs associated with the Great Depression:
1. The Great Depression was caused by the stock market crash of
1929.
2. The banking system of the 1920s was fundamentally unsound.
3. The fact that nominal interest rates were approaching zero
meant that Federal Reserve policy was loose and ineffective.
4. Tariff wars were primarily responsible for the spread and depth
of the Depression.
Cecchetti demonstrates the fallacious nature of these four state
ments. Of particular interest is Cecchetti's discussion of the tightness
of monetary policy during the Great Depression. He points out that
nominal interest rates were low during the Depression, but that real
interest rates were extremely high due to the nature of the period's
deflation. If we consider real rates of interest, the Federal Reserve's
monetary policy was, in fact, extremely tight.
Examination of the four fallacies leads Cecchetti to three lessons
for current policy:
1.

The central bank's function as the lender of last resort is of pri
mary importance in the short-term stabilization of the financial
system.
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2. Deflation is extremely costly.
3. A gold standard is very dangerous.
Margo, Heim, Bernstein, Fackler, Wheelock, and Cecchetti expand
our understanding of an important period in economic history. The
papers in this volume take fresh approaches to the study of the Great
Depression, evidence that the search for the Holy Grail of economics
remains productive and interesting.
These papers developed from lectures given at Western Michigan
University as part of the 1996-1997 lecture series entitled "The Eco
nomics of the Great Depression."

Notes
1. Shocks to the IS curve incorporate Temin's theory, in addition to capturing aspects
of investment and shocks for the rest of the world.
2. In particular, an inflationary monetary policy emerged in the 1960s.
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Labor and Labor Markets
in the 1930s
Robert A. Margo
Vanderbilt University and
National Bureau of Economic Research

This essay surveys recent research on labor and labor markets dur
ing the Great Depression. Fascinated by an economy in which unem
ployment reached nearly a quarter of the labor force and unemployment
rates hovered in double digits for a decade, economists have been
studying the Great Depression ever since it occurred. For the most part,
the perspective taken has been an aggregate one, as befits the most
important macroeconomic event of the century. However, much of the
most interesting current research has delved into the "black box" of
aggregate statistics by examining microeconomic evidence. Such evi
dence has highlighted important features of labor market behavior that
were masked in aggregate data. It has also altered conventional inter
pretations of various government policies adopted in the 1930s, such as
work relief, that were aimed at combatting high unemployment. While
my primary objective is to survey this research, I also attempt to add to
it by presenting some preliminary findings on patterns of self-employ
ment in the late 1930s.

LABOR AT THE MACRO LEVEL
Although this survey is centered on recent microeconomic
research, it is appropriate to begin by reviewing some of the basic
aggregate statistics. These are shown in Table 1, which gives two
series of unemployment rates along with a "real wage" index.
The aggregate statistics tell a familiar story. According to the first
unemployment series, labeled "Lebergott," unemployment rose to
unprecedented levels between 1929 and 1933, peaking at nearly 25
percent of the labor force. Moreover, the rate of unemployment
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Table 1 Unemployment and Real Wages in the 1930s
Unemployment rate (%)
Year

Lebergott

Darby

Real wage index
(1940 = 100)

1929

3.2

3.2

69.4

1930

8.7

8.7

75.7

1931

15.9

15.3

83.2

1932

23.6

22.9

80.8

1933

24.9

20.6

79.5

1934

21.7

16.0

84.3

1935

20.1

14.2

80.4

1936

16.9

9.9

81.1

1937

14.3

9.1

85.5

1938

19.0

12.5

93.9

1939

17.2

11.3

97.3

1940

14.6

9.5

100.0

SOURCE: Margo (1993), p. 43.

remained very high through the decade, although it did decline (except
during the recession of 1938). On the eve of World War II, fully 14.6
percent of the labor force was out of, and looking for, work. By Amer
ican standards these rates are extraordinarily high, although recent
experience in Western Europe (particularly Spain) makes them seem
somewhat less unusual.
The second unemployment series, labeled "Darby," tells a rather
different story. The run-up in unemployment between 1929 and 1932
is still present, but the series diverge sharply afterwards. The Darby
series is different because it considers anyone who had a "work-relief
job as no different from anyone who had a regular job. This assump
tion is certainly debatable (see, for example, Kesselman and Savin
1978), and I will return to this point later.
Aside from the levels of unemployment, the duration of unemploy
ment was also severe in the 1930s. Prior to the 1930s, the "incidence"
of unemployment—the fraction of the nonfarm labor force experienc
ing unemployment in a given year—was relatively high. Using census
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data for 1910, I have estimated that approximately 19 percent of the
nonfarm labor force experienced unemployment during a year's time,
compared with roughly 14 percent in the late 1970s (Margo 1990a). In
1910 and in the late 1970s, the aggregate unemployment rate was
approximately the same (4.8 percent). The implication is that the
"duration" of unemployment was much briefer in 1910 than in the late
1970s, while the probability of becoming unemployed was higher.
The probability of becoming unemployed was certainly very high
for the average worker in the early 1930s, but what changed was the
duration of unemployment. Many people who lost jobs in the 1930s
remained unemployed for long periods of time. According to the Mas
sachusetts state census of 1934, fully 63 percent of the currently unem
ployed had been out of work for a year or longer (Margo 1991). These
percentages fell as the decade progressed, but even in 1940, fully 41
percent of unemployed adult males in the nonfarm labor force had
been out of work for over a year. 1
Exactly why the average duration of unemployment increased in
the 1930s is unclear, since the obvious institutional mechanisms that
produce such outcomes today were not yet in place. For example, longterm unemployment is high in Europe today partly because European
welfare states have a dizzying array of policies that subsidize it.
"Insider-outsider" models, popular among neo-Keynesians, are diffi
cult to apply to the 1930s because the internal labor markets that pro
duce outsiders were largely (although not wholly) irrelevant. Later I
will suggest that excess duration may have been an unintended by
product of the New Deal, in particular, the work-relief programs.
The final column in Table 1 gives the standard "real wage" series
for the 1930s—average hourly earnings of production workers in man
ufacturing. In 1930, when unemployment was 8.7 percent, the index
stood at 75.7 (relative to a base of 100 in 1940). In 1933, when unem
ployment peaked at 24.9 percent, the index was higher—79.5 percent.
Moreover, the unemployment rate understates the depressed level of
labor utilization, since weekly hours of work also fell between 1929
and 1933. After 1933, real wages continued to rise, despite doubledigit unemployment. The total increase over the decade is about 25
index points, pretty good performance in light of labor market condi
tions.
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There are a number of possible interpretations of Table 1. Unless
one is prepared to argue that labor supply schedules shifted inward
from 1929 to 1933, it is difficult to come up with a convincing equilib
rium explanation of why labor utilization fell but real wages
increased. 2 Disequilibrium stories are easier to fashion. The first, and
most common, is wage rigidity. Labor demand sloped downward, but
for reasons that are not fully clear, wages were rigid downward, pro
ducing unemployment. Some developments in modern macroeconom
ics have filtered into this interpretation. Martin Baily (1983) argues
that "aggressive" wage cutting would have lowered worker morale,
even in the 1930s. Others, such as Richard Jensen (1989), suggest that
firms had been adopting "efficiency-wage" policies for some time prior
to the 1930s, and these mitigated against wage cuts. Peter Temin
(1990) has pointed out that wages were apparently less rigid downward
in Germany, and this may be a key reason why German employment
rose smartly after the initial downturn in that country (although others
attribute the recovery to Nazi tinkering with employment statistics).
Anthony O'Brien (1989) suggests that business leaders in the early
1930s firmly believed that wage cuts in the early 1920s had exacer
bated the post-World War I recession, and therefore, they were reluc
tant to cut wages in the 1930s.
Still others point the finger at the New Deal, specifically the
National Recovery Act (or NRA). In an influential book, Michael
Weinstein (1980) argues that the NRA substantially raised wages
above what they would otherwise have been, particularly for unskilled
labor (which dominates the series in Table 1). However, in a recent
study that (in my opinion) took great care econometrically, Ben Bernanke (1986) found much smaller effects of the NRA. Bernanke's
study is also noteworthy because it investigated the interaction between
wage rigidity and "work-sharing." Work-sharing occurs when firms
cut weekly (scheduled) hours instead of employment. Bernanke
argues that, beyond a certain point, it paid to reduce hours more at the
margin than employment. However, hours reductions came at a
price—workers would accept further reductions in hours only if their
hourly wages did not decline (since this would make their weekly earn
ings fall less than their weekly hours).
An alternative explanation is that the wage series in the final col
umn overstates the extent of rigidity. The idea here, which is familiar
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from recent studies of wage changes over the business cycle, is that the
employed are not a random sample of the labor force (and are less so
during downturns). In particular, if low-productivity (and hence lowwage) workers are laid off first, then the wages of employed workers
may look more rigid downward than they actually are. Some evidence
that this is the case has recently been put forth by Stanley Lebergott
(1989). Lebergott has looked at wages at the firm level (General Elec
tric and Westinghouse—both of which are included in the series), find
ing that wages fell by 10 percent from 1929 to 1931 yet the industry
average did not. In effect, Lebergott is arguing that the aggregate data
are misleading about actual labor market outcomes in the 1930s, a
point of view that is consistent with evidence on the heterogeneity of
unemployment.

THE MICROECONOMICS OF
DEPRESSION UNEMPLOYMENT
A great deal of research on the Depression by labor economists has
proceeded as if the statistics in Table 1 applied to a representative
worker, implying that the behavior of the representative worker tells us
everything we need to know. This is more than a little odd because,
even at its worst, 75 percent of the labor force was employed during the
Depression—the average employed worker could not have been,
almost by definition, the same as the average unemployed worker.
Heterogeneity has come back into fashion in macroeconomics. We
know that heterogeneity can inform about the nature of both supply
and demand in the labor market. Investigation of heterogeneity in the
1930s is at an early stage, but it has proceeded far enough to report to a
wider audience.
The heterogeneity of unemployment has received the most atten
tion, primarily because of the availability of the 1940 public use microdata sample (PUMS), a large random sample of the original responses
given to census enumerators. The great advantage here is the availabil
ity of individual level responses—we can, in other words, study what
happened to individuals during the 1930s as individuals, not as repre-
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sentative "agents." It is true that 1940 is not 1933, but there are other
sources—albeit none as good as the 1940 PUMS—to investigate.
The 1940 census is one of the great documents of American statis
tical history. The census was the first to ask about many things, includ
ing income, educational attainment, and weeks worked. It also
included questions on unemployment that, because of various quirks,
allow the investigation of many questions relating to the operation of
the New Deal work-relief programs, a point that I will return to shortly.
Analysis of the 1940 PUMS reveals that the unemployed were dis
proportionately young or older and tended to have fewer skills and less
education than employed persons. These differences were starker
comparing the employed with the long-term unemployed (those out of
work for more than a year) or (in certain respects, such as race) with
persons on work relief (Margo 1988, 1991). Although it is an over
statement to claim that unemployment before the 1930s was "egalitar
ian," it is true that the unemployed were less distinctive in their
(observable) personal characteristics before, as opposed to after, the
Great Depression (Margo 1990b).
One important implication of heterogeneity concerns wage rigid
ity. The fact that the unemployed were a nonrandom sample of the
labor force means that aggregate wage series, such as in Table 1, are
biased. It is likely that the evolution of the characteristics of the unem
ployed over the 1930s is such that the standard aggregate wage index
overstates the degree of wage rigidity, although the extent of such over
statement is open to question.
Although the 1940 PUMS is useful for examining the heterogene
ity of unemployment, it is even more useful for what it reveals about
New Deal work-relief programs. As the Depression unraveled, it
became painfully evident that old-style "relief," primarily the work of
private agencies and churches, was inadequate to deal with the volume
of unemployment. As a result, public relief was expanded, and work
relief—literally, the combination of welfare and work—became an
important mode of delivering assistance to the unemployed. (Unem
ployment insurance, another form of relief, was also adopted in the
1930s, after several decades of relative inaction.) The best known
work-relief program was that undertaken by the Work Projects Admin
istration (WPA), although there were many others (such as the Civilian
Conservation Corps [CCC]).
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By design, and also by a strange statistical quirk, the 1940 PUMS
contains a great deal of information about work relief. I say, "by
design," because the census permitted "work relief to be one of the
answers to its question on labor force status. At the time, persons with
work-relief jobs were counted as "unemployed," and this convention
was accepted by Stanley Lebergott (1964) when he constructed his
now-famous unemployment series. In an equally famous paper,
Michael Darby (1976) argued that persons working for the WPA were,
in fact, "employed." Treating them as such has a dramatic effect on the
aggregate unemployment rate, as Table 1 demonstrates.
Like many questions in macroeconomics, deciding which of these
two points of view is "right" is basically a theological matter. In a
series of papers (Margo 1988, 1991, 1993), I have tried to redirect
attention away from the metaphysical question of "who is employed"
to a different question: Did the WPA affect labor supply (or labor
demand)? The conventional wisdom among economists is that the
unemployed of the 1930s were simply that—unemployed, with zero
opportunity cost. Indeed, the very concept of the fiscal multiplier of
Keynesian lore is predicated on the point of view that the opportunity
cost of unemployed labor is zero.
The first piece of evidence I uncovered is more tantalizing than a
"smoking gun." Table 2 shows the distribution of weeks of unemploy
ment among those currently unemployed (but not on work relief) in
March of 1940 (the census week) and the distribution of weeks of
unemployment among those on work relief. Recall that the census
(and later, Lebergott) considered those on work relief as unemployed,
so they asked a question: When was your last private sector job of one
month or more? Note that the two distributions differ quite radically,
in that persons on work relief were vastly more likely to have been out
of work for over a year.
By itself this is not a particularly novel finding. The WPA knew
that its "workers" were disproportionately the long-term unemployed.
However, there are two interpretations of this result. The first, a benign
one for the "zero opportunity" cost model, is that work relief was a
"last resort," chosen after an exhaustive but fruitless search for a real
job. The second, potentially not so benign, is that people remained
with the WPA for a long time.
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Table 2 Distribution of Weeks Unemployed among the Currently
Unemployed, March 1940
Weeks

Not on PEWa

On PEW

All unemployed

0<x<13

28.1

9.5

20.8

13<x<26

22.7

16.3

20.2

26 < x <39

9.2

10.2

9.6

39<:c<52

8.3
31.6

7.7

8.0

56.3

41.5

52 <x

SOURCE: Margo (1991).
a PEW = public emergency work relief.

Because of a quirk it is possible to use the 1940 PUMS to see
which interpretation is correct. The census asked people how many
weeks they worked in 1939, treating weeks with the WPA the same as
weeks in a regular job. Thus, for example, it is possible to find people
in the 1940 census who were (a) on work relief in March of 1940, and
(b) reported that they had been unemployed for 65 weeks (all of 1939
and the first quarter of 1940) but who had worked 39 to 52 weeks in
1939. These are people who could only have been "employed" on
work relief (assuming they answered the census questions correctly),
essentially full time.
As it happens, approximately 50 percent of all persons on work
relief in March of 1940 and "unemployed" 65 weeks or more actually
worked 39 weeks or more in 1939. It is but a small step to infer that
full-time employment on work relief reduced job search activity and
that, perhaps more controversially, work relief was "preferred" to the
next best alternative.
Why might work relief have been preferred? First, while workrelief jobs were low-paying, there were private sector workers making
less per hour. The exact percentages are hard to determine, but 25 per
cent is a good round number (Finegan and Margo 1994, p. 67). Sec
ond, and perhaps more important, work relief was a pretty steady job.
This seems surprising, because the WPA was always ending projects,
and turnover from project employment was always quite high. But
project employment was not the same as WPA employment, as some
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workers simply rolled over into a new project, albeit with a few weeks
of vacation.
Some "smoking gun" evidence that work relief affected labor sup
ply directly is provided in a paper by T. Aldrich Finegan and myself
(1994), which reexamines an old chestnut of labor economics—the
famous debate between W.S. Woytinsky and Clarence Long over the
relative sizes of the added-worker and discouraged-worker effects in
the late 1930s. The added-worker effect is the idea that other family
members have an incentive to seek employment when the head of the
household becomes unemployed. The discouraged-worker effect is the
idea that persons without jobs are discouraged from looking for work
when the unemployment rate is high. Woytinsky (1942) believed that
there were large numbers of added workers who would withdraw from
the labor force once conditions improved. Long (1958) thought Woy
tinsky was wrong and had a table from the published 1940 census to
prove it, or so he thought. The table showed the labor force participa
tion rates of married women cross-classified by their husband's
employment status. If Woytinsky was right, reasoned Long, the labor
force participation rate of women with unemployed husbands should
exceed the participation rate of women with employed husbands. In
fact, according to Long's table, there was no such difference in 1940—
if anything, the participation rate of women with unemployed hus
bands was slightly lower than the participation rate of women with
employed husbands. The added-worker effect, in other words,
appeared to be negative.
Subsequent generations of labor economists (including Professor
Finegan) were taught that Long was right. However, Long was wrong,
and for an interesting reason: the WPA actually reduced the incentive
for "secondary" workers to enter the labor force.
Table 3 gives the labor force participation rate of married women
by their husband's employment status, as computed from the 1940
PUMS. Note that, if the husband was on work relief, the labor force
participation rate was very low (about 6.6 percent), while if the hus
band had a regular job, the participation rate was 16.1 percent. How
ever, if the husband was unemployed but not on work relief, the
participation rate was 22.8 percent—a clear added-worker effect.
The table from the published 1940 census that convinced Long
was quite different from the evidence in Table 3, in that Long's table
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Table 3 Labor Force Participation Rates of Married Women, by
Husband *s Employment Status, March 1940

Husband's status

,——— ^ ___|

LFPRb

% of wives in labor force
in 1940 who were
Unem
Em
On
ployed
PEW
ployed0

100,499

16.1

96.7

0.5

2.8

On PEW in 1940

7,714

6.6

80.5

3.1

16.4

Unemployed in 1940

8,172

22.8

85.9

3.6

10.5

1,112

16.8

89.3

3.7

7.0

Not on PEW in 1939 7,060

23.8

85.5

3.6

10.9

5,439

24.5

76.1

16.8

7.1

121,824

16.3

93.8

2.0

4.2

Employed in 1940

OnPEWinl939d
Out of labor force
Total

SOURCE: Finegan and Margo (1994, p. 71).
a N is the sample size.
b LFPR is the labor force participation rate, the proportion of women in the sample who
were employed, on public emergency work relief (PEW), or unemployed, during the
census week (March 24-30, 1940).
c "Employed" means employed in a private sector or non-PEW job.
d "On PEW in 1939" identifies husbands who were unemployed in the census week and
who held a PEW job at some time in 1939.

lumped unemployed husbands and husbands with work-relief jobs
together in a single category. (We know this from a note in very tiny
print elsewhere in the volume that Long cited.) If we replicate the cen
sus procedure in Table 3, the labor force participation rate of married
women with unemployed husbands (now counting the ones with workrelief jobs as unemployed) is 14.9 percent. As far as Finegan and I
know, Long's mistake was inadvertent—he had no way of knowing of
the association between work relief and the added-worker effect.
Why would the WPA have inhibited the added-worker effect? Fin
egan and I think eligibility requirements are the key. Not just anyunemployed worker was eligible for a work-relief job; the family had
to pass a means test, and the earnings of other family members (to
varying degrees) were counted. Although wages on WPA projects
were relatively low, they were better than what many married women
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could command in the labor market. Thus for many couples, a job with
the WPA for the husband with his wife at home was better than no job
and his wife working. We reinforce this conclusion in our paper by
showing that labor force participation by married women jumped when
their husbands left work relief but had not found a regular job by the
census week.
Finegan and I think the importance of this work is not the resolu
tion of a crusty old debate between two deceased labor economists, but
rather that, even under extremely trying macroeconomic circum
stances, incentives "mattered." Had the WPA been smaller, it is possi
ble that the unemployment rate among adult males would have been
higher, but our results suggest that more married women would have
entered the labor force. In designing welfare programs, there is always
a tradeoff between the desire to help those in need and the desire to
minimize deadweight loss. The architects of Roosevelt's New Deal
could not avoid this tradeoff any more than their modern day counter
parts have been able to do under much less trying macroeconomic cir
cumstances.

THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND
THE GREAT COMPRESSION
One of the central policy issues of the last 25 years has been the
surge in wage inequality. Simply put, the earnings of college graduates
relative to high school graduates are far higher today than they were ca.
1970. Wage differences within labor market groups—for example, the
dispersion in wages among college graduates—are also much higher.
The increase in wage inequality has taken place against a backdrop of
very little aggregate real wage growth, so that for some population
groups (such as the bottom 40 percent of high school graduates), real
wages are lower today than in the early 1970s.
Much has been made by the popular media (not to mention in the
political arena) of the alleged uniqueness of this recent episode in the
history of American inequality. It is believed that the long-run trend in
wage inequality—"long-run" here meaning since the turn of the 20th
century—has been distinctly downward, and recent changes are a
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reversal of that trend. In particular, the benchmark most in use is in
equality in the period 1950 to 1970.
Until recently it was widely believed that the Great Depression
helped produce a more egalitarian income distribution (Williamson and
Lindert 1980). The Great Depression was a great "leveller"—that is,
the distribution of income became much more equal in the 1930s, con
tinued to do so in the 1940s, and then stayed that way for some time.
Recent research on American wage history, however, has modified this
view (Goldin and Margo 1992).
Exactly what happened to the distribution of wages in the 1930s is
still in the process of reconstruction. What appears to have happened is
that wage differentials between skilled and unskilled labor widened in
the early years of the Depression. The extent of widening was consid
erably greater in the case of weekly wages than hourly wages, because
there were substantial declines in weekly hours worked in the early
1930s, and the decline in weekly hours was greater among the
unskilled. The wage structure snapped back, however, and by 1939 it
appears to have been little different from its counterpart in the late
1920s. This is a little surprising, since unemployment was far higher in
1939 than in 1929. As already mentioned, unemployment in the 1930s
was far worse among the less-skilled and less-educated. We might
have expected the vast reserve army of unemployed and underem
ployed among the less-skilled and less-educated to have bid down their
relative wages, but it did not happen, perhaps because various New
Deal policies (such as work relief) propped up wages in the lower tail
of the distribution.
If the Great Depression did not usher in any vast changes in wage
distributions, what did? The answer: the "Great Compression," which
occurred in the 1940s and produced a substantial narrowing in wage
inequality.
What is remarkable about the Great Compression is that the quan
titative dimensions of change were nearly the mirror image of recent
experience. The gap between the 10th and 90th percentiles in weekly
wages declined by nearly 25 percent between 1940 and 1950, approxi
mately the same percentage as the increase that occurred between 1970
and 1985. The narrowing in wage inequality took place at both tails of
the wage distribution. The gap between the median wage and the 90th
percentile fell by 14 percent, and the gap between the 10th percentile

The Economics of the Great Depression

21

and the median decreased by 11 percent. Consistent with these
changes, the earnings of skilled and educated workers fell relative to
the earnings of less-skilled and less-educated workers between 1940
and 1950. Relative to the nonfarm average, the weekly earnings of
white-collar workers declined between 1940 and 1950, while the rela
tive earnings of factory operatives, personal service workers, and
unskilled laborers increased.
Like the surge in earnings inequality that has occurred recently, the
Great Compression was not solely, or even mostly, a narrowing of
wage differentials between groups. Wage compression also occurred
within groups, as defined by educational attainment, labor market
experience, and occupation. One (very important) point of difference
between the Great Compression and recent experience is that during
the 1940s, real wages for everybody rose substantially. Redistribution
was not achieved at the expense of declining real wages for some occu
pation or educational group, as is the case recently: rising inequality in
the past 20 years has occurred against a backdrop of stagnant or barely
rising real wages for the average worker. The increased dispersal of
wages around the average implies that some groups have gained pur
chasing power in absolute terms, while others have lost absolutely.
From a political economy perspective, redistribution is less a "prob
lem" when living standards are generally rising than when they are not.
Although their relative significance is a matter of debate, the fac
tors behind the Great Compression are not difficult to identify. Some
portion of the Compression occurred early in the decade as a direct
result of wartime shifts in labor demand and of government regulation
of the wartime economy. Various bits of data suggest that the indus
tries that expanded output during World War II were disproportionately
employers of less-skilled and less-educated labor. Federal government
policy also played a role. The National War Labor Board (NWLB),
established in 1942, was responsible for approving all wage increases.
Given the volume of cases under its purview, the NWLB reached deci
sions using various rules of thumb, several of which undeniably com
pressed the wage structure at its left tail. 3
World War II eventually ended and the NWLB went out of busi
ness. With respect to the immediate postwar period, three factors main
taining wage compression were an unexpectedly large increase in the
relative supply of educated workers (partly a consequence of the GI Bill
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of Rights, which subsidized college attendance by veterans); increases
in the level and coverage of the federal minimum wage; and a robust
union movement. Only the latter two factors can be traced to the Great
Depression: the federal minimum wage was first enacted in the 1930s,
and the Wagner Act enhanced the ability of unions to organize.
The Great Compression was not to last much past 1950. By the
early 1950s, there is evidence of a shift in relative demand towards bet
ter-educated workers. By 1960, the Great Compression had been
partly reversed, evidently because the increase in relative supply of
educated labor in the 1950s simply did not keep pace with the increase
in relative demand. Still, the wage distribution on the eve of the
Kennedy administration was far more equal than it had been 30 years
earlier or than it would become a quarter century later.

SELF-EMPLOYMENT IN THE 1930s

All of the research I have reviewed thus far is of the published vari
ety. I would like to take a few moments to talk about some work in
progress involving self-employment in the 1930s.
One of Herbert Hoover's more infamous quotes concerned the
unemployed. In the early 1930s, Hoover remarked that "[m]any
(unemployed) persons [have] left their jobs for the more profitable one
of selling apples on streetcorners."4 If selling apples was so profitable,
why create make-work government jobs when the unemployed could,
so to speak, do it on their own?
The self-employment option is an interesting one, since it is,
apparently, always available. If the unemployed choose to look for a
job with someone else, as opposed to self-employment, it is hard to
argue that unemployment is "involuntary" because the self-employed
are, by definition, employed. For most of the 20th century, selfemployment was in decline in the United States, although in recent
decades it has been on the upswing. During the recent recession, selfemployment was widely reported on in the press, as downsized manag
ers, frustrated by their lack of success in the conventional job market,
hung shingles outside their bedrooms and called themselves "consult
ants."
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Table 4 shows the aggregate nonfarm self-employment rate in the
United States—that is, the num
ber of self-employed in the non1920
14.5
farm
sector as a fraction of the
13.4
1930
total nonfarm labor force—over
1931
12.7
the 1930s, with 1920 and 1950 as
11.8
1932
benchmarks. It is traditional to
1933
11.5
look at the nonfarm labor force,
1934
11.3
since the great majority of farm
labor
was self-employed and the
1935
11.3
farm labor force has been declin
11.6
1936
ing in proportion for two centu
1937
11.7
ries. Note that the self-employ
11.5
1938
ment rate fell in the early 1930s
1939
11.7
and was otherwise stable during
1940
11.7
the decade. On the basis of the
aggregate data, it does not appear
1950
10.9
that
self-employment was much
SOURCE: Lebergott (1964, Tables A-3
of an option at all for the unem
and A-4).
ployed.
However, the aggregate self-employment rate is a function of an
entry "hazard" rate and an exit "hazard" rate. The entry hazard is the
probability of entering self-employment from some other labor market
status, while the exit hazard is the probability of leaving self-employ
ment (the business goes bust, for example). These flows could have
been rather substantial and yet the aggregate self-employment rate
quite stable.
Table 5 provides some preliminary evidence on the flow into selfemployment. It is based on the 1940 PUMS: the sample consists of nonfarm adult men, ages 30^-9, who did no work (for pay or profit) in 1939
but who were in the labor force in March of 1940 (there are a few other
restrictions on the sample). The table shows what these men were doing
during the census week, one possibility being self-employment. Not
very surprisingly, the majority were unemployed as of the census date.
As already suggested, flows into work relief were relatively small. The
big surprise is the relative importance of self-employment, which cap
tured a bigger share of the flow into employment than wage and salary
Table 4 Aggregate Nonfarm
Self-Employment
Rate ( % )
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Table 5 Self-Employment in the Late 1930s3
i——— N ———\
Self-employment, total

% of total
20.2

443

Proprietors, etc.

227

51.2b

Proprietors in wholesale-retail trade

170

38.4b

Work relief
Nonrelief wage and salary work

137

6.2

366

16.7

Unemployment

1,251

56.9

Total

2,197

SOURCE: 50 percent random sample of the 1940 PUMS.
a Sample consists of males, ages 30-^9 who did no work in 1939 but who were in the
labor force in March of 1940. Farm workers are excluded, as are professionals and
unpaid family labor.
b Percentages among self-employed (e.g., proprietors in wholesale-retail trade account
for 38.4 percent = 170/443, of all self-employed).

work. (I note, in passing, that the absolute percentages would decline if
the sample were expanded to include persons out of the labor force, but
not the relative shares.) Furthermore, fully half of the flow into selfemployment was accounted for by "proprietors" in general, and nearly
40 percent by proprietors in wholesale and retail trade (of which food
dealers were by far the biggest category). Although there is much more
work to be done, clearly it seems that self-employment was an option for
many of the jobless, as Hoover seemed to think.

CONCLUSION
Let me conclude by mentioning a few other topics that I have not
had space to cover. I have skipped over the effects of the Great Depres
sion on women and African Americans, but these were certainly sub
stantial. Claudia Goldin (1990) has demonstrated that "marriage
bars"—employment policies adopted by firms and governments that
restricted job opportunities for married women—became more preva
lent in the 1930s. We know from the work of James Smith (1984; see
also Margo 1990c and Sundstrom 1992) that the Depression derailed
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economic progress for African Americans; the black-to-white income
ratio in 1940 was no higher than in 1930. Other important topics not
addressed concern the impact of the Depression on the subsequent eco
nomic behavior of those who lived through it (such as savings rates and
labor supply at older ages), and the political economy of New Deal
labor legislation.
I have also highlighted the 1940 PUMS in this lecture. There are,
however, many untapped data sources from the 1930s, some of which
refer to individuals, others that shed light on geographic variation in
labor market outcomes, which was also considerable. There is much
still to learn about labor and labor markets in the 1930s and, fortu
nately, a good deal of microeconomic evidence to guide our analysis.

Notes
1. "Out of work" here, as is traditional, counts those with work-relief jobs as unem
ployed. If persons on relief are counted as employed, the percentage falls to 32
percent (see Margo 1991).
2. One (rather far-fetched) argument goes as follows. Suppose that workers rationally
expected that demand for their labor would rise substantially in the late 1930s and
early 1940s with the onset of World War II. Then, more leisure would presumably
be desired early in the 1930s—an intertemporal substitution effect. For the argu
ment to make any sense, one would have to believe that World War II would have
occurred even if the Great Depression had not. Alternatively, if one believes that
real interest rates were expected to increase in the early 1930s (relative to the rate
of time preference), one could also rationalize an inward shift in labor supply (as
the outcome of a dynamic optimization on the part of workers).
3. For example, employers could raise wages to 40 cents per hour without NWLB
approval; occupational wage "brackets" were established in each region, and
wages could be increased to the lower end of the bracket. Exceptions to wage
controls were frequently granted if the NWLB judged that the employer in ques
tion was previously paying "substandard" wages.
4. Hoover is quoted in Schlesinger, Jr. (1957, p. 241).

References
Baily, Martin N. 1983. "The Labor Market in the 1930s." In Macroeconom
ics, Prices and Quantities, J. Tobin, ed. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, pp. 21-62.

26

Margo

Bernanke, Ben S. 1986. "Employment, Hours, and Earnings in the Depres
sion: An Analysis of Eight Manufacturing Industries." American Economic
Review 76(March): 82-107.
Darby, Michael R. 1976. "Three-and-a-Half Million U.S. Employees Have
Been Mislaid: Or, an Explanation of Unemployment, 1934-1941." Journal
of Political Economy 84(February): 1-16.
Finegan, T. Aldrich, and Robert A. Margo. 1994. "Work Relief and the Labor
Force Participation of Married Women in 1940." Journal of Economic His
tory 54(March): 64-84.
Goldin, Claudia. 1990. Understanding the Gender Gap: An Economic His
tory of American Women. New York: Oxford University Press.
Goldin, Claudia, and Robert A. Margo. 1992. "The Great Compression: The
Wage Structure in the United States at mid-Century." Quarterly Journal of
Economics 107 (February): 1-34.
Jensen, Richard. 1989. "The Causes and Cures of Unemployment in the
Great Depression." Journal of Interdisciplinary History 19(Spring): 553583.
Kesselman, Jonathan R., and N.E. Savin. 1978. "Three-and-a-Half Million
Workers Never Were Lost." Economic Inquiry 16(April): 205—225.
Lebergott, Stanley. 1964. Manpower in Economic Growth. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
———. 1989. "Wage Rigidity" in the Depression: Concept or Phase? Depart
ment of Economics, Wesleyan University, September.
Long, Clarence D. 1958. The Labor Force under Changing Income and
Employment. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Margo, Robert A. 1988. "Interwar Unemployment in the United States: Evi
dence from the 1940 Census Sample." In Interwar Unemployment in Inter
national Perspective, B. Eichengreen and T. Hatton, eds. London: Kluwer,
pp. 325-352.
——. 1990a. "The Incidence and Duration of Unemployment: Some LongTerm Comparisons." Economics Letters 32(March): 217-220.
——. 1990b. "Unemployment in 1910: Some Preliminary Findings." In
Unemployment and Underemployment in Historical Perspective, E. Aerts
and B. Eichengreen, eds. Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press,
pp. 51-60.
——. 1990c. Race and Schooling in the South, 1880-1950: An Economic
History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
——. 1991. "The Microeconomics of Depression Unemployment." Journal
of Economic History 51 (June): 333-341.
——. 1993. "Employment and Unemployment in the 1930s." Journal of
Economic Perspectives 7(Spring): 41-59.

The Economics of the Great Depression

27

O'Brien, Anthony Patrick. 1989. "A Behavioral Explanation for Nominal
Wage Rigidity during the Great Depression." Quarterly Journal of Eco
nomics 104(November): 719-735.
Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur M. 1957. The Crisis of the Old Order. Boston:
Houghton-Mifflin.

Smith, James. 1984. "Race and Human Capital." American Economic Review
74(September): 685-698.
Sundstrom, William A. 1992. "Last Hired, First Fired? Unemployment and
Urban Black Workers during the Great Depression." Journal of Economic
History 52(June): 415^29.
Temin, Peter. 1990. "Socialism and Wages in the Recovery from the Great
Depression in the United States and Germany." Journal of Economic His
tory 50(June): 297-307.
Weinstein, Michael. 1980. Recovery and Redistribution under the NIRA.
Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Williamson, Jeffrey, and Peter Lindert. 1980. American Inequality: A Macroeconomic History. New York: Academic Press.
Woytinsky, W.S. 1942. Three Aspects of Labor Dynamics. Washington, D.C.:
Social Science Research Council.

2 Uneven Impacts
of the Great Depression
Industries, Regions, and Nations
Carol E. Heim
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

The Great Depression of the 1930s brought hardship and suffering
to many in the United States and in other countries around the world.
The impact of the Great Depression was highly uneven, however.
Although one-quarter of the U.S. labor force was unemployed at the
low point in 1933, those who kept their jobs saw their purchasing
power increase as prices fell. Statistical averages of economic perfor
mance conceal a wide variety of experiences for individuals and firms,
as well as for larger aggregates. 1
In this essay, I examine uneven impacts of the Depression on
industries, regions, and nations. In discussing industries and regions, I
compare the United States and the United Kingdom; in discussing
nations, I examine less-developed economies in Latin America, Africa,
and Asia. Even during the depths of the Depression, some industries
prospered. Regions differed both in the severity of the downturn and in
the speed of recovery from it. Government policies created in response
to the Depression treated geographic areas differently. New concepts
of regions and experiences of regional planning also emerged.
In the United Kingdom, the Depression worsened the difficulties of
problem regions, which were older industrial areas, and policy did little
to help. In the United States, by contrast, government policies had pos
itive (although largely unintended) long-run effects on its major prob
lem region, the low-income, less-developed South. As Wright (1986)
argued, these policies eventually linked the previously isolated south
ern labor market with the national labor market and stimulated devel
opment. In the international sphere, some less-developed nations also
benefited from the Depression, at least in the sense of more rapid
industrialization in the short to medium run. But for these countries, it
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was delinking from a larger economy—the international economy—
rather than linking, that helped. Import substitution increased, and as
countries became delinked, some pursued more independent monetary
and fiscal policies.
My aim here is not to reinterpret the Depression as an unambigu
ously positive historical event. If some industries or regions were
doing better than the national average, that also means some were
doing even worse. What I want to emphasize is that any major eco
nomic change, or policy, affects economic actors and areas differen
tially. Rarely, if ever, does it make sense simply to say that such a
change or policy is good or bad for "the economy" as a whole. Wall
Street often reacts negatively to "good" news of lower unemployment
rates; such rates cause some to fear inflation. Similarly, the question of
whether or not immigration is "good" for the United States does not
have a simple answer. Even an episode as apparently straightforward
as the Great Depression proves to have a complicated mix of effects.

INDUSTRIES
In both the United Kingdom and the United States, some sectors and
industries were much harder hit than others. The United Kingdom saw
industrial production as a whole, as well as the transport and com
munication sector, decline during 1929-1932, but output rose slightly in
services and distribution. Shipbuilding fell by 90 percent, mechanical
engineering by 36 percent, and ferrous and nonferrous metals by
approximately 28 percent, a much steeper decline than the 11 percent
drop for all industry. Above-average declines also occurred in the drink,
vehicles, mining, timber, precision instruments, building, and metal
goods industries. Many of the industries with large declines were cap
ital goods industries and/or were export-sensitive industries. Textiles,
although a major export industry, saw relatively little change during
1929-1932, as did clothing, chemicals, and tobacco. Output actually
increased in paper and printing, leather, food, and gas, water, and elec
tricity, at rates of 5 to 11 percent (Aldcroft 1970, pp. 42, 48-49).
Employment and investment also rose in some industries even during
the worst years of the Depression (Beck 1951; Feinstein 1965).
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From the perspective of business firms, profitability is a key indica
tor of health and is essential for long-run survival. As with output,
employment, and investment, profitability during the Depression var
ied widely among industries. Twenty-one of 78 trade groups had prof
its in 1932 that were equal to or greater than their profits in 1927, and
in 4, profits fell less than 10 percent. The largest percentage increases
were in telephones, grain milling, and electricity; profits in public
amusements rose 24 percent. At the other extreme, in six trade groups
profits fell more than 60 percent. For half of the trade groups, the drop
was 20-50 percent (Worswick and Tipping 1967, pp. 64-68). Esti
mates of annual profit rates for major manufacturing industry groups
also showed wide variation during 1929-1932 (Hart 1968, p. 274).
The Depression hit the United Kingdom against a backdrop of
longer-run decline and expansion of different industries. The major
declining industries were the 19th century export staples of coal, iron
and steel, shipbuilding, and textiles, which were regionally concen
trated in the North and West. These industries already were in diffi
culty in the 1920s as international competition intensified, but many
industry leaders were convinced that their earlier good fortunes would
return. The Depression finally quashed some of those hopes. By 1932,
the Lancashire Industrial Development Council magnanimously
announced that
now that some other countries have taken a part of the respon
sibility for supplying the world with cotton goods, Lancashire
is able to turn with a freer mind to the development of those
other industries which the mighty importance of the cotton
trade tended for a long time to overshadow. (Lancashire Indus
trial Development Council 1932, p. 50)

Expansion was occurring in the inter-war years in a range of "other
industries": new manufacturing industries such as motor vehicles, elec
trical products, and rayon; diverse types of light manufacturing; and
services. The percentage of English households owning a car rose
steadily from 1924-1938, though at a less rapid pace during 1929—
1933 (Bowden and Turner 1993, p. 245). Unfortunately, as we shall
see below, the older industrial regions most in need of these expanding
industries in the 1930s were not very successful in attracting them.
The Lancashire textile region did better than the heavy industrial
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regions in Wales, Scotland, and northern England, partly because Lan
cashire contained the second largest center of population and purchas
ing power in England (Manchester/Liverpool).
Electricity is a good example of an industry that could thrive in the
midst of depression. Output in the electrical engineering industry
(including supply) dipped slightly in 1931, but mainly due to exports;
growth in the home market was rapid (Catterall 1979, p. 253). Invest
ment in electricity supply peaked in 1932, with expansion due to strong
industrial and consumer demand and to technical economies leading to
lower charges. Heavy capital outlays were needed in part because of
deficiencies in electricity supply resulting from earlier delays and diffi
culties (Feinstein 1965, p. 46). Consumer demand for new electrical
appliances such as cookers, irons, vacuum cleaners, wash-boilers,
washing machines, refrigerators, and radios remained strong in the
1930s (Aldcroft 1970, p. 195).
It was somewhat paradoxical that the growth of demand and output
for electrical consumer durables should be so strong when unemploy
ment was so high. In noting the paradox, Catterall (1979, p. 272)
described the inter-war period as "years in which Britain began to enter
Rostow's 'Age of High Mass Consumption' in the midst of an age of
mass unemployment." George Orwell had observed in 1937 that the
consumption of cheap luxuries, particularly movies and mass-pro
duced clothes, increased during depression.
You may have three halfpence in your pocket and not a pros
pect in the world, and only the corner of a leaky bedroom to go
home to; but in your new clothes you can stand on the street
corner, indulging in a private daydream of yourself as Clark
Gable or Greta Garbo, which compensates you for a great deal.
(Orwell 1958, p. 88)

Gambling, "the cheapest of all luxuries," rose almost to the status of a
major industry. Many were underfed, but everyone in England had
access to a radio. Orwell concluded (p. 90) that "it is quite likely that
fish and chips, art-silk stockings, tinned salmon, cut-price chocolate
(five two-ounce bars for sixpence), the movies, the radio, strong tea
and the Football Pools have between them averted revolution."
Recovery came more quickly in the United Kingdom than in the
United States, where the Depression dragged on through the 1930s.
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Bernstein (1987) sought to explain the delayed recovery in the United
States by examining varying experiences of different industries.
Focusing on manufacturing, he argued that delay was due to a combi
nation of financial disruption and long-run trends in the structure of
consumption and production. Dynamic industries could be found even
in the worst years of the Depression, but taken together they were not
yet large enough in the national economy to pull it into recovery.
Szostak (1995) made a similar argument, claiming that there were too
few growing industries. He emphasized the problem of market satura
tion and the lack of new product technology in the late 1920s and early
1930s. Szostak's study included nonmanufacturing; government was
the only major sector to show an employment increase even during
1929-1933.2
While most manufacturing industries lost employment, the bever
ages sector did show an increase in employment during 1929-1933, as
did rayon, buttons, corsets, and several industries in the foods sector
(Fabricant 1942, pp. 264-332). Physical output rose in beet sugar, but
ter, cane sugar, chocolate, liquors (distilled, malt, and vinous), malt,
corsets, knit outerwear, rayon, collapsible tubes, and mechanical
refrigerators. By 1935 it also had risen in radios, washing and ironing
machines, and a variety of other industries (Fabricant 1940, pp. 382602).
Throughout the 1930s, the food, leather, petroleum, and tobacco
products sectors were relatively "depression-proof." Innovations in
canning had become operational, and during the Depression house
holds favored canned foods for their low prices and high nutritional
value. The cigarette industry soared after a slight drop in 1932 (Bern
stein 1987, pp. 53, 61-63, 70-72). Other individual industries also
showed increases in output and employment (Fabricant 1940, pp. 382602; Fabricant 1942, pp. 123-128, 264-332). Consumer credit facili
tated purchases of consumer durables, as it did in the United Kingdom.
Many households, however, cut back on purchases of consumer dura
bles during the Depression (Olney 1991; Bowden and Turner 1993;
Bowden and Offer 1994).
The aggregate net income of U.S. corporations declined drastically
from 1929 to 1932 but, as in the United Kingdom, not all businesses
suffered losses. In 1932, very large U.S. corporations still were mak
ing profits. Among seven broad industry groups, all were profitable in
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1929 and 1930 except trade. But by 1931 and 1932, only public utili
ties and transportation had positive profits; that group was joined by
manufacturing in 1933. Within manufacturing, profit rates varied
widely. Even in 1932, three manufacturing subgroups were profitable:
tobacco products (13.1 percent), chemicals and allied products (0.4
percent), and foods and beverages (0.3 percent). At the other extreme
were forest products (-10.3 percent), textiles and products (-8.0 per
cent), and leather and products (-6.6 percent) (Fabricant 1935, pp. 3—4;
Crum 1939, pp. 17, 45).
In both the United Kingdom and the United States, then, there
were industries that were expanding and profitable during the worst
years of the Depression, and there were even more such industries later
in the 1930s. Changes in long-run patterns of consumption favored
some of the same industries in both countries. There also were impor
tant differences. Building, for example, played a much more positive
role in the United Kingdom than in the United States, where employ
ment by construction contractors fell by 50 percent between 1928 and
1933 (Jaeger 1972, p. 139). Traditional light manufacturing industries
that were adopting mass production methods somewhat later than in
the United States were also expanding rapidly in the United Kingdom
during the 1930s.

REGIONS
In the case of the United Kingdom, a focus on industries in the
1930s leads naturally into a discussion of regions. Many regions were
highly specialized, and the fortunes of their leading industries were
important determinants of their economic performance and welfare
(Hatton 1986). This link was less close in the United States (and also
less close in the United Kingdom later in the 20th century). In this sec
tion I examine short- and long-run impacts of the Depression on
regions in both countries.
While both countries had problem regions, these were of different
types. Problem regions in the United Kingdom—older industrial
regions—were not helped significantly by the Depression or by eco
nomic policies of the 1930s. In the United States, the Depression ulti-
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mately did improve the economic position of its main problem
region—the low-income South. However, this was an unintended
long-run result of New Deal policies; in the short run, such policies
favored the richer regions.
The 19th century export industries in the United Kingdom had
concentrated in northern and western regions. Coal, iron and steel
products, and shipbuilding were found in South Wales, Mid-Scotland,
Northumberland and Durham, and West Cumberland. The cotton tex
tile industry clustered in Lancashire. These regions already were
declining in the 1920s, and the Depression hit them especially hard.
The unemployment rate in Jarrow, a northeastern shipbuilding town,
was over 80 percent in 1932-1933 (Wilkinson 1939, p. 192). As we
saw above, there were expanding industries and services in the United
Kingdom in the 1930s, but they did not locate primarily in these older
industrial regions. Instead, they concentrated in the South and Mid
lands, which were relatively prosperous throughout the inter-war years.
One might expect that unemployment would lower wages and
attract new industry to depressed regions. Recent research suggests
that local wages do influence business location (Bartik 1991, pp. 4952). However, depressed industrial regions might be unattractive to
business for other reasons even if wages did fall. Historically,
resources (especially labor) often were not reallocated from old to new
uses within a region. Instead, old resources remained unused, and
growing industries incorporated new resources, often in new locations.
In the United Kingdom, employers expressed a clear preference in the
1930s for labor without previous employment experience (Great Brit
ain, Royal Commission on the Geographical Distribution of the Indus
trial Population 1937-39, p. 504).
Many of the expanding industries hired large numbers of young
persons and women, rather than the older men being displaced from
coal, iron and steel, and shipbuilding. Expanding industries also
sought proximity to the market and concentrated in the South (near
London). Young persons and women were readily available there
(Heim 1984b). Norman Tebbit, Minister of Employment in the
Thatcher government, observed in 1981 (a time of high unemploy
ment) that during the 1930s, his father "got on his bike and looked for
work" (Tebbit 1988, p. 187). But even if they had headed for the South
in the 1930s, many of the unemployed would not have been hired.
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During a time of general depression, there was little need to look to
the older industrial areas for labor. Moreover, even if macroeconomic
policy had succeeded in lowering unemployment and tightening labor
markets in prosperous areas in the 1930s, organizational structures of
firms in the South and Midlands were not yet sufficiently developed to
manage distant branch plants in northern and western regions (Heim
1983). (By the 1960s this pattern had emerged, and in the 1980s Japa
nese firms investing in the United Kingdom located branch plants in
northern and western regions, as well as in the new towns. Despite the
availability of unemployed workers in the older regions, new labor
often was hired instead. Workers without a history of trade union
activism were preferred, and Japanese firms insisted upon a nonadversarial role for unions when they did accept them [Oliver and Wilkinson
1992, pp. 46, 186, 226, 247, 278-280].)3
The United Kingdom did not succeed in devising effective regional
policy during the 1930s. After short-lived efforts to transfer workers
out of depressed regions, programs were established to finance new
industries there. The Bank of England, however, disliked these initia
tives and sought to keep them just large enough to forestall more farreaching government intervention on behalf of the depressed regions
(Heim 1984a). Compared with governments in many other countries,
however, inter-war U.K. governments were not highly interventionist
on a regional or national scale. While limited public works spending
was undertaken, and there were some efforts to stimulate rationaliza
tion and elimination of excess capacity in older industries, there was no
equivalent to the U.S. New Deal with its wide range of spending and
regulatory policies (Garside 1990).
U.K. macroeconomic policies since World War I had been oriented
more toward defending the pound, protecting the gold standard, and
limiting Treasury spending, rather than toward promoting domestic
industry (Lewis 1949; Eichengreen 1992). What finally helped the
declining regions in the late 1930s was rearmament and war, which
increased employment in older industries such as iron and steel, coal,
and shipbuilding (Thomas 1983). However, longer-run effects of the
war and postwar military spending favored other regions. Research
and development facilities in the research-intensive industries stimu
lated by the war, such as electronics, chemicals, and aircraft, tended to
locate in the South near London (Heim 1987).
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As a consequence of the Depression itself and the lack of effective
policy response, unemployment differentials among regions in the
United Kingdom widened. Taking the two extremes, in 1929 the
unemployment rate in Wales was 18.2 percent, and in London and the
South East, 4.5 percent. The difference between these two regions
peaked in 1933, when unemployment was 34.1 percent in Wales and
10.7 percent in London and the South East. For Inner Regions (the
South and Midlands) versus Outer Regions (Northern England, Wales,
Scotland, and Northern Ireland), the difference in unemployment rates
widened from 1929-1931, dropped slightly in 1932 and was fairly
steady to 1935, then dropped further to 1937. It widened again with
the 1938 recession, before dropping in the war boom to about the same
gap as in 1929 (Beck 1951, Table 18 and p. 36; see also Garside 1990,
p. 10).<
Recession in the 1970s and 1980s similarly increased unemploy
ment differences among regions in the United Kingdom (Martin 1989,
pp. 31-34; Champion and Townsend 1990, pp. 131-132). Gaps also
widened in per capita gross domestic product (GDP) between 1975 and
1986. The South East, East Anglia, and the South West all saw their
per capita GDP rise relative to the U.K. average, whereas that ratio fell
for northern and western regions, and also for the West Midlands auto
mobile region, which had become a declining rather than a prosperous
region (Martin 1989, p. 40). This experience was shared by European
regions generally: disparities in GDP per head widened slightly during
the slow growth years in the first half of the 1980s, before narrowing in
the second half of the decade and leveling off at the beginning of the
1990s (European Commission 1994, p. 37).
Did depression and recession lead to divergence (greater inequal
ity) of per capita incomes in the United States? At the state level, the
evidence is somewhat mixed. Divergence among states, measured by
the standard deviation of the log of per capita income for states, or by
the coefficient of variation of state per capita income, increased both
during prosperous years of the 1920s and in the first years of the
Depression (through 1932). The remainder of the 1930s saw conver
gence, which continued until 1978. Divergence occurred again from
1978-1988, after which convergence resumed (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1991; Wheelock and Coughlin 1993; Sherwood-Call 1996). (Note
that the 1920s and 1980s, when geographic disparities widened, also
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were times of increases in other kinds of inequality, such as income
distribution.)
Unlike what happened in the United Kingdom, in the United States
in the 1930s the main problem region improved its position relative to
other parts of the country. This region was the low-income, less-indus
trialized South, a very different type of region from the older industrial
regions of the United Kingdom. Although Franklin D. Roosevelt still
could refer to the South in 1938 as the nation's number one economic
problem (Schulman 1991, p. 3), the Southeast's share of total personal
income rose from 11.15 percent in 1930 to 13.23 percent in 1940, and
the Southwest's share rose from 4.75 to 5.21 percent (Perloff et al.
1960, p. 274). 5 Installed horsepower increased most rapidly in the
Southeast and Southwest during 1929-1939, in the latter case at more
than twice the national rate (Wardwell 1951, p. 91). Throughout the
nation nominal per capita incomes fell in this decade, but the total per
centage change during 1929-1939 was lower in the Southeast than in
any other region and was also low in the Southwest (U.S. Department
of Commerce 1995, p. 11). The South's relative improvement was
even stronger in the 1940s.
The sharpest drops in real per capita income during 1929-1933
were in the Northwest, Central, and Far West regions; the smallest drop
was in New England. The Southeast and Southwest regions, where
income fell by 24 and 29 percent, did well compared with the U.S.
average of 28 percent. The 10 states with the smallest income declines
(12 to 23 percent) were North Carolina, South Carolina, New Hamp
shire, Maine, Virginia, Rhode Island, Georgia, Maryland, Massachu
setts, and Connecticut; the District of Columbia saw an 18 percent drop
(Hurwitz and Stallings 1957, pp. 248-249).6
The employment picture for southern regions also was positive.
The total employment index for the South Atlantic region was the best
in the nation in 1933 at 88.3, when national employment stood at 78.4.
The worst-off region in that year was East North Central at 69.5. The
other southern regions, East South Central and West South Central,
were below the national average in 1933, but along with the South
Atlantic region made a very strong recovery later in the 1930s (Wallis
1989, pp. 53, 56-64).
Some regional and local differences in income and employment
were rooted in industrial structure, though it may have been less impor-
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tant than in the United Kingdom. In 1939, Fortune magazine reported
being told in Houston, home to a booming oil industry, that "this is the
city that never knew the depression" ("Texas" 1939, p. 87). Tobacco
manufacture, an industry discussed above as one of the most prosper
ous throughout the Depression, helps to explain the performance of
some southern states. California benefited from motion pictures, citrus
fruit, and later airplanes, while mountain states declined along with the
mining and lumber industries (Szostak 1995, p. 307).
Wallis (1989) argued that the South's strong performance during
the Depression cannot be fully explained by the industrial composition
of employment. It did not simply result from the South having its
employment concentrated in industries that saw relatively small
employment declines during the Depression. Nor were certain institu
tional changes associated with the New Deal (the Social Security and
National Labor Relations Acts) primarily responsible. He concluded
(p. 62) that "regional differences remain an important and unexplained
part of the employment experience."
In their working paper on manufacturing employment change dur
ing 1929-1937, Rosenbloom and Sundstrom (1997) sought to control
for both industry and region. They argued that industry effects were
important in some regions, especially during 1929-1933. For exam
ple, the East South Central, Pacific, and Mountain regions, which had
heavy concentrations of manufacturing employment in the lumber
products industry, were hit hard when construction collapsed. Simi
larly, the automobile industry had a negative impact in the East North
Central region. But Rosenbloom and Sundstrom argued that region,
rather than industry, effects were primarily responsible for the rela
tively good performance of the South Atlantic and West South Central
regions during 1929-1937. Their view was that in these regions,
strong regional trends in manufacturing employment growth overcame
negative industry composition effects. More research remains to be
done to clarify the reasons for the relatively favorable performance of
southern regions during the Depression.
Might the New Deal have benefited the South in other ways
besides the changes associated with the Social Security and National
Labor Relations Acts? Earlier research showed that, at least in the short
run, southern states were not disproportionately favored by New Deal
spending. Despite the aim of reform (which might be taken to include
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the raising of incomes in the poorest states), New Deal expenditures
per capita were highest in wealthy western states (Arrington 1969).
Relief and recovery, a restoration of income to (unequal) pre-Depres
sion levels, and improvement of national assets such as land and high
way systems, appear to have been primary motives. Expenditures
favored states with the sharpest drops in per capita income during
1929-1933 (Reading 1973).
Wright (1974) concluded that southern states received less New
Deal spending because they were perceived to be safely in the Demo
cratic camp, whereas western states had exhibited much more
variability in their voting behavior. Spending patterns of the New
Deal did succeed in affecting the vote. Subsequent tests by Wallis
(1987, 1998) confirmed the importance of both economic and politi
cal factors for the distribution of spending. Demand-side as well as
supply-side considerations mattered: southern (and New England)
states were less receptive than western states to federal programs
(Reading 1973, pp. 804-805). The southern states were concerned
about the potential threat to low wages and labor discipline (Wright
1986, p. 260). They also may have feared that unwelcome interven
tion (for example, on policies relating to racial matters) would accom
pany the funds.
The New Deal did create bodies that advanced notions of regional
administration and planning, and ideas of a "new regionalism" (as
opposed to the "old sectionalism") flourished in the 1930s. One part of
the South—the Tennessee River basin—was a major site of such initia
tives. Created in 1933, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was a
government agency with many attributes of a private corporation.
Working with seven state governments and many more local ones, it
embarked on the nation's first comprehensive regional development
program (Wecter 1975, pp. 154-177).
TVA had broad powers in navigation and flood control, hydroelec
tric power generation, land-use planning, and reforestation. It was
highly successful for its first 20 years. After the 1950s, criticism
mounted as socioeconomic gains slowed and TVA shifted from dams
to strip-mined (and nonunion) coal and nuclear power, leading to con
cerns about environmental degradation. Much of the Tennessee River
basin was still poor enough to be included in the Appalachian Regional
Commission region in the 1960s (Raitz and Ulack 1984, pp. 347-349).
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Even if New Deal expenditures did not favor southern states gener
ally, the long-run impact of New Deal policies promoted southern
industrialization. Wright argued in Old South, New South (1986) that
two policies adopted during the Depression ultimately ended the isola
tion of the southern labor market and linked it with the national labor
market. When the South experienced severe dislocation, unemploy
ment, and underemployment as a result of these policies, its leaders
began to welcome capital and people from outside that would help to
develop the region. The policies that set this process in motion were
New Deal agricultural policies and minimum wage legislation.
Agricultural policies created incentives for landowners to elimi
nate sharecropping, the system of farm production in the South that
involved working on an owner's land and dividing the crop with the
owner. Under the New Deal, landowners received payments for limit
ing their production of agricultural goods; the hope was to increase
prices of those products and thus farmers' incomes. However, if a
landowner had sharecroppers or other tenants, the payments had to be
shared with them. As a result, many landowners decided to dispense
with their sharecroppers and other tenants and hire wage-labor instead.
Displaced sharecroppers migrated to northern cities in large numbers
in the 1940s and 1950s, when mechanization also reduced the need for
labor on farms.
Minimum wage legislation, which applied in all states, also
brought the South into a unified national labor market. The immediate
impact of federal policies on southern blacks was negative. But the
combined effect of these policies, and the resulting migration flows,
was
the final disappearance of the plantation regime . . . Having lit
tle of the old low-wage economy to protect, southern property
owners opened their doors wholeheartedly to outside flows of
capital, government funding, and highly paid labor. (Wright
1986, p. 15)

Initially they pressed for the South's "fair share" of military spend
ing in the 1940s. The East South Central and West South Central
regions did receive a larger share of wartime manufacturing facilities
than their share of pre-war facilities, although the textile states of the
South Atlantic region did not fare as well (U.S. War Production Board
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1945, p. 36). Industrial development promotions exploded after the
war, and especially after 1950 (Wright 1986, pp. 257-264). The South
also benefited from spending on highways and from the federal home
mortgage loan programs that had originated in 1933 and that stimu
lated city- and suburb-building after World War II. By 1990, per capita
incomes in the South still were below the national average, but consid
erable progress had been made toward closing the gap (Heim, forth
coming).
In the United States, then, unlike the United Kingdom, policies
adopted in response to the Depression did have a positive long-run
impact on economic performance in the nation's problem region. The
problem regions were of different types: in the United States, a lowincome agricultural area, and in the United Kingdom, older industrial
areas. The U.S. West, a less-developed region—although not one per
ceived as a problem region—also saw its development hastened by the
water projects of the 1930s. The policies adopted in the United States
(with the exception of the TVA programs) did not have as their explicit
goal the development of lagging or newer regions. Nonetheless, in the
case of the South, the linkage with national labor markets that resulted
from New Deal agricultural and minimum wage policies did ultimately
promote industrialization.

NATIONS
A fascinating contrast is presented by certain less-developed
nations during the Depression and subsequent decades. Their industri
alization also accelerated, but as a result of delinking from a larger
economy—in this case, the international economy—rather than
becoming more closely linked with it. During the Depression, export
earnings for many countries dried up, and capital inflows from moredeveloped countries such as the United States were curtailed drasti
cally. In parts of Latin America, Africa, and Asia (as, well as in some
Scandinavian and Eastern European countries, and in Australia),
emphasis shifted away from exports of primary products (such as agri
cultural products and minerals) and toward more import-substituting
production of manufactured goods.
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The idea that the Depression had promoted industrialization in
Latin America was advanced by structuralists (Prebisch 1962; Furtado
1963), writers in the dependency school (Frank 1967), and others (Lee
1969; Diaz Alejandro 1970; Fishlow 1972; Thorp 1984). Diaz Alejandro (1984) provided a useful survey of the issues. The international
shocks of the Depression pushed countries in Latin America toward
policy experimentation. Some countries were questioning the "rules of
the game" as early as 1930. Commitments to the gold standard and to
balancing national budgets were no longer seen as a necessary or desir
able means of attempting to ensure national prosperity. The gold stan
dard regime of the 19th and early 20th centuries had always worked
less well as a stabilizing force for the periphery of the world economy,
including Latin America, than it had for the more-developed countries
of the center. Defending the gold standard became even less a priority
under the pressures of the Depression (Eichengreen 1992, pp. 54-65).
Being delinked from the world economy, and from institutions
such as the gold standard, allowed a different set of domestic policies
to be pursued that were favorable to industrialization. Not all countries
were able to take this path. Diaz Alejandro suggested that among Latin
American republics with nominal sovereignty, largeness (as in the case
of Brazil) and a relatively autonomous public sector (as in Costa Rica
or Uruguay) led to more favorable performance. Smaller countries
such as Honduras and highly dependent governments such as Cuba
were less able to experiment with unorthodox policies. He noted that
"paradoxically, some clear-cut colonies in the Caribbean appear to
have performed better than Cuba or the Dominican Republic" (Diaz
Alejandro 1984, p. 18).
What were these policies? They included balance-of-payment pol
icies, monetary and fiscal policies, and other policies promoting struc
tural change and reform. As export values fell and capital inflows
turned negative, gold and foreign exchange flowed out of Latin Ameri
can countries. Some responded by abandoning the effort to maintain
the gold parities of the gold-exchange standard, thereby avoiding the
difficult deflationary process that was part of the classical adjustment
mechanism. Instead they devalued their exchange rates. By 19301934, real import-exchange rates with respect to the dollar had depreci
ated between 30 and 90 percent, as compared to 1925-1929, in seven
Latin American countries (Diaz Alejandro 1984, pp. 22-26).
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Imports also were discouraged by higher tariffs and by quantitative
restrictions, such as import or exchange controls. Several countries
(Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Brazil, and Cuba) used delinquency on
their international debt payments to alleviate balance-of-payments dif
ficulties (Maddison 1985, pp. 23-32). U.S. tolerance of partial or total
defaults by Brazil contrasted with British insistence on repayment by
both Brazil and Argentina. This tolerance was especially important for
Brazil, which had a more binding foreign-exchange constraint than
Argentina in the 1930s (Abreu 1984, pp. 150-152). Other outward
flows were limited by Latin American authorities: importers seeking to
settle their short-term debts, and foreign companies wanting to remit
profits abroad, had to wait to obtain the necessary foreign exchange
(Dfaz Alejandro 1984, p. 27).
Latin American countries also had serious debt problems in the
1980s, following the difficult years in the world economy after 1973
and the recession of 1980-1982. Again, many debts were rescheduled.
In this debt crisis, unlike that of the 1930s, the International Monetary
Fund acted as a "system manager," providing emergency credit and
pressuring other creditors into helping. But it also imposed strict con
ditions on domestic policy, including budgetary restrictions and other
deflationary measures that increased unemployment (Maddison 1985,
pp. 45-66).
In the 1930s, Latin American governments could, and did, engage
in more expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. The policies gener
ally were not motivated by a conscious and deliberate program, but
together they contributed to the maintenance of aggregate demand.
Real money supplies increased in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, and Uruguay. Central banks found creative ways to issue
domestic currency and increase credit in their economies. Banks gen
erally were not allowed to fail, in sharp contrast to the situation in the
United States (Diaz Alejandro 1984, pp. 29-31). Increases in the
money supply were facilitated by greater leniency in terms of bank
reserves (Twomey 1983, p. 243).
Similarly, fiscal policy helped to maintain aggregate demand.
Brazil's policy after 1932 was deliberately expansionary, with
planned deficits resulting from conscious additional expenditure.
Government support for the coffee sector, through export taxes and
acquisition of coffee, also helped to hold up that sector's income
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(Fishlow 1972, pp. 328-330). In other countries, despite declara
tions by policymakers that they sought to balance their budgets,
"efforts to reduce the deficit induced by the decline in foreign trade
and output were tempered by either common sense or the sheer
inability to cut expenditures and raise taxes fast enough" (Diaz Alejandro 1984, p. 34). Regional or local governments sometimes took
the lead in expansionary fiscal policies, as in Colombia where the role
of central government was smaller than elsewhere in Latin America
(Maddison 1985, pp. 28-29).
Finally, Latin American governments also engaged in other struc
tural and reform policies that included wage flexibility and moderation,
land reform, price regulation for rural products and public utilities,
strengthening of credit institutions, and large public works programs
(Diaz Alejandro 1984, pp. 36-37). In Mexico, for example, agrarian
reform hastened a transfer of resources to the modern sector by
increasing uncertainty about returns to investment in agriculture. Pub
lic outlays for road construction reduced transport costs and enlarged
the available market (Cardenas 1984, p. 233).
The outcome of this policy experimentation was growth rates of
gross domestic product (GDP) during 1929-1939 that were steadier
and higher for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico than for the
United States and Canada. (Since population grew more rapidly in
Latin America, the disparity in real per capita income growth was not
as great.) More impressive than the growth rates was the extent of
structural change and industrialization. There was substantial move
ment from activities oriented toward export markets to those involving
domestic sales. As import substitution surged, manufacturing grew
much faster than GDP. Manufacturing growth rates during 1929-1939
ranged from over 3 percent per year in Argentina to over 8 percent per
year in Colombia, while remaining near zero in the United States and
Canada (Diaz Alejandro 1984, pp. 38^4).
Africa also provides examples of the Depression stimulating struc
tural change and industrial development. Egypt was hard hit by the fall
in the price of cotton, its major export. The resulting drop in the coun
try's capacity to import created incentives for domestic manufacturing
(Lee 1969, p. 152). By 1939, Egypt was meeting most of its local
demand for simple products such as refined sugar, alcohol, cigarettes,
soap, shoes, cement, and matches (Owen 1989, p. 142). Rather than
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exporting almost all its cotton, Egypt began to use it in its own facto
ries, and investment funds shifted from export-oriented agriculture
toward industry generally (Lee 1969, p. 153).
The Egyptian government protected industry by tariffs, which
were revised after a treaty with Italy expired in 1930. Tariffs were
especially important in blocking textile imports from Japan, India, and
Italy, which were less expensive than products made from Egyptian
cotton. By 1939, textile imports, which were 40 percent of the value of
all imports in 1920, had fallen to 16.5 percent. The government aided
industry in other ways as well, such as purchasing locally made cement
for public construction projects. Industrial growth was not the sole
focus; Egyptian leaders also sought to maintain a high level of cotton
exports (Tignor 1984, pp. 106-146).
Other parts of Africa under colonial control had relatively little of
the independence in setting policy that Diaz Alejandro identified as
being important in successful Latin American cases (though some
colonial powers, particularly the Belgians, were more attuned to the
needs of industry than others). The Depression still had some positive
impacts on industrialization. Clarence-Smith (1989, p. 195) argued
that in the colonies of equatorial and central Africa, the main contribu
tion of the 1930s was the strong signal it provided to private industrial
ists about the potential of the home market and about the types of
industries most suitable for the region.
Industries manufacturing cheap products for the African mass con
sumer market did well even in the worst years of the early 1930s and
fared better than industries producing for European settlers in many
areas. Settler purchasing power fell; many settlers were heavily in debt
and were hurt by deflation. In some places their numbers declined.
Import substitution in the African market proceeded in soap and tex
tiles and in some intermediate goods such as cement. The overall level
of industrialization in equatorial and central Africa did not rise dramat
ically in the 1930s, though the experiences of that decade did help to
lay the groundwork for more rapid growth in Angola in the 1940s
(Clarence-Smith 1989, pp. 170, 188-196). 7
In Asia as well, there was less policy autonomy than in Latin
America during the Depression. Colonies were less able to impose
trade and exchange controls, to engage in expansionary monetary and
fiscal policies that would generate some inflation, or to default on
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debts. As in Africa, some colonial governments were more developmentalist than others. The Japanese practiced what Maddison called
"military developmentalism" in Korea and Taiwan, which included
encouraging some industrialization. Korean heavy industry provided
intermediate products to Japan, and Taiwan produced fertilizers, tex
tiles, metals, and chemicals. The British and Dutch followed more
orthodox policies in their colonies (India, Indonesia), defending over
valued currencies and pursuing deflationary policies (Maddison 1985,
pp. 22, 33^3).
The Depression did, nonetheless, stimulate industrialization in
some parts of India such as Madras, as the terms of trade moved to
favor industry over agriculture and rural moneylenders sought new
avenues for their funds. Investments were made in sugar refineries,
cotton textile mills, cement, and electricity supply, as well as in banks,
insurance companies, and the film industry. Record numbers of joint
stock companies were registered in 1933-1937 (Baker 1978, pp. 238242).
Japan grew very rapidly during the 1930s, and in this case, being
linked to the world economy was crucial. Japanese exports rose by 70
percent between 1929 and 1937, at a time when France, Germany, the
United Kingdom, and the United States all saw their exports fall. But
Japanese export success in this period was based partly on an earlier
phase of delinking and import substitution. During World War I,
developed economies such as Britain were unable to supply manufac
tured goods, and Japan began producing textiles both for the local
market and for other Asian countries. Military spending in the 1930s
also stimulated the growth of Japan's heavy industry (Maddison 1969,
pp. 35-39).
China was at the other end of the spectrum during the Depression
and was perhaps best described as "unlinked" rather than "delinked."
The Chinese economy was so underdeveloped and internally oriented
that it was largely immune to the shocks of the Depression. Myers
(1989, pp. 256-259) summarized data showing that GDP grew in real
terms at 1.55 percent per year during 1931-1936, and growth in manu
facturing was considerably higher, at 2.11 percent. Some industries in
the modern sector outpaced their Western counterparts. Coal produc
tion in modern mines grew at 7.81 percent per year (this figure includes
Manchuria, which had been seized by Japan in 1931-1932). Growth
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also was especially rapid in modern banking, electrical power, and
postal services.
By the mid 1930s, China was engaging in relatively expansionary
monetary and fiscal policies, had increased tariffs, and was continuing
the debt default and readjustment it had begun in the 1920s (Maddison
1985, pp. 33-34). Internal trade boomed, much of the urban sector
flourished, and new consumer goods became available. Rural distress
occurred, but bad harvests were a major cause. Myers (1989, p. 274)
concluded that "China simply did not experience any national eco
nomic depression as the world depression deepened."
The import-substituting industrialization pursued by many lessdeveloped countries during the Depression had its flaws. In Egypt, for
example, locally produced goods were almost invariably more expen
sive than those of foreign producers (Owen 1989, p. 142). But as Mad
dison (1985, p. 23) argued, "In the conditions of the 1930s, the verdict
must be in favor of the import substitution policies, for openness to the
world economy of the type Cuba was compelled to follow meant largescale unemployment of productive resources." He quickly went on to
assert that in the longer run these measures, which continued in the
1940s and 1950s, were a hindrance to growth.
By the 1970s, many critics were pointing to undesirable effects of
import substitution policies and associated protectionist measures.
They cited price distortions, resource misallocation, lack of competi
tion in the industrial sector, and an anti-export bias. Movement away
from inward-looking policies, initiated by Brazil, had begun in the
1960s. Other countries followed in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly
following the second oil shock and the debt crisis (Corbo 1992). Longlasting negative impacts on growth from some of the inward-looking
policies first adopted during the Depression recently were estimated by
Taylor (1998). However, when comparing countries in Latin Amer
ica's Southern Cone (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay)
with other Latin American countries, Taylor (1996) noted that the "big
push" into manufacturing also may have generated dynamic externali
ties with long-run benefits for at least some parts of Latin America. 8-9
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CONCLUSION
Like most episodes in economic history, the Depression of the
1930s had winners and losers. In both the United States and the United
Kingdom, certain industries flourished. Some of these industries pro
duced the cheap luxuries that made the Depression more tolerable for
those at the bottom of the income scale, as well as other new consumer
goods (such as electrical appliances) whose use continued to grow
even during these years of economic difficulty. However, while there
were growth industries in both countries in the 1930s, these industries
did not necessarily locate in the regions that most needed them. This
was especially true in the United Kingdom, where expanding indus
tries and services concentrated in the prosperous South and Midlands
rather than in the older industrial areas of the North and West.
In the United States, it was the South—a poor, less-developed
region—that had been the main problem region. The South was hit
less hard than other U.S. regions by the Depression and recovered
more quickly, for reasons that still are not fully understood. Short-run
impacts of the New Deal were not responsible. New Deal spending
went disproportionately to wealthy western states, where voting pat
terns were less reliably Democratic than those of the South and where
there had been especially sharp drops in income in 1929-1933. But in
the longer run, New Deal agricultural and minimum wage policies
broke down the isolation of the southern labor market and linked it to
the national labor market. Without the remains of a plantation econ
omy to protect, the South became more open to economic develop
ment, especially after 1950.
Elsewhere in the world, the Depression of the 1930s had more
immediate effects in stimulating industrialization. In these cases
delinking, rather than linking, was what helped. As their export reve
nues fell and capital inflows dried up, less-developed countries found
themselves less able to import. Several of the larger, more independent
countries in Latin America began experimenting with unorthodox,
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies that cushioned the effects of
the Depression. They also instituted policies that encouraged more
domestic manufacturing. There was less scope for this response in
Africa and Asia, where colonial control remained stronger. Egypt did
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follow a similar path of import substitution, and the Depression also
created new awareness of the potential of African consumer markets in
equatorial and central Africa.
It is interesting to speculate as to why, for the U.S. South, the
Depression had positive effects through linking the South with a larger
economy, whereas for less-developed countries it was delinking that
proved beneficial. Delinking, of course, is not usually an option for
regions in the same sense as for nations, although Jane Jacobs (1984)
did argue that if it were possible there would be advantages to cities
and their regions becoming independent sovereignties, issuing their
own currencies and conducting their own policies. Perhaps part of the
reason for the difference between the U.S. South and less-developed
countries is that it was labor markets that were linked in the U.S. case.
Is linking labor markets more beneficial than linking product and capi
tal markets? Would less-developed countries have been better off in
the 1930s and later decades if international barriers to migration had
not been erected in the 1920s and more migration to richer countries
had been possible (similar to the migration of displaced sharecroppers
to the U.S. North)?
International labor markets were more linked, and migration wide
spread, in the earlier period from 1870-1914. A group of scholars has
argued that certain European areas with large outmigrations (Ireland,
Sweden, and Italy) were better off as a result; the departure of the mov
ers raised wages, reduced unemployment, and eroded poverty at home
(Boyer, Hatton, and O'Rourke, 1994; O'Rourke and Williamson, 1995;
Williamson 1996; Taylor and Williamson 1997). However, southern
Italy remained a less-developed region in the later 20th century. There
also may be difficulties in applying these arguments to less-developed
countries with very large populations, such as China or India.
Moreover, the U.S. South benefited from the outflow of labor
partly because what followed were inflows of capital and skills. Would
many less-developed nations or regions in the 1930s and later decades
have seen similar inflows, on terms that would be beneficial to devel
opment, if their labor markets were more linked to international ones?
And did they have institutional and political structures that would have
allowed them to use such inflows effectively?
The timing of the linking or delinking also may be important for
either regions or nations. Although stimulated by Depression-era poli-
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cies, the actual linking of the U.S. South with the national economy
came during the prosperous 1940s and 1950s. Clearly there are many
questions that remain to be answered. My hope is that this consider
ation of the uneven impacts of the Great Depression on industries,
regions, and nations will have illustrated the complexity of that experi
ence and will stimulate further thought about its consequences.

Notes
I thank Michael Bernstein, Carmen Diana Deere, Michael Edelstein, Susan Helper,
Jane Humphries, Leonce Ndikumana, John Wallis, Jeffrey Williamson, and Gavin
Wright for helpful discussions and suggestions for sources of information for this
chapter. The chapter was revised slightly before publication to incorporate papers that
were not available when it was presented in the public lecture series on which this book
is based.
1. For individuals, experiences differed by race, age, gender, and other dimensions
(Eichengreen and Hatton 1988, pp. 29-35 in the editors' introduction and chap
ters by individual authors; Szostak 1995, pp. 308-309). See Bresnahan and Raff
(1991) on differences among U.S. firms in the motor vehicles industry during the
Depression.
2. On the debate over the role of new industries in pulling the United Kingdom out
of depression, see Buxton (1975) and von Tunzelmann (1982).
3. There is evidence of a preference for greenfield sites and new labor in the recent
location of Japanese auto transplants in the United States. Locations in or near the
Midwest were chosen partly for proximity to other automotive firms and supplier
networks. But the transplants often avoided large, older urban centers and hired
rural workers, some of whom maintained connections to farms (Bingham and
Eberts 1990, pp. 317-320; Mair, Florida, and Kenney 1988; Helper 1991; Kingsolver 1992). For example, Japanese automotive facilities located in the 1980s "in
the exurban counties around Dayton and Columbus" (Blair and Fichtenbaum
1990, p. 152). Smith and Florida (1994) sought to challenge this view, at least for
Japanese-affiliated establishments in auto-related activities such as components,
steel, finishing and processing, and rubber and tire manufacturing (i.e., not auto
assembly establishments). There may be problems in their analysis arising from
correlation between their population and population density variables.
4. Unemployment differentials among regions widened in some other countries as
well. As in the United Kingdom, the absolute gap in unemployment rates
increased by more than the ratio of rates in high- and low-unemployment areas
(see the editors' introduction in Eichengreen and Hatton [1988, pp. 30-31]).
5. U.S. regions are defined differently by different authors. See the appendix for
lists of states included in regions discussed in this paper.
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6. Not all southern states did well. In the Southeast the range was from 12 percent
(North and South Carolina) to 34 percent (Arkansas). In the Southwest it was 27
percent (Texas) to 40 percent (Arizona) (Hurwitz and Stallings 1957, pp. 248249).
7. Interestingly, the food, beverage, and tobacco industries, which were relatively
prosperous in the United States and the United Kingdom, fared rather badly. They
were more closely tied to the settler market (Clarence-Smith 1989, pp. 194-195).
8. The section in Taylor (1996) comparing Latin America's Southern Cone and other
Latin American countries was omitted in Taylor (1998), which focused exclu
sively on the costs of inward-looking policies. The results in Taylor (1996) do,
however, suggest variation in the experience of Latin American countries with
such policies. All experienced costs, but some also may have experienced bene
fits. It stands to reason that the larger Southern Cone countries, which embarked
most strongly upon import-substituting industrialization, would reap the greatest
benefits from the dynamic externalities that a long tradition of writers on eco
nomic growth have emphasized.
9. The question of whether any of the policies pursued by governments of lessdeveloped countries during the Depression would have been appropriate in the
1970s to 1990s is a complicated one that is beyond the scope of this paper. Not all
accept the idea that export-led industrialization was by the 1980s a universally
desirable alternative to approaches maintaining some emphasis on domestic mar
kets, nor do all accept a view of the state as primarily the problem rather than a
part of the solution in less-developed countries. Fishlow (1990) argued that while
more attention to market signals was appropriate, the degree of emphasis on liber
alization and the invisible hand of the market that accompanied debt assistance
plans of the 1980s went too far in denying a positive developmental role for the
state. Earlier he suggested that even the import substitution of the 1930s to 1950s
in Brazil might have suffered from an excessive reliance on the market, as it did
not result in an articulated development bloc (Fishlow 1972, pp. 355-356). See
Shapiro and Taylor (1990) for a survey on the role of the state and different devel
opmental strategies. They noted that some successful export promotion strategies
depended upon a previous phase of import substitution. Maddison (1985) and
Thorp (1984, pp. 13-14) discussed comparisons between the 1930s and the 1970s
and 1980s.

Appendix
Definitions of Selected U.S. Regions
Hurwitz and Stallings (1957)

Central:

Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Ohio, Wisconsin

Far West:

California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington

New England:

Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont

Northwest:

Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming

Southeast:

Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia

Southwest:

Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas

Perloff etal. (1960)

Southeast:

Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia

Southwest:

Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas

Louisiana is included in the Southeast in Perloff et al.'s discussion on p. 274.
Later in the book it is included in the Southwest, due to the growth of the
petroleum industry and oil-using industries in more recent decades.
Rosenbloom and Sundstrom (1997)

U.S. Census Divisions
East North Central:
East South Central:
Mountain:

Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin
Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee
Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming

Pacific:

California, Oregon, Washington (Alaska and Hawaii
were included in this division from 1960 on)

South Atlantic:

Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia,
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia,
West Virginia

West South Central: Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas
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Rosenbloom and Sundstrom (cont.)
In the U.S. Census, the South includes the South Atlantic, East South Central,
and West South Central divisions.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (1995)
Southeast:

Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia

Southwest:

Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas

U.S. War Production Board (1945)
Regions are not defined on pp. 35-36, but appear to be U.S. Census Divisions,
as for Rosenbloom and Sundstrom (1997).
Wallis (1989)
U.S. Census Divisions, as for Rosenbloom and Sundstrom (1997).
Wardwell (1951)
Southeast:

Southwest:
Wright (1986)
South:

Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia
Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas
At most, 11 states: 1) the Deep South states of
Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South
Carolina; 2) broadened by the addition of Arkansas,
North Carolina, and Tennessee; 3) plus the "swing"
states of Florida, Texas, and Virginia, which
sometimes are dropped. For example, for aggregates
such as land-labor ratios, including Texas would cause
problems; for migration, Florida would be the problem
state.
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3 The Great Depression as a
Historical Problem
Michael A. Bernstein
University of California, San Diego

It is now over a half-century since the Great Depression of the
1930s, the most severe and protracted economic crisis in American his
tory. To this day, there exists no general agreement about its causes,
although there tends to be a consensus about its consequences. Those
who at the time argued that the Depression was symptomatic of a pro
found weakness in the mechanisms of capitalism were only briefly
heard. After World War II, their views appeared hysterical and exag
gerated, as the industrialized nations (the United States most prominent
among them) sustained dramatic rates of growth and as the economics
profession became increasingly preoccupied with the development of
Keynesian theory and the management of the mixed economy. As a
consequence, the economic slump of the inter-war period came to be
viewed as a policy problem rather than as an outgrowth of fundamental
tendencies in capitalist development. Within that new context, a debate
persisted for a few years, but it too eventually subsided. The presump
tion was that the Great Depression could never be repeated owing to
the increasing sophistication of economic analysis and policy formula
tion. Indeed, the belief became commonplace that the business cycle
was "tamed" and "obsolete."
The erratic performance of the American economy since the early
1970s has made this notion itself seemingly obsolete. Serious ques
tions have been raised concerning the political obstacles to the effec
tive management of cyclical instability and, as well, our skill in
diagnosing and correcting economic maladies. Indeed, entirely new
varieties of economic thinking have emerged, which have argued that
the government cannot alter levels of real output (let alone rates of
increase in output) except under exceptional circumstances that involve
the execution of consistently inaccurate (or irrational) forecasts by eco-
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nomic agents and/or the implementation of fiscal and monetary poli
cies without the anticipation of the private sector. The confidence of
the Keynesian Revolution has been shaken. A new "classicism" has
come to prominence in economic thought.
In this climate of economic opinion, it is important to note that the
optimism of the post-World War II era regarding the mixed economy
and the new economics of Keynesianism had emerged at a time of dra
matic reconstruction in the world economy and concomitant prosperity
in the American. Such hope had been absent in the decade of the Great
Depression; even during the war years there had been great apprehen
sion that a return to depression would come close on the heels of vic
tory. But the high growth rates of the 1950s and 1960s obscured the
pre-war debates and dissolved for the moment any fears of a return to
hard times.
Yet the concerns and misgivings of the depression and war years,
far from being resolved, simply faded from view. While it has by now
long been fashionable to claim that "Keynes is dead," and that alto
gether novel approaches to economic policy formulation must be
developed, it has nevertheless been deemed passe to engage with the
ideas and theses of an older generation of economists who struggled to
understand strange and devastating events at a time when orthodox the
ories and remedies no longer sufficed. Indeed, the vast majority of
contemporary economists have grown decidedly hostile to arguments
concerning the Great Depression that have not focused on the short run
or on policy failure. In this respect they have avoided the structural,
institutional, and long-run perspectives—more characteristic of their
forebears—that sought to situate the great economic crisis of the interwar years within a historical framework that spanned several decades
or more. By so doing, they have lost an appreciation not simply of
some possible causes of the Great Depression itself, but also of the
subsequent development and performance of the American economy
since mid-century. It is for this reason that I seek, through a reassess
ment of particular aspects of these older analytical approaches, to per
suade you of the usefulness and insight afforded by an understanding
of "The Great Depression as a Historical Problem."
The older literature concerning the Great Depression in the United
States may be broadly classified into three categories. The first argued
that the severity and length of the downturn was the direct result of the
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collapse of financial markets that began in 1929. The main emphasis
of such work concerned the causes of the 1929 crash and those factors
that amplified its impact. The second concluded that the economic
calamity of the 1930s was the direct result of poorly formulated and
politically distorted actions undertaken by the government. The third
category took a broader perspective and attempted to analyze the
Depression in a long-run context. It suggested that whatever the ori
gins of the slump, the reasons for its unparalleled length and severity
predated and transcended the events of the last quarter of 1929. To this
third category of analysis I shall devote most of my attention—but first
I would like to survey the general arguments characteristic of those
economists who focused on short-run dynamics and policy failure.
All short-run analyses of the Great Depression shared a common
attribute. They focused on the immediate causes and impacts of the
stock market collapse in 1929, and they asserted that the precipitous
devaluation of wealth and the disruption of the banking system occa
sioned by it explained the intensity of the crisis. The "business confi
dence" thesis was perhaps the best example of this school of thought.
It held that regardless of the mechanisms that caused the collapse, the
dramatic slide of the stock market created intensely pessimistic expec
tations in the business community. The shock to confidence was so
severe and unexpected that a dramatic panic took hold, stifling invest
ment and thereby a full recovery. 1
A more comprehensive formulation of the short-run argument
directly confronted the question of why financial markets collapsed.
Looking to the political and institutional distortions created by the
Treaty of Versailles, some writers (such as Irving Fisher, Lionel Robbins, and Jacob Viner) argued that the Depression was the inevitable
consequence of the chaotic and unstable credit structure of the 1920s.
World finances, of course, were significantly destabilized by the provi
sions of the Versailles Treaty itself. The principal irritant consisted of a
dangerous circle of obligations and risks in which (as epitomized by
the Dawes Plan of 1924) the United States lent funds to Great Britain,
France, and Germany, while German reparations were needed to allow
the Allies to liquidate their American debts. By 1928, American banks
were already quite wary of the situation. Yet their predictable and
understandable response, cutting back on loans to European govern
ments, merely made the situation worse. Moreover, the demise of the
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gold standard in international trade, and the demands by France and
the United States that Germany make her reparations payments in gold
rather than in the export of goods and services, created a net gold flow
into the United States that led to a veritable explosion of credit.
Extremely unstable credit arrangements thereby emerged in the 1920s,
especially in mortgage markets. Given the relatively unregulated envi
ronment at the time, many banks were committed to questionable loan
contracts. Once the crash came, the collapse of the banking system
was quick to follow. Thus, excessive credit and speculation coupled
with a weak banking network caused the Great Depression. 2
Another version of the short-run argument concerned the immedi
ate effects of the crash on consumer wealth and spending. The severity
of the downturn, it was argued, resulted in a drastic devaluation of con
sumer wealth and incomes. The large stress placed on the capital mar
kets and the lack of consumer confidence in banks ensured that
effective demand could not be bolstered by increased credit. The large
decreases in purchasing power, which emerged directly from the crash,
left the economy saddled with excess capacity and inadequate
demand. 3
None of these short-run arguments were completely convincing or
satisfying. Inasmuch as the business confidence thesis was subjective,
it was virtually impossible to evaluate in the light of historical evi
dence. This weakness was perhaps best exemplified by the claim of
Gustav Cassel who, in focusing on psychological factors in the slump,
argued that "American puritanism stands out as perhaps the most
important [example] . . . the stock exchange speculation of 1928-29
was regarded as particularly sinful behavior which had to get its pun
ishment." There was also the major theoretical objection to notions
like these that they mistook effect for cause, given that the objective
circumstances of the 1930s may have generated the subjective
responses of pessimism and panic. Such theories could not, therefore,
occupy a central place in explanations of the Depression. 4
The excessive credit and speculation argument was frequently
rejected on the grounds that it abstracted too boldly from real rather
than monetary events in the inter-war economy. Indeed, business cycle
indicators turned down before the stock market crashed; indices of
industrial production started to fall by the summer of 1929, and a soft
ness in construction activity was apparent in 1928. Such critics as John
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Kenneth Galbraith held that "cause and effect run from the economy to
the stock market, never the reverse. Had the economy been fundamen
tally sound in 1929 the effect of the great stock market crash might
have been small . . . the shock to confidence and the loss of spending
by those who were caught in the market might soon have worn off."5
As for the wealth and spending hypothesis, the evidence did not
provide a compelling proof. The dramatic decline in consumption
expenditures after 1929 may have been due to the wealth effects of the
stock market debacle; it may have arisen once expectations had been
dampened by the events after 1929; or it may have been an outgrowth
of a declining trend in construction activity and in farm incomes during
the 1920s. But even recent econometric investigations have been inca
pable of unambiguously explaining a large portion of the decline in
spending. We can speak of an autonomous drop, but we cannot say for
sure why it happened.6
Another approach to understanding the Depression evaluated the
extent to which the slump was the result of systematic policy errors.
Inadequate theory and misleading information, as well as political
pressures, it was argued, distorted the policymaking process. Such
investigators as Melvin Brockie, Kenneth Roose, and Sumner Slichter
maintained that from 1932 onwards the American economy showed a
great potential for recovery, only to be set back profoundly by the 1936
recession. They found that monetary conditions were not a factor inso
far as the data showed low short-term interest rates, a strong bond mar
ket, and a high incidence of excess reserves. It was the impact of the
New Deal, they asserted, which was responsible for negating whatever
monetary stimulus did exist because of the tendency of the Industrial
Codes to raise labor costs and material input prices. The rhetoric and
ideology of the Roosevelt administration may have also played a role
by jeopardizing the confidence of the business community. 7 Not sur
prisingly, several investigators (as well as journalists and pundits)
labeled the downturn of 1936-37 the "Roosevelt Recession."
The monetarist criticism of New Deal policy, originally posed by
Clark Warburton but most persuasively presented by Milton Friedman
and Anna Schwartz, focused on the impact of the external dollar drain
generated by Great Britain's departure from the gold standard in 1931
and the internal drain created by the crash itself. To the extent that the
Federal Reserve Board failed to understand the links between bank
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failures, runs on deposits, and the international pressure on the dollar,
it also failed to recognize the inappropriateness of the classical policy
response undertaken—the raising of discount rates. 8
It was not solely criticisms of actual government policy in which
these writers indulged to explain the Depression's unusual severity. In
some cases they also criticized the government for not doing enough.
They maintained that the private sector moved too quickly in the mid
1930s in raising prices. As a result, by 1937 consumers showed an
increasing resistance to higher prices, owing to their desire to liquidate
the large debt incurred earlier in the decade and to maintain their sav
ings in uncertain times. The average propensity to consume subse
quently fell and a recession took hold. 9 Pro-competitive policies
presumably were the solution, but government action (such as the cre
ation of the Temporary National Economic Committee to Investigate
the Concentration of Economic Power) was too little, too late, and
often inspired more by political than economic concerns.
The notion that the Great Depression was essentially an outgrowth
of policy failures was problematic at best. To be sure, one could with
the benefit of hindsight engage in some forceful criticism of economic
policy during the 1930s, but it seems that was and is a futile exercise.
After all, in many respects the Roosevelt administration (especially the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) did what many of
its predecessors had done in the face of a cyclical downturn. One must
ask, therefore, how government officials suddenly became so inept in
the inter-war period. Moreover, the question remains: why were tradi
tional policies that had seemingly worked in the past and that repre
sented a theoretical consensus among generations of economists
suddenly so perverse in the 1930s? What had changed in the structure
and operation of the national economy in the inter-war period that
made orthodox economic theory and policy inadequate?
While concern with the problem of economic instability has punc
tuated the history of economic thought for several centuries, it is hardly
surprising that the Great Depression of the 20th century inspired a vast
literature on the issue of investment failure and the maladjustment of
investment plans. 10 In particular, the persistence of the Depression and
the over-a-decade-long weakening of economic performance that it
caused prompted several investigators to formulate a "stagnation the
sis" concerning mature capitalist economies; it is within this context
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that we can assess the work of those who regarded the crisis of the
1930s as a secular phenomenon. To their investigations, I now turn.
The literature that focused on long-run factors in the American
Depression was distinctive in holding that the New York stock mar
ket crash of 1929 was less important than certain developments in the
economy that had deleterious impacts throughout the inter-war
period. Some authors—for example, Seymour Harris and Paul
Sweezy—argued that during the 1920s the distribution of national
income became increasingly skewed, lowering the economy's aggre
gate average propensity to consume. Others, such as Charles Kindleberger, W. Arthur Lewis, and Vladimir Timoshenko, focused on a
secular shift in the terms of trade between primary products and man
ufactured goods, due to the uneven development of the agricultural
and industrial nations. This change in the terms of trade, they argued,
created a credit crisis in world markets when bad crop yields obtained
in 1929 and 1930. At the same time that agricultural economies were
losing revenue because of poor harvests and declining world demand,
the developed economies were contracting credit for the developing
nations and imposing massive trade restrictions such as America's
Hawley-Smoot Tariff of 1930. As the agricultural nations went into a
slump, the industrialized countries (most notably the United States)
lost a major market for their output. Hence, the downturn of 1929
became more and more severe. 11
Industrial organization economists, Adolf Berle and Gardiner
Means most prominent among them, sought an explanation of the
Depression in the increasing extent of imperfect competition in the
American economy of the early 20th century. 12 Downward inflexibility
of prices after the crash of 1929, caused by the concentrated structure
of American industry and the impact of labor unions, intensified the
effective demand problem and prevented the price system from reach
ing a new equilibrium at full employment. On the one side, "sticky
prices" further limited the already-constrained purchasing power of
consumers. On the other, to the extent that noncompetitive pricing pre
dominated in the capital goods sector, producers were less willing to
buy new plant and equipment. Excessive real wages, helped up by
union pressure and New Deal policy, further contributed to persistent
disequilibrium in labor markets. Price inflexibility thus inhibited the
recovery of both final product demand and investment demand. 13
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There were several weaknesses in all these theories. Those authors
who focused on an increasingly unequal distribution of income or on
administered pricing did not marshal unambiguous evidence to make
their case, nor did they specify precisely how such factors came to life
in the inter-war economy. While Berle and Means claimed to have
demonstrated a relative price inflexibility in concentrated economic
sectors during the 1930s, their critics were unconvinced. Insofar as the
aggregate price-level fell by one-third in the early 1930s, they argued,
how inflexible could the general price system have been? The sticky
prices thesis also relied on an assumption of perfect competition in all
markets other than those where the imperfections existed. If this
assumption were relaxed, the thesis did not hold. As Michal Kalecki
pointed out, if "sticky wages" were responsible for the length of the
Depression, it followed that a reduction in wages would have elimi
nated the persistent disequilibrium. If, however, there were imperfec
tions in product markets as well, a reduction in nominal wages would
have lowered real wages, thereby exacerbating the effective demand
crisis. Only if price adjustments were general and were followed
instantaneously by increased investment would the sticky prices thesis
concerning the 1930s hold. 14
The terms-of-trade argument similarly had a major flaw. The major
weaknesses in the American economy of the inter-war period were
domestic, and the collapse of demand on the part of primary productexporting nations was not highly relevant. America's dependence on
foreign markets was not significant in the inter-war years. During the
1920s, exports as a share of the nation's gross national product had
annually averaged only a bit over 5 percent. A fall in export demand
then could not have played a major role in worsening or prolonging the
Great Depression. 15
Continued research on secular mechanisms in the Great Depres
sion necessarily relied upon the work of Joseph Schumpeter on cycli
cal processes in modern economies. Schumpeter held that the interwar period was an era in which three major cycles of economic activity
in the United States (and Europe) coincidentally reached their nadir. 16
These cycles were 1) the Kondratieff, a wave of 50 or more years asso
ciated with the introduction and dispersion of major inventions; 2) the
Juglar, a wave of approximately 10 years' duration that appeared to be
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linked with population movements; and 3) the Kitchin, a wave of about
40 months' length that had the appearance of a typical inventory cycle.
Schumpeter's efforts were paralleled by those of Simon Kuznets
and, more recently, Moses Abramovitz and Richard Easterlin. Kuznets
was successful in documenting the existence of waves of some 15 to 20
years in length. These periodic swings, according to Abramovitz, dem
onstrated that in the United States and other industrialized countries
"development during the 19th and early 20th centuries took the form of
a series of surges in the growth of output and in capital and labor
resources followed by periods of retarded growth." Significantly,
"each period of retardation in the rate of growth of output. . . culmi
nated in a protracted depression or in a period of stagnation in which
business cycle recoveries were disappointing, failing to lift the econ
omy to a condition of full employment or doing so only transiently." 17
Most, if not all, of the "Kuznets Cycle" literature was concerned
with the explicit dating of the long swings that appeared in the data. It
seemed clear that these swings involved changes in resource endow
ments (including the size of population) and alterations in the intensity
of resource utilization. 18 The specific behavioral mechanisms that
could account for the Kuznets phenomenon (and its precise manifesta
tion in the United States in the 1930s) were necessarily the focus of
continued debate. It is in this context that we can understand the large
literature on "secular stagnation."
Broadly speaking, the so-called stagnation theorists of this century
grouped into those who evinced a "Schumpeterian pessimism" about
the declining incidence of innovations and new technologies, and those
who shared a "Keynes-Hansen pessimism" concerning the shrinkage
of investment outlets owing to a decline in the rate of population
growth. 19 Both groups agreed that stagnation or, as it was sometimes
called, economic maturity involved a "decrease of the rate of growth of
heavy industries and of building activity . . . [and] the slowing down of
the rate of growth of the total quantity of production, of employment,
and usually of population. It [also involved] the rising relative impor
tance of consumer goods." They also believed that "the appearance of
industrial maturity raisefd] profound questions concerning the ability
of an enterprise system to produce a progressive evolution of the econ
omy . . "20
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The "Keynes-Hansen" pessimism held that as population growth
fell off and as major markets in housing, clothing, food, and services
consequently contracted, outlets for new investment were quickly lim
ited to those created by the introduction of new technology or new
products. To the extent that recovery from a depression required
investment outlays above and beyond the level of depreciation allow
ances, an upturn would be dependent on the availability, in an adequate
volume, of opportunities in new industries and processes. If these were
not forthcoming, as some stagnation theorists believed was true of the
1930s, the only avenue out of the slump would be deficit spending to
augment consumer purchasing power. But political barriers to such
government action in the thirties left many economies mired in an
environment of excess capacity and inadequate demand. Needless to
say, contrary to popular perceptions, it was not the New Deal that dem
onstrated the efficacy of restitutive fiscal spending, but rather World
War II. While hardly inspired by specific economic concerns, Presi
dent Franklin Roosevelt's "Arsenal of Democracy" nevertheless con
tained rather vivid policy lessons for economists, politicians, gov
ernment officials, and the public at large.21
There was a serious inadequacy in the arguments concerning eco
nomic maturity and population growth. The theory conflated popula
tion with effective demand. As one critic put it,
[i]t is sometimes maintained that the increase in population
encourages investment because the entrepreneurs anticipate a
broadening market. What is important, however, in this con
text is not the increase in population but in purchasing power.
The increase in the number of paupers does not broaden the
market. For instance, increased population does not mean nec
essarily a higher demand for houses: without an increase in the
purchasing power the result may well be crowding of more
people into the existing dwelling space. 22

"There is no rigid physical relation," another commentator declared,
"between the number of families in the country and the amount and
value of the housing they will pay to occupy. Demand depends not
only on their number, but their incomes."23 A more systematic theory
had to argue that, for secular reasons, the purchasing power of the pop
ulation, rather than the size of the population itself, fell in advanced
capitalist systems.
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Much like the population theory, the variant of the stagnation the
ory that focused on the decline of innovation and technical change as a
factor in the distress of the 1930s embodied many inconsistencies and
questionable assertions. The lower rate of technical change and the
decline in the number of major innovations, which were posited as a
primary cause of the inability of the economy to recover in the course
of the Great Depression, were deemed to be exogenous factors derived
from the state of technical knowledge at the time. 24 Little justification
of this position was offered. Furthermore, meager attention was given
to a seeming contradiction in the argument. If during the 1930s little
technical change took place, why did not the eventual reduction in the
amount of capital equipment available (owing to firm exits and the
periodic obsolescence of plant) result in a revival of capital goods out
put?25
There was one further objection to the technology argument that
was apparent to some of the stagnation theorists themselves. There
was an implicit assumption that new innovations were always of the
capital-using type; thus, had innovation occurred in the 1930s, net
investment demand would have absorbed large capital outlays, thereby
generating a robust upturn. But if innovations were capital-saving, this
argument foundered. Heavy investment in earlier stages of economic
growth (in, for example, railroads, motor cars, and housing) may have
given way (in later periods) to newer forms of investment in manage
rial technique and information processing. These latter innovations
may not have absorbed very large amounts of investment expenditure
at all. While they may have therefore improved the organization and
efficiency of production, their impact on aggregate spending would not
have been adequate to the task of systematic recovery. As Alvin
Hansen succinctly put it in 1941, "[t]he transformation of a rural econ
omy into a capitalistic one is something distinctly different from the
further evolution of a society which has already reached the status of a
fully-developed machine technique."26
It was the Austrian economist Josef Steindl who provided the most
sophisticated version of the economy maturity idea. Not surprisingly,
he did so in part by explicitly situating the Great Depression in the
United States within a long-term development framework. His work
linked economic stagnation directly with the behavior of capitalist
enterprise, thereby avoiding the mechanistic qualities of many of the
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stagnation arguments as well as their frequent appeals to exogenous
factors. Steindl's version of the maturity thesis was that long-run ten
dencies toward capital concentration, inherent in capitalist develop
ment over time, led to a lethargic attitude towards competition and
investment. 27 Specifically, the emergence of concentrated markets
made difficult, and in some cases impossible, the expulsion of excess
capacity required for revival after a trough.
Steindl argued that in any given industry there existed a hierarchy
of firms based upon the relative level of prime production costs. Such
a hierarchy existed because firms would have grown at different rates,
entered the industry at varying times, and therefore installed equipment
of assorted degrees of cost-effectiveness given their past profit perfor
mance (and their differential access to outside funds). The gross mar
gin, £„ for the zth firm, therefore, could be expressed as:

where PI was the firm's output price, 7Z the level of output, and where
w, LI, and MJ were respectively the wage rate, the size of the hired labor
force, and the level of materials costs facing the firm. (Steindl
assumed, at least initially, that the wage rate was not employer-spe
cific.) This gross margin, Steindl held, was the fundamental competi
tive resource of the firm. It provided internal funds for investment and
the securing of outside loans. For Steindl it was obvious that the mag
nitude of a firm's internal funds was often directly proportional to its
ability to secure credit by means of bond sales, equity issues, and bank
loans. This was primarily due, in his view, to the "good will" that was
commonly associated with firm size. Larger firms clearly had access to
funds (both internal and external) far in excess of those for smaller
firms.
In addition, a larger gross margin would enable a firm to initiate
sales and advertising efforts and quality campaigns (and, attendant
upon this, product differentiation) that could possibly allow it to appro
priate other (less powerful) firms' markets. Most important, the gross
margin could provide the means with which a firm might innovate and
apply technically superior methods to production. The resultant sav
ings in costs would be the basis of price cuts to drive competitors out of
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the market. Smaller firms that could not introduce these superior tech
niques would thereby experience a shrinkage in profit margins result
ing from the price war. The inability of these firms to employ new
techniques might simply be due to the fact that they could not pay the
price to install them. In fact, to the extent that patent laws existed, they
might not have the funds for research and development efforts to
deploy new methods themselves.
Figure 1 provides a graphical depiction of the competitive process
of which Steindl conceived. The ray VR expresses the cost hierarchy of
the industry, with the most inefficient firms at the higher point of the
ordinate—their output is lower, in keeping with the notion of their min
imal share of the market. Assuming that a standard mark-up pricing
rule is used in the industry, VW describes a gradient of prices that
expresses the differences in costs incurred by the various firms. Trian
gle RVW is thus the gross margin of the total industry. The hierarchy of
profit margins becomes immediately apparent. The firms with the
larger margins (owing to lower costs) have larger shares of the market
by assumption. Assume that demand increases in the industry, with the
leading firms expanding output to S' from S. Their large margins allow
for the introduction of cost-cutting techniques at R'. Should the result
ing increase in profit margins cause the leading firms to accumulate
such that then" rate of expansion rises above the market rate, a price cut
ensues in the struggle for a greater share of the market. At the new
(lower) price level FN, the least efficient firms are forced out due to the
excess of their production costs over the market price. Producers TH
are thus eliminated.
Consider a situation where the market in question is more concen
trated than in the foregoing case. Presumably, the cost differentials
among firms are less severe insofar as, over time, a small number of
firms have become dominant by means of similar technology, sales
efforts, and so on. Thus, the spectrum of costs structures is now V'R\
not VR'. This being the case, the expulsion of a certain number of firms
from the industry by a competitive drive for market share requires a
larger price reduction than in the first case. The price level FN, suffi
cient to expel producers TH before, now threatens the economic exist
ence of no one. To expel firms TH, at this point, would require a
further cut in the price level to F'N'. The unwillingness to engage in
more severe price cutting of this kind stems from the fact that large
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Figure 1 Schematic Representation of the Competitive Structure of an
Industry

Prices,
Costs

H
Output,
Market Share
SOURCE: Steindl (1976), p. 44 (Figure 3).

reductions in price can invite retaliation that may generate a downward
spiral of the price structure in general. In other words, there is the risk
that the market, to use modern business parlance, may be "spoiled." 28
Price inflexibility in concentrated industries is intensified during
depressions, and this has an important impact on the response of firms
to economic fluctuations. The net revenue of firms tends to be so jeop
ardized in a slump that strategies of price reduction are viewed as
unfeasible. There may even be incentives to raise prices in order to
compensate for the reduction in the volume of sales—resulting in what
James Tobin once named, during the celebrated 1962 confrontation of
the Kennedy administration with the national steel industry, the
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"Blough Effect." 29 For a given industry, therefore, the impact of a
decline in the rate of growth (i.e., the aggregate rate of capital accumu
lation) will depend on the extent to which the industry is concentrated.
In a sector where the squeezing out of competitors is relatively easy,
large declines in demand will result in the reduction of profit margins
(for each firm) as prices are cut. By contrast, in a concentrated market,
profit margins will tend to be inelastic in the face of reductions in
demand.
At the macroeconomic level, the implications of inelastic profit
margins for cyclical performance are most profound. Insofar as price
reductions do not obtain in the event of a decline in the rate of growth,
the necessary adjustment of sectoral rates of expansion to the aggregate
rate will require reductions in the rate of capacity utilization. When
viewed in terms of the sector as a whole, if prices are fixed, output
must fall to bring gross margins down. If industrial structure were
more competitive, excess capacity would not result from a decline in
the accumulation rate; rather, prices would fall.
Reductions in capacity utilization imply not only declines in
national income but also increases in unemployment. In the presence
of underutilized capacity, firms will be increasingly disinclined to
undertake any net investment. A cumulative process is thereby estab
lished wherein a decline in the rate of growth, by generating reductions
in the rate of capacity utilization, will lead to a further decline in the
rate of expansion as net investment is reduced. Individual firms, by
believing (in another striking example of the "fallacy of composition")
that decreases in their own investment will alleviate their own burden
of excess capacity, merely intensify the problem economy-wide. The
greater the proportion of the nation's industry that is highly concen
trated, the greater the tendency for a cyclical downturn to develop into
a progressive (and seemingly endless) decline.
A further consequence of the existence of highly concentrated sec
tors in the national economy is the impact it has on effective demand.
The higher profit margins secured by large firms are indicative of an
increasingly skewed distribution of output that, when combined with
the reluctance of firms to invest (or otherwise spend) their revenues,
generates a rising aggregate marginal propensity to save. Declining
effective demand is combined with rising excess capacity when a
slump occurs. The potential for recovery, barring the intervention of
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exogenous shocks, government spending, or the penetration of foreign
markets, is therefore greatly lessened.
What is central to Steindl's thesis is the conception of long-term
alterations in industrial structure that make the economy as a whole
more incapable both of recovering from cyclical instability and of gen
erating continued growth. The emergence of oligopolistic market
structure is taken to be inherent in the process of capitalist develop
ment insofar as that process is coterminous with the development of
large-scale manufacturing techniques and of financial concentration.
Economic maturity and the threat of stagnation result because the
growing incidence of "[oligopoly brings about a maldistribution of
funds by shifting profits to those industries that are reluctant to use
them."30 In order to escape stagnation, capital must be redistributed
either to more competitive sectors or new industries, although such
shifts can only proceed (given the difficulties of obtaining technical
knowledge and good will in new product lines) with considerable time
lags.
Indeed, during the Great Depression, some members of
Roosevelt's "Brain Trust," such as Rexford Tugwell, argued forcefully
for the imposition of an "undistributed profits tax" to prevent the accu
mulation of corporate surpluses and to stop the privilege firms had
always enjoyed of investing their surpluses at will. The incentive of
the tax, it was claimed, would lead firms to issue more of their sur
pluses in the form of productive investment commitments or in the
form of dividends. There would thus obtain either direct productive
expenditure, through firm-level investment or the allocation of funds to
stockholders that would then be subject to the discipline of private cap
ital markets. As a result, the mobilization of capital resources would
be more efficient and more likely to generate recovery. Embedded in
the Revenue Act of 1936, the undistributed profits tax proved to be one
of the most unpopular and controversial pieces of legislation to emerge
from the New Deal; it was repealed in 1938. 31
Interestingly enough, no clear relationship exists between stagna
tion and concentration in American industry during the Great Depres
sion. By applying a static conception of market structure, investigators
have tended to focus on the number of firms in an industry as the pri
mary determinant of a sector's competitiveness. The difficulty lies in
the fact that cross-section data on firm numbers provide no information
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concerning those differentials in costs that are the basis of pricing strat
egies. Given large disparities in techniques and costs, it is possible that
a small number of enterprises may, over time, engage in large amounts
of competition. Conversely, a sector with a large number of identical
firms may prove to be quite lethargic, given the absence of cost differ
entials that can be competitively exploited. Not surprisingly, therefore,
the historical record of the 1930s seemingly does not give Steindl's
argument unqualified support.
As I demonstrated in my 1987 book, The Great Depression:
Delayed Recovery and Economic Change in America, 1929-1939,
some highly concentrated industries were relatively vibrant during the
decade, while others less so appeared virtually moribund. 32 In addi
tion, the data on sectoral shares of wages in the value added, which
Steindl cited as indices of competitiveness, were similarly mislead
ing.33 A rising (falling) trend in the wage-share may not necessarily
indicate a competitive decline (noncompetitive rise) in the industry's
gross margin, but rather may demonstrate changes in the labor inten
sity of that sector's technology over time. Clearly, the evidence con
cerning market structure was a frail reed upon which Steindl attempted
to base his theory. Whether a given industry is dynamic or not involves
several issues that are not directly linked with numbers of firms or the
extent of capital concentration—issues having to do with the industry's
position in the economy's input-output matrix, the durability of its out
put, and the relative maturity of the industry with respect to the shifting
composition of the economy as a whole.
The weaknesses in Steindl's analysis do not, of course, obscure the
importance of his contribution to an understanding of the Great
Depression in particular and of maturity in capitalist economies in gen
eral. That importance derives from the fact that Steindl attempted to
situate the decade of the 1930s within a larger historical framework. In
this context, he could view the Great Depression as the outcome of an
interaction between cyclical forces dating from 1929 and tendencies of
long-run development spanning a half-century or more. In short, he
was thus able to understand the Great Depression as a historical prob
lem.
Steindl's conception of long-term capitalist development was obvi
ously embedded within a theoretical tradition linked with the work of
the classical economic theorists—Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and
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Karl Marx. That tradition posited the concentration of capital as the
major expression of secular growth. To attempt to grasp capitalist
development in terms of the increasing concentration of capital, as the
classical theorists and Steindl did, it was necessary to locate the pri
mary determinants of growth in the production process itself—i.e., in
the firm. Changes in the role of markets—markets being defined as
both loci of purchasing power and as collections of needs for specific
kinds of goods—had no place in the theory.34
Conceptually, capitalist economies may avoid (and, in the latter
half of this century, have avoided) tendencies toward stagnation
through exogenous stimuli such as war, territorial expansion, interna
tional monetary networks that privilege some industrial systems rela
tive to others, and of course through product innovation and technical
change. Indeed, it is this last potential avenue for expansion that has
been both common in fact and most germane to the extension of the
neo-Keynesian, neo-Marxian, and neo-Ricardian theoretical frame
works. Even so, such compositional transformations in modern econo
mies occasion a great deal of instability and unpredictability in
performance.
Secular changes in the growth performance and potential of vari
ous industries must offset declines in certain groups with rises in oth
ers. The chance that such changes in sectoral performance will
proceed smoothly is small, and economic history provides ample testi
mony to this fact.35 While the possibility of terminal stagnation has not
been realized in advanced capitalist states, economic performance in
those economies throughout the last four decades of this century has
nevertheless been erratic at times and often premised more on external
developments than internal mechanisms of recovery and expansion.
Secular transitions in development involve the decline of old
industries and the rise of new ones. These alterations in the composi
tion of national output tend to be discontinuous and disruptive, not
because of imperfections in markets but rather because of forces inher
ent in the accumulation of capital over time. First, the ongoing expan
sion of the capitalist economy is coterminous with the advance of
scientific and technical knowledge, which transforms production tech
niques, cost structures, and the availability of raw materials, and which
creates entirely new inputs and outputs. Consider, for example, the
emergence of fossil fuels, the replacement of natural fibers with syn-
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thetics, and the rise of internal combustion as a means of locomotion.
Entire industries are made obsolete or virtually so, while new ones are
created. Second, the structural milieu in which product and technical
changes take place is itself a product of economic growth.
Concentration of capital may lead to unequal access to investment
funds, which obstructs further the possibility of easy transitions in
industrial activity. Because of their past record of profitability, large
enterprises have higher credit ratings and easier access to credit facili
ties, and they are able to put up larger collateral for a loan. Equity
issues by such firms are more readily financed and sold, and such firms
can avoid takeovers more easily than small firms. Large firms, too,
may have commonalities of interest with financial institutions through
interlocking directorates. All these factors may impede the flow of
capital out of old and into new sectors, thereby making shortfalls in
aggregate economic performance much worse.
Compositional and structural change in economies may also pre
cipitate serious unemployment problems that interfere with the
achievement of full capacity output. New industries may have differ
ing capital intensities and skill requirements, relative to older sectors,
that complicate (or possibly even prevent) the absorption of unem
ployed workers. The problem may be twofold: newer industries may
not grow fast enough to provide employment opportunities for those
laid off in older sectors; but even if higher growth rates are achieved,
the newer industries may require different amounts and altogether dif
ferent kinds of labor for their production. Structural unemployment
may be the troubling and persistent consequence. These were, in fact,
many of the specific findings of my research on the Great Depression
reported over the past decade.
Finally, changes in the relationship of a national economy to the
world economic system may also be responsible for wide fluctuations
in macroeconomic behavior. A resurgence of competition from other
national systems previously excluded from or inadequately prepared
for international commerce may seriously affect the fortunes of domes
tic industries grown used to protected or exclusive markets. Transfor
mations in international currency systems, whereby a nation's
monetary unit that had previously served as numeraire and means of
international clearance is rapidly integrated into a general floating cur
rency system, will also profoundly change the performance character-
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istics of that economy. Inflationary pressures at home now may
translate into an export boom as a currency is devalued, while defla
tionary patterns may yield an upswing in imports to the detriment of
domestic producers. Policy flexibility and independence may also be
constrained as a nation's economy becomes more open to economies
elsewhere. Domestic changes in fiscal and monetary policy will now
have international trade consequences as well. Modulations of interest
rates, for example, will affect the flow of capital across national bor
ders as investors compare rates of return in various nations. Interest
ingly enough, Keynes himself suggested to Roy Harrod in 1942 that
"the whole management of the domestic economy depends upon being
free to have the appropriate rate of interest without reference to the
rates prevailing elsewhere in the world. Capital control is a corollary
to this."36
National economic performance may also, in a mature setting,
require increasing involvement of the state itself. Maintaining suffi
cient outlets for net investment expenditure might possibly involve def
icit spending to bolster effective demand, direct government purchases
of goods and services (particularly of public goods such as infrastruc
ture and military and law-enforcement equipment), and government
oversight of the penetration of foreign markets. These efforts might
conceivably be paralleled by rising outlays by private firms on sales
efforts, distribution mechanisms, and various means to enhance con
sumer credit. 37 While for most neoclassical economic theorists, fiscal
and monetary mechanisms stand as instruments of periodic counter
cyclical policy, for neo-Keynesian, neo-Marxian, and neo-Ricardian
economists, governmental involvement in mature economies is a per
manent (and ever-increasing) feature of modern industrial states.
Steindl had, of course, focused his work on the inter-war economic
crisis of the 1930s. His central theses regarding maturity and stagna
tion in advanced capitalist economies seemed particularly compelling
when viewed in terms of the long-run historical experience of the Great
Depression. Yet both the postwar record, at least in the case of the
United States, and some of the theoretical lacunae in his earlier claims
led Steindl to modify some of the arguments of his 1952 book. With
the 1976 republication of his Maturity and Stagnation in American
Capitalism, Steindl allowed that technical innovation, product develop
ment, public spending, and research and development initiatives might
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provide the means to escape from investment inertia. Even so, he was
extremely concerned that most accumulation strategies in mature capi
talist nations would be focused on military-industrial activity and war
itself. Using both public and private investment funds for other pur
poses, while obviously desirable, would be "exceedingly hard" given
"the workings of political institutions."38
The wisdom (not to mention the prescience) of Steindl's 1976
observations is made apparent as soon as one surveys the more recent
evolution of American capitalism. American accumulation in the latter
half of this century has, on the one side, confirmed many of Steindl's
suppositions regarding expansion in advanced industrial states. On the
other, it has demonstrated both the unique and abiding flexibility of
capitalism in the face of contradictory tendencies toward underutilization and the importance (even at times the possible centrality) of politi
cal and social forces often understood by economists to be exogenous.
In all these respects, contemporary history portrays the conceptual
power and importance of what Steindl had to say when he first exam
ined the crisis of the 1930s. But it also reminds us of the unyielding
impacts of contingency and human agency in economic performance
over time.
World War II had achieved in the United States, of course, what the
New Deal could not—economic recovery. With the start of war in
Europe, the unemployment rate had already begun to fall, so that by the
time of the Japanese naval offensive at Pearl Harbor, only 7 percent of
the labor force remained idle. American entry into the war brought
almost instantaneous resolution of the persistent economic difficulties
of the inter-war years. Between 1939 and 1944, the national product,
measured in current dollars, increased by almost 125 percent, ulti
mately rising to $212 billion by 1945.
Yet as World War II came to a close, many economists and busi
ness people worried about the possibility of a drop in the level of pros
perity and employment to one far below that of the war. But these
apprehensions proved to be unwarranted. 39 By 1946, gross national
product fell less than the postwar reduction in government spending;
unemployment did not even reach 4 percent; consumer spending did
not fall at all, and eventually rose dramatically. Although recessions
occurred between 1945 and the mid 1970s, most of them lasted only
about a year or less, and none of them remotely approached the sever-
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ity of the Great Depression of the 1930s. During these three decades,
American output steadily increased, with only minor setbacks.
According to the Federal Reserve Board's index, manufacturing pro
duction doubled between 1945 and 1965, and tripled between 1945
and 1976.
Such robust economic performance is hardly surprising in war
time—especially when conflict is global and, with a few exceptions,
kept outside of national boundaries. What is most striking about the
American economic experience linked with World War II was the
enduring growth and prosperity of the postwar years. Consumption
and investment behavior played a major part in this great prosperity of
the late 1940s and 1950s. As soon as Germany and Japan had surren
dered, private and foreign investment in the United States rose quickly.
On the domestic side, reconversion was itself an investment stimulus.
Modernization and deferred replacement projects required renewed
and large deployments of funds. Profound scarcities of consumer
goods, the production of which had been long postponed by wartime
mobilization needs, necessitated major retooling and expansion efforts.
Even fear of potentially high inflation, emerging in the wake of the dis
mantling of the price and wage controls of the war years, prompted
many firms to move forward the date of ambitious and long-term
investment projects. On the foreign side, both individuals and govern
ments were eager to find a refuge for capital that had been in virtual
hiding during the war itself. Along with a jump in domestic invest
ment, therefore, a large capital inflow began in late 1945 and early
1946.
Domestic consumption was the second major component of post
war growth. Bridled demand and high household savings due to war
time shortages, rationing, and controls, coupled with the generous
wage rates of the high-capacity war economy, all contributed to a dra
matic growth in consumer spending at war's end. The jump in dispos
able income was bolstered by the rapid reduction in wartime surtaxes
and excises. And the baby boom of the wartime generation expressed
itself economically in high levels of demand for significant items like
appliances, automobiles, and housing. G.I. Bill benefits additionally
served to increase the demand for housing and such things as educa
tional services, with associated impacts on construction and other
industrial sectors.

The Economics of the Great Depression

85

Foreign demand for American exports grew rapidly in the immedi
ate postwar years. In part, the needs of devastated areas could only be
met by the one industrial base that had been nearly untouched by warrelated destruction. Explicit policy commitments to the rebuilding of
allied and occupied territories, such as the Marshall Plan in Europe,
also served to increase the foreign market for the output of American
industry. Even so, one of the most significant contexts within which
the impressive postwar growth of the American economy took place
was the unique and special set of arrangements developed for interna
tional trade at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944.
When the allied nation's financial ministers gathered at Bretton
Woods in New Hampshire just before the war's end, they were con
cerned to reconfigure world trade and financial flows such that the dis
putes so characteristic of the inter-war years of 1919-1939 could be
avoided and stability maintained. Along with the creation of an Inter
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development and of an Interna
tional Monetary Fund, the conference decided to establish fixed
exchange rates between the U.S. dollar and all other internationally
traded currencies. The value of the dollar itself was set in terms of
gold at $35 per ounce. This installed a benchmark against which the
value of all other currencies was measured. As the American economy
was, by far, the most powerful at the time, it seemed prudent and
indeed necessary that its currency play such a central international role.
American postwar prosperity and the benefits of world economic
leadership continued throughout most of the 1950s. The added fiscal
stimulus of the Korean War also helped to maintain the high levels of
growth and employment characteristic of the decade. Republican Pres
ident Dwight Eisenhower, carrying on in the tradition of his Demo
cratic predecessor Harry Truman, repeatedly committed his admin
istration to the practice of compensatory demand management. But the
prosperity of the 1950s, while robust and impressive, nevertheless
weakened by 1957. This set the stage for the arrival of a new brand of
economics in Washington, explicitly (and self-consciously) imbued
with the doctrines of Keynesianism.
From the "New Frontier" policies of John Kennedy, to the "Great
Society" agenda of his successor Lyndon Johnson, through the declara
tion of a "New Federalism" by Richard Nixon, there ensued an era of
sustained central government intervention in the nation's economic
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life. The self-assurance of many (but not all) of the "new" economists
of the early 1960s that the goal of achieving simultaneously acceptable
levels of unemployment and inflation could be realized has more
recently been shattered. But throughout the 1960s and much of the
1970s, and for some even during the 1980s, the perceived obligation of
government to secure overall economic stability was not seriously
questioned and remained one of the more important changes of 20thcentury American economic history.
Historical specificity notwithstanding, American economic perfor
mance in the latter half of this century appears to conform in many
major respects to the general analytical propositions derived from a
secular analysis of inter-war economics. The ability to forestall and/or
overcome tendencies toward economic stagnation has depended upon a
varied and uncommon set of circumstances both global and domestic
in their genesis and impact. But a continuation of such a charmed
existence is apparently no longer possible. Josef Steindl himself noted,
in 1976, that "the cheerful extroverted era of [postwar] growth has
apparently come to an end." He held that the reasons for this were "the
reduction of tension between the superpowers . . . the increase in ten
sion within the capitalist countries . . . and . . . the emergence of envi
ronment, raw material, and energy problems . . ." And, in words that
today seem as apposite as they did over 20 years ago, Steindl noted that
the political and psychological basis of the postwar boom has been
sapped by such developments as these: public spending ... [has]
decreased . . . the competition in technology . . . and education
unleashed by Sputnik has flagged; the development in these fields
has been dominated instead by [an] internal reaction against intel
lectuals and youth... the cooperation between the capitalist pow
ers has broken down . . . [and] the internal stresses of groups
contending for shares in the national income have shown them
selves [to be] inflationary.40
In the midst of a return to the weak and intermittent growth of ear
lier decades of this century, there has also obtained an altogether reac
tionary (re)orientation of fiscal and monetary policy. A resurgence of
general equilibrium approaches to cyclical phenomena has prompted
the formulation of a "new classical macroeconomics" and the rise of a
"rational expectations school."41 These intellectual developments,
linked with political events having to do with the backlash against the
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progressive politics and redistributive programs of the New Frontier
and the Great Society, eliminated Keynesian thinking from the formu
lation of responses to contemporary economic problems. Thus, we
have the more recent attempts to balance fiscal expenditures (and, until
recently, tighten monetary variables) in the face of unemployment and
shortfalls in national product. In other words, we witness an attempt to
embrace what Keynes once derisively called "the Treasury View."42
There is, of course, a major difference between past decades and
today in this regard, at least in the United States. Timid countercyclical
policy in the inter-war period was to some extent the result of igno
rance and misplaced confidence in old remedies. Today, slow-growth
policies are derived from the politics of reaction and resentment—a
politics arrayed against the reformist agendas and civil rights initiatives
of the 1960s. Whatever its social and cultural roots, this revanchist
spirit has grounded its appeal, to a broad segment of the American
electorate, in the pessimism and antagonism attendant upon erratic
economic growth since the oil price shocks and hyperinflation of the
1970s. As the macroeconomic "pie" has grown more slowly and less
consistently, distributional struggles—often deployed along racial, eth
nic, and gender lines—have become more intense. Insofar as the
national economy falls short of a full-employment approximation of
potential output, the justifications for reversing the distributional gains
of the activist fiscal policies of the 1960s gain ever greater force. To
put it in the words of Josef Steindl once again, contemporary "argu
ments against full employment have got the upper hand in the councils
of the powers, and thus we witness stagnation not as an incomprehensi
ble fate, as in the 1930s, but stagnation as a policy."43 The ironies and
the poignancy of this state of contemporary affairs are made strikingly
clear as soon as we reflect upon the Great Depression as a significant
and coherent historical problem.44
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1. For an exposition of the business confidence argument, see Morgan (1935).
2. See Fisher (1930, 1932). Also see Schumpeter (1946), Roepke (1936), Noyes
(1930), Persons (1930), and Viner (1936). The notion of excessive speculation
and "wild" stock prices was challenged by Sirkin (1975). Lionel Robbins (1934)
argued that the crash itself may have been generated by attempts by the Federal
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Reserve, in 1927, to reverse the net gold inflow in order to alleviate the destabiliz
ing pressures on sterling.
See Temin (1976) for a contemporary statement of this view. Also see Mishkin
(1978).
See Cassel( 1932, p. 76).
See Galbraith (1972, pp. 93, 192). Also compare Lewis (1950). The fact that the
economy had significantly weakened before the crash was demonstrated by
Moore (1950). Also see Erickson (1972).
As most forcefully explained by Temin (1976).
For a more recent statement, see Weinstein (1980). Also see Brockie (1950).
See Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Warburton (1944, 1945a, 1945b, 1946).
See Roose (1948, 1954) and Slichter (1938).
I have surveyed much of this literature (published in English, and as it applied to
the United States experience) in Bernstein (1985).
See Harris (1948), Sweezy (1968), Lewis (1950, pp. 55-56), Kindleberger (1973,
pp. 292-293), and Timoshenko (1933, pp. 541-543).

12. See, for example, Means (1935) and Means and Berle (1968).
13. See Reynolds (1939) and Thorp and Crowder (1941). Interestingly enough,
Backman (1939) challenged the empirical relevance of the administered prices
theory and argued (on p. 486) that in order to understand the low levels of output
that prevailed during the 1930s, one had to examine the "character of the market;
durability of the product; capital goods versus consumers' goods; joint demand,
stage of development of an industry; [and] necessaries versus luxury products."

14. See Kalecki (1969, pp. 40-59).
15.
16.
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20.
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22.
23.
24.

25.
26.

See U.S. Department of Commerce (1975, part 2, series U201-206, p. 887).
See Schumpeter (1939, vol. 2, pp. 905-1050). '
SeeAbramovitz(1961,p. 241).
See Kuznets (1958), Abramovitz (1961), and Easterlin (1968).
As suggested by William Fellner (1954). It should be pointed out that Fellner had
earlier rejected all arguments concerning stagnation on the grounds that none of
their propositions could be formulated in behavioral terms. See Fellner (1941).
The quotations are taken from McLaughlin and Watkins (1939, pp. 1-14).
See Hansen (1939) and Keynes (1937). A complete, if rather polemical exposi
tion of the stagnation thesis may be found in Terborgh (1945).
From Kalecki (1943, p. 88). Also see Sweezy (1940).
From Terborgh (1945, p. 181).
See Hansen (1941, p. 279ff) and Kalecki (1962). Kalecki did concede, on pp. 134
and 147, that innovations might not be wholly exogenous and might, in fact, be
influenced (with appreciable lags) by changes in profit rates, output, and the size of
the capital stock. Even so, he also argued, elsewhere, that the exogeneity of tech
nical change indicated that "long-run development [was] not inherent in the capi
talist economy." See Kalecki (1968, p. 161).
As admitted by Kalecki (1971, p. 30).
Hansen (1941, pp. 310, 314-315). See also Kalecki (1968, p. 159).
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27. The following exposition, both textual and graphic, is derived from Steindl (1976,
Chapters 2-5, 9, 13) and Steindl (1945, pp. 48-54, 63-66). The idea that large
concentrated firms eschew major investment opportunities, owing to a desire to
maintain their dominant market position, also played a role in the conception of
economic stagnation developed by Michal Kalecki. See Kalecki (1943, p. 92) and
Kalecki (1968, p. 159).
28. This particular assertion obviously ties in with the kinked demand curve theory of
oligopoly. See, for example, Sweezy (1939).
29. See Tobin (1975). This counter-intuitive price effect was named after Roger
Blough, then head of the United States Steel Corporation.
30. From Steindl (1976, p. xv).
31. See Bernstein (1987, pp. 190-191).
32. Explicit documentation for these claims may be found in Bernstein (1982, Chap
ters 3-4).
33. See Steindl (1976, Chapter 8).
34. This is not to say that these theorists did not address the problem of effective
demand, but rather that their conception of the role of markets was fairly limited
in scope. Steindl, in particular, did not fully consider the effect of investment
strategies geared toward product diversification and sales efforts.
35. See, for example, Aldcroft (1977), Bernstein (1987), Dahmen (1970), and
Svennilson (1954).
36. See Crotty (1983, pp. 59-65) and Keynes (1980, pp. 148-149). Also see Keynes
(1933) and Williamson (1985).
37. Steindl, at one point, noted that expanded systems of consumer credit were a
means by which investment opportunities could be maintained in mature econo
mies. See Steindl (1966).
38. See Steindl (1976, pp. xii-xiii).
39. In fact, it was this dramatic postwar economic performance, one that seemingly
belied the stagnation theories of the inter-war years, that in part prompted
Steindl to open the new introduction to the 1976 edition of Maturity and Stagna
tion with the observation that "[t]he first (1952) edition of this book appeared at
a time which could not have been less propitious for its success." See Steindl
(1976, p. ix).
40. From Steindl (1976, pp. xvi-xvii).
41. See, for significant and influential examples, Lucas (1975, 1977). Also see
Steindl (1984).
42. The "Treasury View," that fiscal spending could not lower unemployment,
emerged in Great Britain in 1929 in response to Liberal Party calls for more activ
ist policy. See Bernstein (1987, p. 218).
43. From Steindl (1976, p. xvii). On the political constraints within which counter
cyclical policy is often formulated, see the pathbreaking essay of Kalecki (1972).
Also of interest in this regard are Nordhaus (1975) and Fair (1978).
44. With apologies to my friend and colleague Arno J. Mayer (1975).
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4 Propagation of the Depression
Theories and Evidence
James S. Fackler
University of Kentucky

Despite the fact that it has been more than six decades since the
onset of the Great Depression, the factors involved in propagating this
dramatic decline in economic activity remain subjects of debate and
interest. My objective is 1) to review the received wisdom on how the
Great Depression evolved through time, and 2) to reintroduce into the
discussion one of the original theories of the Depression that has been
subjected to relatively little empirical analysis, the debt-deflation
hypothesis. 1
Let me emphasize that my objective is to discuss the "propagation
mechanism" operative in the early 1930s rather than to try to isolate the
initiating factor(s) for the Great Depression. I omit lengthy discussion
of the initial impulse only to keep the current discussion manageable
and not because it is inherently less interesting or important.
Until fairly recently, the received wisdom on the propagation
mechanism included two schools of thought. The first, developed by
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and now called the "money view"
explanation, argues that inappropriate monetary policy caused what
otherwise would have been a (perhaps severe) recession to become the
Great Depression. The second, derived from Temin (1976), argues that
the impetus for the Depression was the autonomous behavior of con
sumption.
Recently, a new view of the Depression has emerged. Bernanke
(1983) has augmented the money view analysis with what is now
called the "credit view." The credit-view model demonstrates how a
deflationary shock can disrupt the credit intermediation process and
cause a sustained decline in output. Specifically, deflation lowers the
net worth of borrowers by raising their real indebtedness. If the defla
tion is sufficiently severe, debtor insolvency jeopardizes the financial
condition of creditors (banks), increasing the fragility of the credit
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intermediation process. If bank failures result, local "information cap
ital" on the quality of borrowers is lost, raising the cost of credit inter
mediation and lowering economic efficiency. 2

THE BEHAVIOR OF OUTPUT
Figure 1 shows the behavior of output (measured as monthly levels
of industrial production) over most of the inter-war period. This longer
period provides a background against which to evaluate the time period
of interest for present purposes, August 1929 to March 1933. As is evi
dent, industrial production declined precipitously over this three-anda-half-year period. Whatever the initial impulse, the objective here is
to describe and evaluate the dynamics (i.e., the propagation mecha
nism) in the economy that caused this impulse to have its prolonged
effect.
The path of output displayed in Figure 1 suppresses potentially
important parts of the story. Specifically, the focus is on the behavior
of a single, aggregate measure of output. An expanded analysis would
also investigate the interactions among the components of this single
measure of output; that is, attention would be paid to the "comovement" of output across sectors of the economy. For example, interest
ing elements of the story revolve around the agricultural and housing
sectors. Unfortunately, time does not permit detailed analysis of sec
toral interactions.

THEORIES OF THE PROPAGATION MECHANISM
The Money View
One time-honored interpretation of the decline in output that began
in the fall of 1929 is the money view of Friedman and Schwartz
(1963). Their argument proceeds by first building a statistical case,
using roughly a century's worth of data, that changes in the money
stock cause subsequent changes in output. Second, beginning in late
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Figure 1 Industrial Production Index, January 1921 to December 1937
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1929 and accelerating in late 1930, declines in the money supply
occurred due to what they referred to as the "inept" response of offi
cials of the Federal Reserve System to the emerging crisis (Figure 2). 3
The Friedman-Schwartz argument is that the Depression was both
deeper and more prolonged than need be due to this inappropriate
monetary policy.4 Finally, a contributing factor was the fall in wealth
of both bank shareholders and depositors associated with widespread
bank failures. Among other effects, these wealth shocks likely contrib
uted to falling demands for consumption goods, further contributing to
the downward spiral in production.
While the sharp decline in output certainly accompanies the dra
matic fall in the money stock, a deeper look at the data suggests that
the links between money and output may be decidedly more complex.
In particular, the stock of money in the economy is the result of inter
actions among the Federal Reserve, the banking sector, and the nonbank public. The Fed sets the quantity of base money (5) in the
economy. The banking system and the nonbank public then use this
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Figure 2 Ml Money Supply, January 1921 to December 1937
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monetary base to produce the money supply (Ml). A "bare bones"
expression of this relationship is the money multiplier model:
Ml =m*B,
where the money multiplier is
m = (1 + c)l(rd + e + c)
with rd being the required reserve ratio for demand deposits, with c
being the ratio of currency to demand deposits (C/D) held by the pub
lic, and with e being the ratio of excess reserves to demand deposit lia
bilities (ER/D) held by banks. Note that the money supply is
determined in part by Fed policy that sets the required reserve ratio and
the monetary base, in part by banks as they choose the quantity of
excess reserves to hold relative to deposit liabilities, and in part by the
nonbank public as it chooses the level of currency to hold relative to
deposits.
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The money multiplier model suggests an investigation of the base
and the multiplier separately. Figure 3 shows the behavior of the base
over the inter-war period. Notice in particular the modest (relative to
the decline in money) decline in the base over the 1928-1930 period.
Figure 4 shows the money multiplier, m, which declined dramatically
over the first three years of the Depression. This decline was driven by
a rising excess reserve ratio, as banks struggled to maintain liquidity in
the face of the possibility of bank runs, and by a rising currencydeposit ratio, as the nonbank public, fearing instability of the banking
system in general and the possibility of the failure of their own banks
in particular, preferred to hold currency rather than deposits. 5
Do Figures 3 and 4 mean that the Friedman-Schwartz hypothesis,
that the fall in the money stock was due to inept policy, is incorrect?
Not necessarily, since the rises in the ratios of currency and excess
reserves to deposits may reflect a lack of public confidence in Fed pol
icies. The Fed, after all, could have chosen to flood the financial mar
ket with money, though perhaps at the cost of giving up alternative
policy goals.
The initial impression from Figures 2 to 4 is that the FriedmanSchwartz money view certainly appears consistent with the data. But
since advanced economies are complex, other hypotheses may also be
supported by the data as well. We now turn to two popular alternatives.
Autonomous Spending Shocks

The second of the time-honored hypotheses about the propagation
mechanism is due to Temin (1976), who argued that the impetus for the
Depression was the autonomous behavior of consumption. In his view,
the Depression began as a recession, which was brought about by a
variety of factors. First, there was an oversupply in the housing mar
ket. Second, financial markets were uneasy because of the stock mar
ket boom and the Federal Reserve's efforts to burst this speculative
bubble. These forces led to a fall in income. The stock market crash in
October 1929 was an additional major force leading to the economic
collapse. In Temin's view, the crash propagated its deflationary effect
through consumption, which was in part depressed due to the decline
in consumer wealth and an increase in consumer leverage. 6 But even
after considering the magnitudes of the negative effects of lower
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Figure 3 Monetary Base, January 1921 to December 1937
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wealth, increased leverage, potentially pessimistic expectations, and
deflationary shocks from the agricultural sector of the United States,
there is still a large portion of the fall in consumption in 1929 that
Temin considered unexplained or "autonomous." He states (Temin
1976, p. 83): "It is somewhat unsatisfactory to say that the Depression
was started by an unexplained event, but this alternative is preferable to
statements that are inconsistent with the data." Thus, he claimed that
nonmonetary and nonfinancial forces played the primary causal role in
the Depression.7
In contrast to Friedman and Schwartz, Temin views the behavior of
money as responding to, but not causing, the economic decline; for
Temin, money is a passive, endogenous variable. Specifically, he
argues that "there is no evidence of any effective deflationary pressure
from the banking system between the stock market crash in October
1929 and the British abandonment of the gold standard in September
1931" (Temin 1976, p. 169). Temin reached this conclusion because
short-term interest rates fell, contrary to what would be expected dur
ing a period of monetary stringency. He argued further that the
approximate constancy of the real money supply throughout this period
hardly signals that contractionary movements in output are the
response to monetary tightening. 8
Romer (1988) has recently revisited the issue of the aberrant
behavior of consumption in the early stages of the Depression. Consis
tent with the results of Mishkin (1978) and Temin, Romer argues that
neither wealth nor income effects can account for all of the fall in con
sumption. Rather, her hypothesis is that the drop in consumption was
the result of increased uncertainty during 1929.9
She concludes that "uncertainty effects due to stock market vari
ability can explain most of the unusual behavior of consumer spending
on durable and semidurable goods in the first year and a half of the
Great Depression" (p. 29). That is, the stock market crash made con
sumers sufficiently uncertain of the future to induce them to decrease
their consumption, and thus provided an impetus for the initial fall in
economic activity in 1929 that marked the beginning of the Depres
sion. She also provides contemporary accounts from business fore
casters that suggest the uncertainty persisted well into 1930. 10
Romer's analysis suggests that a substantial portion of the drop in
consumption was due to increasing uncertainty about the state of the
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economy. Further, this decline in consumption may account for some
of what Temin viewed as "autonomous." For the consumption expla
nation of the propagation mechanism to be plausible, some type of
proxy showing increased consumer uncertainty should be available.
Figure 5 shows a measure of uncertainty: changes in the 12-month
moving variance of stock prices. As expected, near the end of 1929,
these changes become much more pronounced. Further, the plausibil
ity of the argument that consumption declines were the primary driving
force for the tailspin in output in the early 1930s would be enhanced
with evidence that monetary policy was not unusually restrictive. Fol
lowing Temin's argument, Figure 6 shows the interest yield on Trea
sury securities maturing in three to six months, and at first glance it
provides support for Temin's claim that monetary policy was not
"tight" at the outset of the Depression. Specifically, after the rise in
rates engineered in 1928 by Fed officials concerned with stock market
speculation, rates began to fall well in advance of the outset of the
downturn and continued to fall through the middle of 1931. 11 Taken
together, the casual evidence in Figures 5 and 6 does not obviously dis
count the hypothesis that consumption shocks played an important role
in the decline in output.
Debt-Deflation and the Credit View
The debt-deflation hypothesis originated with Fisher (1933), who
argued that there are two dominant factors that account for the "great"
booms and depressions: overindebtedness and deflation. To see the
mechanics by which debt-deflation operates, consider first some initial
level of nominal debt. A "small" negative price shock raises the real
obligation of the debtor. At the same time, the creditor is being repaid
in dollars with higher real value. Under the usual assumption that dis
tributional effects are at most of second-order importance, little macroeconomic effect is predicted. Next, assume an initial state of
overindebtedness. A sufficiently large price decline forces debtors into
insolvency; nominal incomes fall along with prices, so that not only
does the real value of the debt obligation rise, the ability to service the
debt declines. In the event of bankruptcy of the debtor, the creditor (a
bank, for example), ends up owning the asset. The bank, with a given
level of nominal liabilities (deposits), finds itself in possession of
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Figure 5 Change in the 12-Month Moving Variance of Stock Prices,
January 1921 to December 1937
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assets whose prices are falling and which are costly to sell. The
decline in prices may lower the nominal value of (illiquid) assets below
this nominal value of liabilities, forcing insolvency onto the bank as
well. As banks find their balance sheets becoming increasingly precar
ious, they may respond by raising the fraction of their assets held in the
form of "safe" assets (excess reserves and government securities), low
ering funds available for loans. Further, as bank balance sheets deteri
orate, concerned depositors may withdraw funds from the bank,
increasing its vulnerability to a "run." Thus, "excessive" debt com
bined with deflation may both lower wealth and jeopardize the credit
intermediation process, contributing to a downward spiral in output
and prices. If a bank fails, information capital in the form of special
ized knowledge about borrowers by local creditors is lost. 12
If debt-deflation is to explain at least part of the path of output dur
ing the Depression, then two important conditions would need to hold.
First, there should be evidence of overindebtedness, so that price
declines can have the potential of raising real obligations enough to
cause a wave of bankruptcies. Second, there should be evidence that a
major part of the deflation of the early 1930s was unanticipated at the
time agents assumed debt, either in the open market or in the form of
bank loans. 13
Was there an "excessive" debt build-up prior to the onset of the
Depression? This is a difficult question to assess. Fisher recognized
the complexity of the issue when he noted that overindebtedness is
always measured relative to a variable such as wealth or income and
that overindebtedness depends in part on the maturity structure of the
debt. Further, the assessment may be complicated when relative mea
sures give conflicting evidence on a debt build-up. 14 Some evidence
does support the existence of a relatively large rise in debt. First,
according to Clark (1933), in the early 1930s the ratio of debt service
to national income rose from 9 percent in 1929 to 20 percent in 19321933. Second, Persons (1930) reported that urban real estate debt rose
by nearly 150 percent between 1920 and 1929, from about $11 billion
to $27 billion. Further, he notes that the $16 billion increase exceeds
by $5 billion "the entire debt of this character amassed in all the earlier
years of our urban development." Third, issuance of corporate bonds
and notes rose from $26 billion in 1920 to $47 billion in 1928.
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The second issue, whether there was unanticipated deflation, has
been the subject of recent literature, which is currently divided regard
ing whether the deflation was anticipated or not. The data on whole
sale and consumer prices are plotted in Figures 7 and 8. Note that
there was some precedent for deflation, as the data for 1921 show;
agents would not need long memories to allow for the expectation of
deflation. However, prices for most of the decade appear stationary,
albeit with some variability. The most recent data, for agents assessing
price trends as the end of the decade of the 1920s approached, may
have suggested continued price stability.
Hamilton (1987, 1992) and Dominguez, Fair, and Shapiro (1988)
present empirical evidence consistent with the view that the deflation
was unanticipated. However, Cecchetti (1992) critiques Hamilton's
findings and concludes that once deflation started, people expected it to
continue. Nelson (1991) presents an extensive and detailed examina
tion of the statements of business commentators from April 1929
through December 1930. He concludes that the business press antici
pated deflation.
While the debt-deflation mechanism can explain a decline in out
put over the course of a business cycle, can it alone account for the
massive decline in output experienced in the 1930s? Using the debtdeflation hypothesis as a point of departure, Bernanke (1983) presented
a new explanation of the experience of the U.S. economy in the early
1930s. In Bernanke's credit-view theory, credit became unavailable for
all but the very safest loan prospects, and that disrupted economic
activity by eliminating sources of financing for both investment and
production. Once the combination of overindebtedness and deflation
raised problems of debtor insolvency, "the disruption of the financial
sector by the banking and debt crises raised the real cost of intermedia
tion between lenders and certain classes of borrowers" (p. 263). Banks
became unwilling to loan to all but the most creditworthy customers,
effectively forcing borrowers without access to other sources of credit
to lower their levels of economic activity. As banks (and other credi
tors) engage in a "flight to safety," lending only to the safest prospects
and not at all to others, the interest rate spread between "risky" and
"safe" loans will widen substantially. This implication is supported in
the data, as demonstrated in Figure 9, where the spread more than tri
pled in the early 1930s.
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Figure 7 Wholesale Price Index, January 1921 to December 1937
(base year 1926 = 100)
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Figure 8 U.S. Cost of Living Index, January 1921 to December 1937
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Figure 9 Baa Interest Rate Minus Government Bond Interest Rate,
January 1921 to December 1937
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In the money view, it is the liability side of the balance sheet of the
banking system, reflecting the quantity of money, that determines eco
nomic activity and prices. The asset side, and in particular how bank
portfolios are allocated between securities and loans, is irrelevant to
economic outcomes. In the credit view, banks are important not only
because their liabilities serve as the medium of exchange, but also
because banks specialize in lending to agents who would find openmarket borrowing prohibitively expensive. Thus, a monetary policy
that lowers reserves works not only because of the upward pressure on
interest rates, as argued by money-view proponents, but also because
some borrowers do not have alternative sources of funds as bank lend
ing declines; if bank loans fall, some agents cannot obtain funds else
where. The corresponding decline in spending then complements the
interest-rate effect of the restrictive monetary policy.
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HOW IMPORTANT IS EACH THEORY OF THE
PROPAGATION MECHANISM?
The analysis of the previous section suggests that the various
hypotheses that purport to explain the downward spiral in output are
not only plausible, but appear consistent with a casual look at the data.
Let me caution, however, that we need not necessarily look at these
hypotheses as competing with one another. One theory may explain
events over one time period (for example, consumption shocks may
explain events just after the stock market crash) and another over the
next time period (for example, credit shocks may explain events subse
quent to bank panics). And some may complement each other during a
given period (such as debt-deflation and disruptions to the credit inter
mediation process). The results of a more sophisticated analysis are
now examined in the hope that they will allow at least tentative
answers to the question posed in the title of this section. 15
I have analyzed a model of the U.S. macroeconomy for the interwar period that incorporates each of the hypotheses outlined in the pre
vious section. As indicated in the introduction, I ignore explicit con
sideration of international events. Viewing the U.S. experience in
isolation, while perhaps controversial to some, has as an important pre
cedent recent work by Romer (1993). She argues that, at least until the
fall of 1931, domestic factors were the cause of the drop in U.S. output,
rather than international constraints. 16 In particular, Federal Reserve
policy decisions (from the tightening in 1928 to curb what was seen as
excessive stock market speculation to the failure to counteract banking
panics in 1930 and in both the spring and fall of 1931), rather than
international events, were likely of primary importance in explaining
the drop in U.S. production.
Monthly data over the period from January 1921 to December
1937 are used so as to study the Depression era in the broader context
of the inter-war period. The data employed are the rate on U.S. gov
ernment bonds, the Ml measure of money, industrial output, the
wholesale price index, bank loans made for purposes other than securi
ties purchases, the spread between the Baa bond rate and the govern
ment bond rate, the real liabilities of failing banks, and the par value of
outstanding bonds.
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While most of these data are well known and require no additional
discussion, the loan series and the bond series require some comment.
The loan data represent total loans by banks in 101 leading cities net of
loans made by banks on securities. By netting out loans made on secu
rities, the resulting loan series should correspond closely to loans made
for commercial and industrial purposes, the relevant concept for an
evaluation of the credit view of policy. 17 Note that it is not possible to
derive a consistent net loan series after 1937, which thus determines
the ending point for the sample.
The outstanding bond series is intended to represent indebtedness
of borrowers with access to open-market sources of finance. This
series is derived by Hickman (1953) and represents the stock of out
standing corporate bonds of railroads, public utilities, and industrial
firms. The basic data were annual, with monthly data derived by Hick
man by adjusting the data for which the month of issue was known so
that their sum equaled the annual total. Since the months of issue of
about 95 percent of total par amounts are known, the monthly data
should be accurate. In addition, Hickman provides a detailed compari
son of this debt series with those available from other major sources,
including the Commercial and Financial Chronicle and the Journal of
Commerce. He is able to reconcile his data with that contained in these
alternative sources, so that Hickman's degree of confidence in these
data is high; see Appendix C in Hickman (1953) for detail.
The final data issues of importance relate to the interest rates
series. First, the government bond rate represents a "safe" interest rate
on U.S. bonds with 12 or more years to maturity or call date. Second,
the interest rate spread is intended to proxy for the difference between
the loan rate at banks for bank-constrained borrowers and a safe market
rate. Note, however, that the Baa rate corresponds to borrowers who
have access to open market sources of funds, so that the spread is far
from a perfect measure of the concept it is intended to measure. How
ever, due to problems associated with adverse selection, moral hazard,
and credit rationing, the spread between the loan rate series on bank
lending and the safe government bond rate may not adequately mea
sure the premium required by banks to lend to "good" risks. Bernanke
(1983) represents a precedent for using the interest rate spread em
ployed here.
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The model estimated and analyzed is a variant of a standard text
book aggregate demand (AD) and aggregate supply (AS) presentation
of the macro economy. Underlying the AD schedule are augmented
versions of the IS and the LM schedules. The usual specifications are
augmented to account for the market for bank loans and for the volume
of open-market credit. The IS curve represents, inter alia, the behavior
of consumption and investment decisions. 18 The IS curve includes as
arguments bank loans, real open-market debt obligations, and the inter
est rate spread; these variables are intended to capture the debt-defla
tion/credit-view impacts on the demand for goods and services. The
money demand equation underlying the LM schedule includes deposits
in failing banks as a variable that represents portfolio shifts undertaken
by agents in response to bank failures or panics. That is, the money
demand equation includes a proxy for shifts between deposits and cur
rency that alters the money multiplier, as in the money view. The
money supply equation underlying the LM schedule includes real
open-market obligations, bank loans, and the interest rate spread.
These variables are intended to capture the effects of changes in the
credit intermediation process on the supply of money, as in the credit
view. The money supply curve also includes deposits in failing banks
in an effort to account for the effect of bank failures, as a proxy for the
excess reserve ratio on the money supply, as in the money view. The
financial sector is completed with demand and supply equations for
bank loans, as well as equations explaining bank failures as depending
on financial distress, as in the credit view, and the volume of open-mar
ket credit. Finally, a relatively simple aggregate supply curve is speci
fied; its distinguishing feature is the inclusion of deposits in failing
banks as an explanatory variable to take into account the effect of a
decline in working capital on production.
The model described above is analyzed in the following way. Each
variable in the model contains two parts: a systematic or predictable
component and a random component or error term. The systematic
component can be thought of as the "predicted" or "forecast" part of
the variable; this component represents the "best information" the
agent has about the future path of the variable, given the model struc
ture. The random component represents the deviation between the
actual data and the systematic or forecast component. 19 Finally, the
model is dynamic, so that random shocks to a variable one period can
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alter the path of other variables over time. By way of terminology,
breaking down output into its systematic and random components is
referred to as a "historical decomposition."
As an example of the general procedure outlined in the previous
paragraph, consider industrial production ("output"). At a point in
time, output can be forecast into the future; this is the systematic com
ponent. The error in the forecast—the difference between the forecast
and the actual path of output—is due to unforeseen shocks in the econ
omy; this is the random component. This forecast error in output can
be the result of a variety of shocks to other variables in the economy.
For example, if banks unexpectedly alter their lending preferences and
stop lending to some firms, as in the credit view, then output may fall
relative to the forecast level if firms cannot obtain enough working cap
ital to finance production. Or, if consumers unexpectedly slow their
purchases, firms may reduce production to avoid unwanted inventory
build-up. In general, shocks to all variables can have some effect on
output.
To see the relative importance of various factors for the path of
output, begin by considering Figure 10, which shows the forecast or
"base projection" of industrial production, a 95 percent confidence
band around the base projection, and the actual path of this measure of
output. Given the model parameters, the base projection represents the
path for industrial production that would have been predicted in a fore
cast made at the beginning of October 1929. Visually, the base projec
tion completely fails to capture any of the general pattern of actual
movements in industrial production. Statistically, for the entire period,
the root mean squared error (RMSE) between the base projection and
actual industrial production is 40.8 (Table 1).
The remaining figures present two types of visual evidence on the
difference between the base projection and the actual behavior of out
put. First, the figures provide a way to see whether the error compo
nent in some particular variable explains the difference between the
base projection of output and its actual level. Second, the figures allow
us to form impressions on whether these errors help reproduce the
"characteristic phases" (i.e., the turning points and rates of growth) of
actual output during various subperiods, even in the absence of closing
the gap between the forecast and the actual path of industrial produc
tion. The major phases of interest begin with the period between Octo-
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Figure 10 Industrial Production Index, October 1929 to December 1933
(base period 1935-1939 = 100)
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Table 1 Root Mean Squared Errors for Historical Contributions of
Selected Variables Relative to Actual Output
Variable(s)
Base projection (BP)
BP + money supply shocks
BP + IS shocks
BP + deflation shocks
BP + bank loan shocks
+ interest rate
differential shocks
BP + IS shocks
+ money supply shocks
BP + IS shocks
+ deflation
BP + IS shocks
+ bank loan shocks
+ interest rate
differential shocks
BP + IS shocks
+ money supply shocks
+ deflation shocks

Oct. 1929 to
Sept. 1931
24.1
19.4
17.0
18.2
24.2

Oct. 1929 to
Dec. 1933
40.8
35.7
21.8
30.9
33.3

13.5

17.7

11.9

14.2

17.1

16.8

9.3

10.8
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ber 1929 and January 1931 when the U.S. economy went into a deep,
but not historically unprecedented, recession. From February 1931
through May 1931, the economy flattened out. Then output went into a
tailspin from June 1931 through July 1932. There was an incipient
recovery from August 1932 until October 1932, which was followed by
a collapse that hit the bottom in March 1933. The remainder of 1933
displayed a sharp "spike," in that a rapid recovery began in April,
peaked in July, and declined to the end of the year.
Figure 11 shows the contribution to the base projection of the
errors to the money stock, and so approximately corresponds to the
money view advanced by Friedman and Schwartz. This figure sug
gests that the money supply shocks contributed to declines in output
throughout 1930 and again in late 1931. With the exception of a slight
uptick in output in early 1930 rather than a relatively flat path for actual
output, these patterns are not obviously at odds with the tightening of
policy in the late 1920s and the panics in the early 1930s. However,
accounting for the money stock errors does little to close the gap
between actual output and its forecast path. A quantitative assessment
of the role of money supply shocks in determining the path of output is
presented in Table 1, where the RMSE of the base projection plus the
contribution of money is 35.7 for the entire period, a reduction of 12.5
percent from the base projection of industrial production alone. Note,
however, that for the initial stages of the Depression, i.e., the period
from the stock market crash through September 1931, the percentage
improvement in the RMSE is about 20 percent (an RMSE of 19.4 vs.
24.1).
Figure 12 shows the contribution to the base projection of shocks
to the IS curve. Note that while this figure is in the spirit of Temin, the
factors underlying this chart are much broader than those in his origi
nal hypothesis. In particular, the shocks underlying the IS curve
include, in addition to consumption shocks, shocks to investment and
shocks from elsewhere in the world. 20 With this caveat, it should none
theless be noted that the IS shocks underlying the early months in Fig
ure 12 are unlikely to be due to exports; exports rose by about 3 percent
between 1928 and 1929, and real exports were a relatively small frac
tion of GNP. As is evident from Figure 12, over the first several
months after the stock market crash, IS shocks roughly mimic the mon
etary shocks displayed in Figure 11, showing an initial decline fol-
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Figure 11 Industrial Production Index, Base Projection + Money Supply,
October 1929 to December 1933
(base period 1935-1939 = 100)
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Figure 12 Industrial Production Index, Base Projection + IS Curve,
October 1929 to December 1933
(base period 1935-1939 = 100)
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lowed by a modest rise in early 1930. From mid 1930 on, however, IS
shocks appear to provide a more complete explanation of both the
actual path of output and the characteristic phases of output during the
Depression era. More precisely, the results reported in Table 1 show
that the IS shocks nearly halve the RMSE of the base projection for the
period ending in December 1933. These IS shocks also dominate the
monetary shock explanation for the initial phase of the Depression, but
not nearly so completely as for the entire period. For the initial phase,
the RMSE of the base projection falls from 24.1 to 17.0, a 30 percent
improvement. Note, however, that most of the improvement relative to
the monetary explanation appears to occur after late 1930, so the initial
months of the Depression don't seem to be dominated by either theory.
Figure 13 shows the ability of the debt-deflation hypothesis to
account for the path of output. Note that this plot represents the effects
of deflation without the complementary effects associated with the
credit view; independent shocks associated with the credit view are
discussed below. However, compared with the monetary explanation,
deflation surprises provide some explanatory power for the path of out
put, especially over the entire period. The notable aspect of this figure
is that, unlike the results displayed in Figures 10, 11, and 12, the defla
tion shocks do not produce a path in which output rises in late 1929
and early 1930. The RMSE associated with the initial two years of the
Depression is 18.2, midway between those for money and IS shocks.
For the period ending in December 1933, the RMSE for the base pro
jection plus the effects of deflation surprises is 30.9.
Figure 14 provides a representation of the credit view, where
shocks to the market for bank loans and the interest rate differential are
combined with the base projection of output. Visual inspection sug
gests that, like shocks to the IS curve but unlike the monetary and
deflation explanations, the credit view reasonably captures the charac
teristic phases of the period. Notice in particular that industrial pro
duction tends to fall in periods following banking panics in this plot,
consistent with firms being forced to lower production due to drops in
the availability of working capital. However, as reported in Table 1,
the credit view explains less of the scale effects of the Depression than
does the debt-deflation hypothesis, with a full period RMSE of 33.3
and an initial period RMSE of 24.2. Of particular interest to creditview proponents should be the declines in output accounted for by
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Figure 13 Industrial Production Index, Base Projection + Deflation,
October 1929 to December 1933
(base period 1935-1939 = 100)
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Figure 14 Industrial Production Index, Base Projection + Loans and
Interest Rate Differential, October 1929 to December 1933
(base period 1935-1939 = 100)
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shocks in the bank loan market around the first and second banking
panics in late 1930 and mid 1931, and the accounting for rising output
following the bank holiday in 1933.
Given that shocks to the IS curve generate the lowest RMSEs and
most accurately capture the characteristic phases of the Depression
over the full horizon, the remaining charts investigate the joint abilities
of shocks to the IS curve and other explanations of the Depression to
account for the path of output.
Consider Figure 15, which shows the joint contributions of shocks
to the IS curve and the money supply; roughly, this plot represents the
combined effects of the time-honored explanations of Temin and
Friedman and Schwartz. Compared with Figure 12, the addition of
money tends to bring the projected path of industrial production some
what closer to the actual path. Specifically, as reported in Table 1, the
RMSE of the base projection plus both IS shocks and money supply
shocks is 17.7 for the full period, in contrast to an RMSE of 21.8 for
the contribution of IS shocks alone; thus, the addition of money supply
shocks lowers the RMSE by about 19 percent relative to the RMSE
associated with IS shocks alone. Roughly the same percentage
improvement occurs during the first two years of the Depression.
Figure 16 shows the joint contributions of IS and deflation shocks.
As compared with Figure 12, the inclusion of deflationary shocks
allows a closer description of the path of output than do just the IS
shocks. This appearance is confirmed in Table 1, where the RMSE for
the projected path relative to the actual path is 14.2 for the full period
and where it is 11.9 for the initial phase of the Depression.
Figure 17 combines the base projection with shocks to the IS curve
and the variables associated with the credit view. Unlike previously
described alternatives, the output decline is noticeably faster after the
second banking panic in 1931 and most closely parallels the upward
spike in output after the 1933 bank holiday. However, this combina
tion of IS shocks with the credit view shocks does not provide much
initial explanatory power for the early part of the Depression. Thus,
the RMSE for this combination is 17.1 over the first two years of the
era (about the same as for IS shocks alone) but is 16.8 for the entire
period.
Finally, Figure 18 combines the deflationary shocks associated
with the debt-deflation hypothesis with those from the money view and
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Figure 15 Industrial Production Index, Base Projection + IS Curve +
Money Supply, October 1929 to December 1933
(base period 1935-1939 = 100)
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Figure 16 Industrial Production Index, Base Projection + IS Curve
Deflation, October 1929 to December 1933
(base period 1935-1939 = 100)
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Figure 17 Industrial Production Index, Base Projection + IS Curve +
Loans and Rate Differential, October 1929 to December 1933
(base period 1935-1939 = 100)
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Figure 18 Industrial Production Index, Base Projection + IS Curve +
Money Supply + Deflation, October 1929 to December 1933
(base period 1935-1939 = 100)
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the autonomous shocks influencing the IS curve. While not capturing
all of the Depression, the implied multicausal view of propagation of
the Depression does capture most of the drop in output and closely
describes the characteristic phases of the period, with the exception of
the early months of 1930.

CONCLUSIONS
A number of conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, for the
period as a whole, there does not appear to be a single, dominant expla
nation of the Depression; no factor alone can explain both the magni
tude of the decline in output along with the characteristic phases of the
Depression. Overall, the factor that does the "best" at explaining the
various facts is the shock term to the IS curve. This term probably rep
resents consumption early in the horizon, but later also probably
reflects shocks to investment, fiscal policy, and external events.
Second, as indicated in Table 1, among shocks to the individual
equations, those to the IS curve produce the lowest RMSE over the two
years following the stock market crash. However, as was visually evi
dent from Figures 11 to 14, only the debt-deflation hypothesis, as
embedded in deflation surprises, suggested a downward path for output
at the onset of the Depression. In fact, the RMSE for the base projec
tion alone for the first year following the crash was 12.8. Among the
various theories, only the RMSE associated with the debt-deflation
hypothesis (10.6) shows a noticeable drop in the RMSE through Sep
tember 1930; the RMSE associated with money was 12.6, with IS
shocks was 13.2, and with shocks to the bank loan market was 13.0.
This result seems to suggest that further investigation of the role of
deflationary surprises may be warranted.
Third, the credit view that disruptions to the market for bank loans
help explain the depth and length of the Depression is consistent with
the data presented here. Specifically, the credit view seems to work
well in explaining the rate of decline in output around the banking pan
ics in the early 1930s.
Fourth, note that the credit view appears to contain explanatory
power over the period from the stock market crash through the end of
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1933, even in the presence of money shocks. This result stands in
some contrast to that of Bordo, Rappoport, and Schwartz, who argue
that for an earlier period, the evidence for the credit view is weakened
by the presence of the money stock.

Notes
This research was supported by a Summer Research Grant from the College of Busi
ness and Economics of the University of Kentucky. The grant was made possible by a
donation of funds to the College by Ashland Oil, Inc.
1. This theory was first proposed by Irving Fisher (1933). Recently, Calomiris and
Hubbard (1989) and Bordo, Rappoport, and Schwartz (1992) have addressed
some of the issues that arise in debt-deflation. Calomiris and Hubbard estimated a
"credit view" model of the 1884-1909 period; Bordo, Rappoport, and Schwartz
investigated "hybrid credit view" and "hybrid money view" models that attempt to
sort out the relative roles of money and credit for economic activity over 18801914, a period that encompasses the Calomiris-Hubbard period. In contrast to
these papers, the focus of this paper is (most of) the inter-war period, 1921-1937.
2. Eichengreen (1992) has argued that the breakdown of the gold standard that had
governed international monetary arrangements prior to World War I and again
over the first part of the inter-war period was the driving force behind the sharp
and protracted decline in output. I do not address this explanation for the propa
gation mechanism explicitly. However, as argued by Bernanke (1994), the "com
parative approach" to understanding the Depression stimulated by the rise and fall
of the gold standard in the inter-war period enhances the confidence in model
identification when assessing the Depression experience of an individual country.
3. The data plotted in Figure 2 are for the Ml stock of money. A plot of M2 shows
the same pattern of steep declines over the early 1920s.
4. Recent support for this hypothesis is presented by Schwartz (1981) and McCallum (1990). Schwartz presents Granger-causality tests consistent with the
hypothesis of unidirectional causality from money to income during the Depres
sion. McCallum demonstrates with counterfactual simulations that a monetary
base rule aimed at keeping nominal GNP growing smoothly at a noninflationary
rate would have avoided most of the decline in output during the 1930s. However,
other evidence suggests that there remains room for additional explanations. For
example, Gordon and Wilcox (1981) argue that money does not play an important
role in the decline in output in the initial stages of the Depression. Burbidge and
Harrison (1985) report similar results.
5. Recall that deposit insurance was not introduced until later in the decade.
6. Mishkin (1978) discusses the effect on wealth of the stock market crash. It seems
clear that consumption in 1929 was adversely affected by the crash.
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7. Recent research supportive of Temin's view is provided by Romer (1988) and
Flacco and Parker (1992), who argue that consumption fell due to increased
uncertainty. Support for the premise of increased uncertainty is included in Nel
son (1991), who documents accounts from the contemporary business press.
Arguments attempting to refute the basic Temin hypothesis are included in Mayer
(1978), Meltzer (1976), and Hamilton (1987).
8. Hamilton (1987) convincingly demonstrated that monetary policy was contrac
tionary as early as January 1928. It follows that Temin must implicitly believe
that monetary policy does not operate with a lag in its effect on real economic
activity in order for the thrust of his nonmonetary arguments to go through.
Moreover, if this is not believed, "much of the substance of Temin's objection dis
appears" (Hamilton 1987, p. 155). Given a constant real money stock and falling
nominal interest rates, Hamilton also concludes that Temin's position—that shifts
in the IS curve are more important than shifts in the LM curve—"seems to be little
more than an a priori specification that the parameters are such that monetary pol
icy was unlikely to exert much of an effect on the economy anyway" (p. 158).
9. Romer's discussion of uncertainty is in terms of its impact on consumption and at
face value may be viewed as supportive of the Temin explanation of the Depres
sion. However, Romer's analysis is also consistent with other explanations of the
Depression, since what matters is the impact of uncertainty on consumption rather
than the source of the uncertainty.
10. There are, of course, many reasons other than stock market volatility that can
explain why uncertainty would have persisted beyond 1929 and increased subse
quent to mid 1930. Events such as massive unanticipated deflation, the HawleySmoot tariffs, Federal Reserve inaction, excessive government optimism, political
dissension over the proper economic course, the doubling of tax rates in 1932, the
failure of the Bank of the United States, the collapse of the Kredit-anstalt in Aus
tria, Britain's departure from the gold standard, and the near complete collapse of
the U.S. financial system are some sources of uncertainty that could well have
kept consumption depressed for the entire October 1929-March 1933 period.
Indeed, increasing uncertainty may have been pervasive up until March 1933,
when the government finally stepped in.
11. Note, of course, that the plot shows a nominal rate of interest. If the rate of defla
tion is high, then real rates may be high even though nominal rates are low. If the
ultimate impact of monetary policy on the economy is through real rates of inter
est, then low nominal interest rates can be consistent with restrictive monetary
policy.
12. In Fisher's analysis, other factors such as the quantity of money, its velocity, busi
ness confidence, and interest rates play secondary roles in the propagation of eco
nomic fluctuations.
13. Suppose for a moment that the deflation is anticipated. Rational borrowers and
lenders would take the anticipated deflation into account when drafting the loan
contract. This might take the form of specifying the repayment schedule in real
terms (e.g., adjusting the loan payments for movements in a broadly based price
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index such as the consumer price index) or altering the term to maturity of the
loan (e.g., arranging for repayment to be complete prior to the onset of the defla
tion if it is expected to occur some reasonable amount of time in the future), or
some other type of arrangement. That is, presumably most of the debt burden
leading to insolvency and bankruptcy can be avoided if the deflation is foreseen,
As a contemporary example, consider the evidence presented in Bernanke and
Campbell (1988) for the decade of the 1980s in which, at least from the perspec
tive of the popular press, there was a period of "excessive" debt build-up. This
view can be supported from the perspective of the ratio of interest payments to
firm cash flow. However, corporate debt-equity ratios did not change much in the
1980s and were below their peaks attained in the 1973-74 recession. Thus, deter
mination of whether there existed excessive debt in the period leading up to the
Depression, for which data are not nearly as complete as are available today, may
not be easy to discern.
Technical details on the model are included in an appendix, available from the
author on request.
In September 1931, Britain left the gold standard. A fear of devaluation may have
led foreign depositors to withdraw funds from the U.S. financial system. Domes
tic agents responded by raising their currency/deposit ratios, afraid that flows of
funds from an already-weakened banking sector could result in additional losses
for depositors. However, just prior to Britain leaving gold, the United States held
about 40 percent of the world's monetary gold stock, so these fears may not have
been justified. That is, primary focus on domestic events beyond the fall of 1931
may still be approximately correct.
In practice, of course, some of these loans are likely made to borrowers who are
not constrained to borrow from banks; the data likely mix bank-constrained bor
rowers with nonconstrained borrowers. However, we will generally interpret the
loan series as representing bank-constrained borrowers.
As indicated earlier, shocks to the IS curve also may originate elsewhere in the
world. These shocks are not considered explicitly in the model.
Notice that the sum of the systematic and random components equals the data
itself.
Shocks from the international economy are not explicitly modeled here, but rather
are subsumed in the errors terms.
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5 Monetary Policy in the Great
Depression and Beyond
The Sources of the Fed's Inflation Bias
David C. Wheelock
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

On August 15, 1971, President Nixon announced his "New Eco
nomic Policy." Nixon's plan included two features that reflected on the
state of American monetary policy. First, to combat inflation, Nixon
imposed wage and price controls; and, second, in response to Amer
ica's long-running and worsening international payments deficit,
Nixon suspended convertibility of the dollar into gold. Both policies
were intended to be temporary. Wage and price controls were tempo
rary, but the gold window appears to be permanently shut, and the dol
lar has floated against other currencies since 1973.
The imposition of wage and price controls and suspension of dollar
convertibility reflected the failure of U.S. monetary policy to control
inflation under the prevailing international monetary regime—the Bretton Woods System. Although Bretton Woods was at its heart a gold
standard, it did not impose the same level of discipline on monetary
policy that the pre-war gold standard had. Under the classical gold
standard, market-driven gold outflows would limit inflationary money
supply growth and provide long-run price stability. Bretton Woods was
a gold standard managed by central banks, however, and with central
bank cooperation a country could run a long-term payments deficit if
other countries were willing to hold its currency. The Bretton Woods
System ultimately collapsed because other countries became unwilling
to hold dollars and because the United States was unwilling to impose
a monetary policy on itself that would ensure convertibility of dollars
into gold.
The United States had confronted a similar choice before. In 1931,
uncertainty about the ability or willingness of the United States to
remain on the gold standard precipitated gold outflows that forced
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American monetary authorities to make a decision. They could choose
to defend their gold reserve by tightening monetary policy or they
could suspend convertibility of the dollar into gold. In the midst of the
Great Depression, Federal Reserve officials understood that a tighter
monetary policy might worsen the downturn, but to preserve the gold
standard they chose to raise interest rates and allow a contraction of
bank reserves.
In this paper, I argue that American officials chose to abandon gold
in 1971 because of institutional and ideological changes brought about
by the Great Depression. Key changes included a new avenue for
monetizing federal government debt, a weakening of the Federal
Reserve System's insulation from political interference, and a new eco
nomic policy ideology that doubted the stability of private markets and
prescribed government management of aggregate demand.
The most important change for monetary policy stemming from
the Great Depression concerned the gold standard. In 1931, Federal
Reserve officials viewed the gold standard as fundamental to long-run
economic prosperity and were willing to defend the system even if it
meant taking actions that would worsen the ongoing Depression. In
1971, U.S. economic policymakers no longer viewed the gold standard
in this way and were unwilling to tighten monetary policy to preserve
the gold standard, even though the United States had a rising rate of
inflation and a growing economy. The choice to abandon Bretton
Woods was made, I argue, because the Great Depression had weakened
the ideological underpinnings of the gold standard. 1
During the Depression, the gold standard had failed to preserve
prosperity for those countries with even the largest reserve holdings,
and suspension proved to be a prerequisite for recovery in most coun
tries (Eichengreen and Sachs 1985). Although many people continued
to view the gold standard and fixed exchange rates positively, most
believed that the gold standard required the management of govern
ment officials. Thus, after World War II, the managed gold standard of
Bretton Woods supplanted the pre-war gold standard. Under Bretton
Woods, the United States was able to run an inflationary monetary pol
icy without the swift discipline of gold outflows. The initial impetus
for inflation resulted from other changes—increased political pressure
on the Fed and attempts to stimulate output by increasing aggregate
demand, for example, as well as from flaws in the Fed's basic operat-
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ing strategy. But under Bretton Woods, inflation could gather substan
tial momentum before policymakers were forced to confront the
consequences of their policies. In the face of a hemorrhaging balance
of payments deficit and no strong ideological attachment to gold, Bret
ton Woods collapsed and external constraints on domestic monetary
policy were abandoned.
This paper begins with an overview of monetary policy during the
Great Depression. By many (though not all) possible measures, mone
tary policy was exceptionally contractionary during 1929-1933, and I
examine why the Fed pursued such a policy during this period. Next, I
identify and discuss key institutional changes to the monetary policy
environment that resulted directly from the Great Depression. I argue
that these changes help explain the inflation bias of the Fed's postWorld War II monetary policy. Finally, I describe the Federal
Reserve's response, or lack thereof, to the growing balance of pay
ments deficits leading up to the collapse of Bretton Woods in 1971, and
how the decision to abandon gold in 1971 was a legacy of the Great
Depression.

MONETARY POLICY IN THE FIRST PHASE
OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION
By almost any measure, monetary policy during the period 1929—
1933 was a disaster: the money supply and price level both fell by onethird, ex post real interest rates reached double digits, and banks failed
by the thousands (Table 1). How could the Fed have let this happen?
The explanations for the Fed's disastrous monetary policy during
the Great Depression largely fall into two categories. One attributes
policy failures to innocent mistakes or neglect, while the other con
tends that the Fed willfully engineered contractionary monetary policy
to foster bureaucratic objectives, or in response to interest group pres
sure. Although some political scientists and public choice economists
favor the latter explanation (e.g., Epstein and Ferguson 1984; Anderson, Shughart, and Tollison 1988), most economists and economic his
torians blame the Fed's policy on misguided policy rules, as well as on

Table 1 Selected Measures of Monetary Policy and Economic Activity
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a $ billions (Historical Statistics 1960, Fl).
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c 1947-1949 = 100 (Historical Statistics 1960, El 13).
d $ millions, June figure (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, Appendix Al).
e $ millions, June figure (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, Appendix Al).
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petty jealousies that limited the Fed's ability to respond decisively to
rapidly changing conditions.
The most prominent explanation of Federal Reserve behavior dur
ing the Great Depression is that of Friedman and Schwartz (1963), who
argue that a distinct shift in policy occurred with the death in 1928 of
Benjamin Strong, Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Like Fisher (1935) before them, Friedman and Schwartz contend that
Strong understood how to employ the tools of monetary policy to min
imize cyclical fluctuations in output and prices and to prevent or limit
financial panics. His death created a void of both leadership and
understanding that left the Fed unresponsive to financial crises, bank
runs, and their contractionary effects.
Under Strong's leadership, the Fed had used the tools at its dis
posal to pursue both domestic and international objectives (Wheelock
1991). Large open-market purchases and discount rate reductions in
1924 and 1927 were apparent attempts both to encourage domestic
economic growth and to enable Great Britain to attract gold reserves
(by lowering U.S. interest rates relative to those in Britain). Open-mar
ket sales and discount rate hikes in 1928-1929, on the other hand, were
intended to discourage stock market speculation, which at least some
Fed officials viewed as a manifestation of inflation.
On the surface, the Fed seems to have been less responsive to the
Depression than it had been to earlier, smaller, cyclical downturns.
Table 2 presents a rough comparison of Federal Reserve actions during
the initial phase of the Great Depression (1929-1931) with Fed actions
during the recessions of 1924 and 1927. The Fed's Index of Industrial
Production serves as a measure of economic activity. The index
declined approximately 20 points from the cyclical peak in April 1923
to the trough in July 1924. The recession of 1927 was considerably
more modest—the index declined 11 points from October 1926 to
October 1927. By contrast, the Index of Industrial Production declined
by 42 points between July 1929 and July 1931 and by another 9 points
from July 1931 to October 1931. In terms of the Fed's basic policy
tools—the discount rate and open-market purchases of government
securities—the Fed was much less vigorous in 1929-1931 than it had
been in response to the smaller recessions of 1924 and 1927. This fact,
along with the occurrence of banking panics and sharp declines in the
money stock and price level during 1929-1931, lead Friedman and
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Table 2 Monetary Policy During Three Recessions
Month
Jul 1929
Oct 1929
Jan 1930
Apr 1930
Jul 1930
Oct 1930
Jan 1931
Apr 1931
Jul 1931
Oct 1931
Apr 1923
Jul 1923
Oct 1923
Jan 1924
Apr 1924
Jul 1924
Oct 1924
Jan 1925
Oct 1926
Jan 1927
Apr 1927
Jul 1927

Oct 1927
Jan 1928

IP
124
118
106
104
93
88
83
88
82
73
106
104
99
100
95
84
95
105
111
107
108
106
102
107

GS
147
154
485
530
583
602
647
600
674
733
229
97
91
118
274
467
585
464
306
310
341
381
506
512

DR
5.0
6.0
4.5
3.5
2.5
2.5
2.0
2.0
1.5
3.5
4.5
4.5
4.5
4.5
4.5
3.5
3.0
3.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
3.5
3.5

i
6.00
6.25
4.88
3.88
3.25
3.00
2.88
2.38
2.00
3.13
5.38
5.13
5.38
4.88
4.63
3.50
3.13
3.63
4.63
4.25
4.13

4.25
4.00
4.00

DL
1096
885
501
231
226
196
253
155
169
614
658
834
873
574
489
315
240
275
663
481
447
454
424
465

DL(NYC)
319
74
39
17
0
6
5
0
0
74
123
143
121
85
45
13
28
32
84
76
78
59
75
94

SOURCE: Board of Governors (1937), pp. 175-177 for IP, and Board of Governors
(1943), pp. 370-371 for GS and DL, pp. 440-441 for DR, pp. 450-451 for /, and p. 400
forDL(NYC).
Definitions:
IP: Index of Industrial Production (seasonally adjusted)
GS: Federal Reserve System's holdings of government securities (in $ mil
lions)
DR: discount rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (in %)
i: commercial paper interest rate (in %)
DL: borrowed reserves of Fed member banks (in $ millions)
DL (NYC): borrowed reserves of New York City Fed member banks (in $ millions)
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Schwartz (1963) to conclude that the intent and implementation of
monetary policy during the Great Depression were dramatically differ
ent from what they had been in 1924 and 1927. 2
Despite the Fed's weak response to the Depression, some research
ers argue that policy changed little, if at all, with Benjamin Strong's
death (e.g., Wicker 1966; Brunner and Meltzer 1968; Wheelock 1991).
During the Depression, the Fed used borrowed reserves (discount-win
dow loans) and market interest rates as policy guides. 3 When member
banks borrowed relatively little from the Federal Reserve discount win
dow or market interest rates were unusually low, Fed officials inter
preted monetary conditions as "easy." Conversely, high levels of
borrowed reserves or high interest rates signaled that money was
"tight." Once the Depression began, both borrowed reserves and inter
est rates fell sharply and generally remained low, giving Fed officials
the impression that money was plentiful and "cheap."
The Fed's use of discount-window borrowing and interest rates as
policy guides during the Depression appears consistent with the policy
framework that Benjamin Strong had outlined when he was running
the Fed. Speaking to Federal Reserve officials in 1926, for example,
Strong described his rule of thumb for determining how to use openmarket policy during a recession:
Should we go into a business recession while the member
banks were continuing to borrow directly 500 or 600 million
dollars ... we should consider taking steps to relieve some of
the pressure which this borrowing induces by purchasing gov
ernment securities and thus enabling member banks to reduce
their indebtedness . . .
As a guide to the timing and extent of any [open-market] pur
chases which might appear desirable, one of our best guides
would be the amount of borrowing by member banks in princi
pal centers . . . Our experience has shown that when New York
City banks are borrowing in the neighborhood of 100 million
dollars or more, there is then some real pressure for reducing
loans, and money rates tend to be markedly higher than the dis
count rate . . . When member banks are owing us about 50 mil
lion dollars or less the situation appears to be comfortable, with
no marked pressure for liquidation, (quoted by Chandler 1958,
pp. 239-240)
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By Strong's guidelines, additional open-market purchases were not
called for in 1929-1931. The borrowed reserves (discount loans) of all
Fed member banks as well as those of New York City banks declined
far below their levels of 1924 and 1927 (Table 2). Similarly, money
market interest rates were unusually low in 1930-1931. Thus, by
Strong's measures, the stance of monetary policy in 1930-1931
appears to have been quite easy. Policymakers inferred that there was
little more the Fed could, or should, do, and that it was now up to the
economy to respond. As Strong (1926, p. 468) had said on another
occasion, "The Reserve Banks do not push credit into use" (emphasis
in original).
Many economists have noted that rigid use of borrowed reserves or
interest rates as policy instruments will cause the money supply to rise
and fall procyclically because borrowed reserves and interest rates tend
to vary positively with economic activity. Moreover, the banking cri
ses of 1929-1933 made borrowed reserves an especially poor indicator
of monetary conditions during the Depression because a fear of runs
made banks especially reluctant to suggest any weakness to depositors,
which discount-window borrowing might do (Wheelock 1991).
Although a few System officials questioned the reliability of borrowed
reserves as a policy guide during the Depression, the prevailing view
was that monetary conditions were exceptionally easy and that the
economy's failure to expand was not the fault of monetary policy. We
cannot say for certain whether monetary policy would have been dif
ferent during 1929-1931 had Benjamin Strong lived, but it does seem
to have been consistent with Strong's response to business cycle down
turns in 1924 and 1927 and the guidelines for assessing the stance of
monetary policy he had outlined.

THE GOLD CRISIS OF 1931
Federal Reserve policy during the initial phase of the Great
Depression—from the stock market crash in October 1929 through
September 1931—was largely predictable from the policy guidelines
followed by Benjamin Strong during the 1920s. But interest rates and
discount-window borrowing shot up dramatically in the fourth week of
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September 1931 and remained high until early 1932. During this
period, the Fed raised its discount rate but failed to make significant
open-market purchases, even though the Depression was getting worse
and monetary conditions were exceptionally restrictive.
The year 1931 was marked by a series of financial crises that led to
suspension of the gold standard by a number of European countries,
culminating with Great Britain on September 21. Following Britain's
departure from gold, speculation that the United States would soon fol
low triggered a massive gold outflow from the United States and atten
dant decline in commercial bank reserves. The Federal Reserve acted
to stem the outflow by raising its discount rate—the classic defense—
but did not use open-market operations to replace the outflow of com
mercial bank reserves.
In the six weeks ending October 28, 1931, the monetary gold stock
of the United States declined by $727 million, or some 15 percent. At
this point, the gold stock stabilized, but uncertainty about the condition
of American banks caused bank customers to redeem their deposits for
currency. Between mid September and the end of December, currency
held by the public rose $544 million (11 percent). Banks borrowed
heavily from the Federal Reserve to replace reserves lost from deposit
redemptions for gold and currency, even though the Fed had increased
its discount rate from 1.5 percent to 3.5 percent.4
The Fed made virtually no open-market purchases of government
securities during the crisis. On February 24, 1932, the Fed's security
portfolio was the same size that it had been on September 16, 1931,
and thus open-market operations had contributed nothing toward off
setting the gold and currency outflows. While increased discount-win
dow borrowing offset these outflows somewhat, member bank total
reserves still fell by $540 million, or 22 percent, between mid Septem
ber and the end of February.
On the surface, the Fed's behavior in the fourth quarter of 1931
appears inconsistent both with Benjamin Strong's policy guidelines
and with appropriate lender of last resort policy. As Friedman and
Schwartz (1963, pp. 315-322) describe, the Fed had acted to halt an
"external drain" of reserves from the banking system (gold outflows),
but not the "internal drain" (conversion of deposits into currency).
The Fed argued that it had not made open-market purchases during
the crisis of 1931 because its own reserve position was in jeopardy.
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The Federal Reserve Banks were required to maintain gold reserves
equal to 40 percent of their notes outstanding and 35 percent of their
deposit liabilities (which consisted mainly of member bank reserve
accounts). In addition, the Reserve Banks were required to hold collat
eral in the form of gold or eligible securities against their note issues
(gold held as reserves also counted as collateral). Finally, the Reserve
Banks were required to deposit gold with the U.S. Treasury equal to at
least 5 percent of their note issues that were collateralized by securi
ties.
Securities eligible for use as collateral for Federal Reserve note
issues included bankers acceptances and commercial notes the Reserve
Banks had purchased or discounted for member banks, but not govern
ment securities acquired in the open market. Thus, purchases of gov
ernment securities increased Fed liabilities but did not add to the
collateral backing them, and so the Fed had to hold excess reserves
before it could engage in open-market purchases. 5
From July to October 1931, Federal Reserve Bank gold reserves
declined from over 84 percent of Fed liabilities to 63 percent.
Although the Fed still had sufficient gold to cover its gold reserve
requirement, some of its excess gold reserve was used as collateral for
Reserve Bank note issues. Consequently, the Fed's "free gold," i.e., the
amount of gold not currently pledged as reserves or collateral, dwin
dled.
In its 1932 Annual Report, the Federal Reserve Board implied that
a lack of free gold reserves had kept it from purchasing government
securities during the 1931 crisis, and it noted that large purchases had
followed enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act of February 27, 1932,
which had expanded the types of securities that were eligible for use as
collateral for Fed liabilities to include U.S. government securities (see
also the Federal Reserve Bulletin, March 1932). Friedman and
Schwartz (1963, pp. 399-406) contend that the Fed's claim that a lack
of free gold had prevented open-market purchases was a ruse, though
others, such as Epstein and Ferguson (1984, pp. 964-965) argue that
Fed officials truly felt constrained by a lack of reserves.
Regardless of whether or not the Fed was constrained by its collat
eral requirement, the System had another option—the Federal Reserve
Board had the right to suspend the Fed's reserve requirements. I am
aware of no evidence that the Fed considered suspension, however.

138 Wheelock

Wicker (1966, pp. 169-170) argues that Fed officials feared that openmarket purchases would exacerbate gold outflows by increasing doubt
about the Fed's resolve to maintain the value of the dollar in terms of
gold over the long run. Presumably these officials believed that sus
pension of the Fed's reserve requirements would also cause gold out
flows, and hence that a combination of suspension and open-market
purchases was untenable.

DID THE FED FOLLOW GOLD STANDARD ORTHODOXY?
Fed officials believed strongly in preserving the gold standard, and
at first glance their policy actions appear to have reflected gold stan
dard doctrine. But, two aspects of policy—the Fed's delay in raising
its discount rate following Britain's suspension of the gold standard,
and the Fed's long-time policy of limiting the impact of gold flows on
the domestic money supply—suggest otherwise.
Wicker (1996, pp. 86-94) argues that the gold standard played
only a "minor" role in the discount rate increases of October 1931, cit
ing the fact that the discount rate was not increased until two and onehalf weeks after Britain suspended gold payments and the United
States had experienced heavy gold outflows. As further evidence, he
cites meeting records of the board of directors of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York in which George Harrison, Governor of the New
York Fed, argued against raising rates in the wake of Britain's action
and then buried defense of gold among other reasons when later advo
cating a discount rate increase. Wicker argues that the Fed's policy
was thus not a "knee-jerk" response to gold standard conventions.
Chandler (1971, p. 177) interprets the Fed's delay in raising its dis
count rate somewhat differently. He argues that some Fed officials
believed that a discount rate increase might suggest weakness and
thereby exacerbate gold outflows, though fear that a rate increase
might hurt the economy also played some part in the delay. Moreover,
other Federal Reserve policymakers did press for an immediate dis
count rate increase to defend the gold standard. Fed Governor Eugene
Meyer, for example, argued that "an advance in the rate was called for
by every known rule, and . . . foreigners would regard it as a lack of
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courage if the rate were not advanced" (quoted by Wicker 1996, p. 93).
Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 383) cite a memorandum prepared
for a meeting of the Fed's Open Market Committee in November 1931,
which concluded that the "foreign and domestic drains upon bank
reserves were met in the classic way by increases in the discount rate
combined with a policy of free lending." Although disputing the
memo's conclusion regarding the policy's efficacy, Friedman and
Schwartz (1963) agree that the Fed had sought to maintain the gold
standard.
Besides the delay in raising the discount rate in 1931, the Fed's
long-standing policy of limiting the impact of gold flows on the domes
tic money stock also suggests that the Fed was not fully committed to
the gold standard. Gold standard doctrine (the "rules of the game")
held that gold inflows (outflows) should be permitted to increase
(decrease) a country's money stock and price level so as to induce
shifts in capital flows and the balance of trade that would limit future
gold movements.6 Since the early 1920s, however, the Fed had largely
offset reserve fluctuations caused by flows of gold, currency, and other
sources by varying the quantity of reserves supplied by open-market
operations and discount-window lending. In essence, the Fed "steril
ized" gold flows, as Benjamin Strong explained in 1926:
In the old days there was a direct relation between the coun
try's stock of gold, bank deposits and the price level because
bank deposits were . . . based on the stock of gold and bore a
constant relationship to the gold stock . . . But in recent years
the relationship between gold and bank deposits is no longer as
close or direct . . . because the Federal Reserve System has
given elasticity to the country's bank reserves . . . Federal
Reserve bank credit is an elastic buffer between the country's
gold supply and bank credit. (Strong 1926, p. 470)

Moreover, Strong credited the Fed with preventing inflation by offset
ting gold inflows in 1921 and 1922:
As the flow of gold imports was pouring into the United States
in 1921 and 1922, many economists abroad, and in this country
as well, expected this inward flow of gold would result in a
huge credit expansion and a serious price inflation. That no
such expansion or inflation has taken place is due to the fact
that the amount of Federal Reserve credit in use was dimin-
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ished as gold imports continued. Thus . . . the presence of the
Reserve System may be said to have prevented rather than fos
tered inflation. (Strong 1926, p. 471)

Although the Fed generally sterilized gold flows, it proved willing
to deviate from that policy when it seemed necessary to protect the
gold standard. The easing of monetary policy in 1924 and 1927 seems
at least partly motivated by a desire to repel gold inflows and thereby
assist Britain's ability to maintain gold reserves (Wicker 1966; Whee
lock 1991). Moreover, when gold outflows reduced the Fed's reserve
ratio in 1920-1921, the Fed increased its discount rate to 7 percent (a
level not reached again until 1973) and endured a sharp deflation in
order to preserve its gold reserve. This episode demonstrated the Fed's
resolve to maintain its gold reserve and set the precedent for its policy
in late 1931. Benjamin Strong may have "discovered" and actively
used open-market policy, but he was unwilling to conduct policy out
side the framework of the gold standard. He testified in 1928 that
When you are speaking of efforts simply to stabilize com
merce, industry, agriculture, employment and so on, without
regard to the penalties of violation of the gold standard, you
are talking about human judgment and the management of
prices which I do not believe in at all. (quoted by Burgess
1930, p. 331)

Like Strong, Federal Reserve officials in 1931 viewed preservation
of the gold standard as fundamental to long-run economic stability, and
to preserve the gold standard for the long-term they were willing to
undertake policies that might be destabilizing in the short run. Their
response to the gold crisis of 1931 may have sealed the fate of Herbert
Hoover and the Republicans in Congress, however, and ensured the
election of politicians who would prove willing to change dramatically
the institutions of monetary policymaking in the United States, includ
ing the gold standard.
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INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES TO THE MONETARY
POLICY REGIME
The year 1932 marked the beginning of a series of institutional
reforms with potentially large consequences for monetary policy
(Table 3).7 Among the most significant were the Glass-Steagall Act of
1932, which permitted the Federal Reserve to use government securi
ties to back its note issues; suspension of the international gold stan
dard by executive order on March 6, 1933 (ratified by Congress on
March 9); the Thomas Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1933, which, among other things, permitted the Federal Reserve to
adjust commercial bank reserve requirements; the Gold Reserve Act of
1934, which authorized the President to fix the dollar price of gold and
established the Treasury's Exchange Stabilization Fund; and the Bank
ing Act of 1935, which markedly altered the structure of the Federal
Reserve System and expanded the Fed's authority to adjust reserve
requirements.
By permitting U.S. government securities to serve as backing for
Federal Reserve notes, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1932 removed an
important constraint on discretionary monetary policy and enhanced
the Fed's ability to initiate transactions that monetized government
debt. 8 Although he lent his name to the enabling legislation, Carter
Glass, who had sponsored the original Federal Reserve Act, apparently
voiced considerable worry about the inflationary potential of permit
ting government obligations to serve as collateral for Federal Reserve
notes (Chandler 1971, p. 189). I argue below that Glass was prescient
in his concerns.9
The next institutional change came when President Franklin
Roosevelt suspended the gold standard upon taking office in March
1933. Roosevelt was willing—perhaps forced—to take the step that
Federal Reserve officials had so feared. As in other countries, eco
nomic recovery followed suspension and thereby gave credibility to a
regime of "managed money" (see Eichengreen 1992 or Temin 1989).
Using authority granted by the Gold Reserve Act of January 1934,
Roosevelt fixed the value of gold at $35 per ounce (the previous level
had been $20.67). Although the ownership of gold and its use for
domestic payments remained prohibited, the United States returned to
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Table 3 Key Institutional Changes in Monetary Policy in the Early 1930s
1932

Glass-Steagall Act (February 27): temporarily made U.S.
government securities eligible collateral for Federal Reserve note
issues, thereby expanding the Fed's ability to make open-market
purchases (made permanent in 1933); also temporarily relaxed rules
on discount-window lending (extended in 1933, made permanent in
1935).

1933

Emergency Banking Act (March 9): ratified suspension of the gold
standard.
Thomas Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act (May 12):
authorized the Fed to set reserve requirements; gave the President
authority to require open-market purchases by the Federal Reserve
and to fix the weights of the gold and silver dollars.
Banking Act of 1933 (June 16): enhanced Federal Reserve Board
control of discount-window lending; technical adjustments to Federal
Reserve System organization.

1934

Gold Reserve Act (January 30): authorized transfer of monetary gold
stock to the U.S. Treasury; amended the President's authority to fix
the dollar prices of gold and silver; and established the Exchange
Stabilization Fund.
Silver Purchase Act (June 19): authorized the President to purchase
and nationalize monetary silver; authorized limited Federal Reserve
lending to industrial and commercial firms.

1935

Banking Act of 1935 (August 23): reorganized Federal Reserve's
Open Market Committee and otherwise enhanced the authority of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System relative to the
Federal Reserve Banks; extended Federal Reserve authority to adjust
member bank reserve requirements.
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the gold standard for the settlement of payments with other countries
that also were on the gold standard. The restored gold standard, how
ever, differed fundamentally from the previous standard in the degree
to which its operation was removed from private markets and placed
under control of government authorities. Americans were forbidden
from holding gold, gold clauses in private contracts were made illegal,
and the Treasury would sell gold only for making foreign payments.
Gold also was no longer regarded as an absolute exogenous check
on government manipulation of the supply of money. Under the
weight of the Great Depression, the ideology of the gold standard,
which viewed gold as fundamental to a country's economic prosperity,
had cracked. Although the dollar remained linked to gold, the link was
weakened and, perhaps more important, government authorities had
demonstrated a willingness to manipulate the gold standard to limit the
extent to which it would interfere with discretionary monetary policy.
Thereafter, when the Fed's gold reserve requirement threatened to limit
money supply growth, the reserve requirements were reduced and ulti
mately eliminated with apparently little debate or fanfare. The gold
standard as it existed after 1933 was thus fundamentally different from
its precursor and foreshadowed the Bretton Woods gold standard that
was to replace it after World War II.
In addition to marking a fundamental shift in the degree to which
gold served as a constraint on domestic monetary policy, the revalua
tion of gold in 1934 left the U.S. Treasury with a capital gain of some
$2.8 billion on its gold holdings. Under authority conveyed by the
Gold Reserve Act of 1934, the Treasury used $2 billion of its windfall
to establish the Exchange Stabilization Fund: "For the purpose of sta
bilizing the exchange value of the dollar, the Secretary of the Treasury
... is authorized ... to deal in gold and foreign exchange and such
other instruments of credit and securities as he may deem necessary."
Although the operations of the Exchange Stabilization Fund during
the 1930s had little effect on the quantity or growth of bank reserves,
the size and open-ended authority of the Fund were widely viewed as a
threat to the Federal Reserve System and its ability to effect monetary
policy. For example, Roy Young, then Governor of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, argued that the Gold Reserve Act "gives the
Secretary of the Treasury such powers, of a permanent nature, that he
could nullify anything we [the Federal Reserve] could do" (quoted by
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Johnson 1939, p. 36). The Commercial and Financial Chronicle (Janu
ary 20, 1934, p. 367) had a similar reaction: "The Reserve authorities
have been reduced to shadowy nonentities, the Federal Reserve System
having become simply an adjunct of the United States Treasury and the
Federal Government, to do what they are told to do."
In addition to the Exchange Stabilization Fund, additional authori
ties granted the President and Treasury Secretary included the right to
"request" the Federal Reserve to use open-market purchases to
increase bank reserves by up to $3 billion, and, if the Fed refused, to
issue a commensurate amount of fiat currency. This power was granted
by the Thomas Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1933, which, along with the Silver Purchase Act of 1934, also autho
rized the purchase of silver and permitted the President to devalue the
silver dollar. Between 1933 and 1938, the Treasury purchased 1.8 bil
lion ounces of silver, thereby increasing bank reserves by $1 billion
(some 20 percent of the total increase in reserves during the period).
Had the President chosen to devalue the dollar in terms of silver, the
Treasury would have reaped a $2.2 billion windfall on its silver hold
ings (Johnson 1939, pp. 195-198). In summarizing the various new
authorities given the administration, Johnson (1939, p. 202) concludes,
The President could double or triple bank reserves, had com
plete discretion over the gold value—and consequently the for
eign exchange value—of the dollar, and could establish
bimetallism by proclamation, in other words, he could com
pletely refashion the monetary system of the country, and the
sole criteria required were his own subjective evaluations of the
situation.

Organizational changes to the Federal Reserve System may have
also contributed to the Fed's willingness to accept the administration's
desired monetary policy. The authors of the Federal Reserve Act
agreed that the Federal Reserve System should not be a "central bank"
on the European model, but a federal system of semi-autonomous
Reserve Banks with an overseeing board. Dissatisfaction with the sub
sequent performance of the Federal Reserve, both during the 1920s and
during the 1929-1933 period, led to reforms that enhanced the author
ity of the Federal Reserve Board at the expense of the Reserve Banks.
Marriner Eccles accepted the chairmanship of the Federal Reserve
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Board in 1933 with the understanding that he would have freedom to
redesign the Federal Reserve System. His reforms included limits on
the power of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which he viewed
as an instrument of the private interests of New York bankers, and mea
sures to ensure oversight and coordination of the activities of the
regional Reserve Banks in pursuit of the national interest (Eccles 1966,
pp. 170-172).
Under Eccles' plan, which was largely adopted by the Banking Act
of 1935, the Board of Governors was given substantial control over
open-market operations and Federal Reserve Bank discount rates. The
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) was reconstituted to include
all 7 members of the Board of Governors and just 5 of the 12 Reserve
Bank presidents. 10 The legislation thereby increased the authority and
stature of the Federal Reserve officials located in Washington and
appointed by the President. On the other hand, it also sought to limit
the influence of the President by removing the Secretary of the Trea
sury and Comptroller of the Currency as ex officio FOMC members.
With his reforms, Eccles intended that monetary policy making would
be by professionals whose allegiance was solely to the national inter
est. These changes, however, increased political pressures on the Fed
at the same time that establishment of the Exchange Stabilization Fund
and other measures increased the administration's power to conduct
monetary policy. Consequently, these reforms shifted power away
from the Fed toward the Treasury and promoted an inflation bias in
monetary policy.

THE POSTWAR MONETARY REGIME

From 1933 to 1951, the Federal Reserve System was largely subor
dinate to the Treasury in the conduct of monetary policy. The Fed
increased reserve requirements in 1936 and 1937 to absorb some of the
large volume of excess reserves that member banks had built up. A
subsequent increase in government security yields angered Treasury
officials, however, and the Fed was forced to make open-market pur
chases and eventually reverse some of the change in reserve require
ments.
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During World War II, the Fed agreed to prevent government secu
rity yields from rising above predetermined levels. The Fed remained
an instrument of debt management until 1951, when rising inflation
caused Fed officials to argue for an independent monetary policy.
Negotiations between the Fed and Treasury produced the Accord of
March 1951, in which the Treasury agreed that the prices of govern
ment securities should be permitted to find their market levels and the
Fed agreed to be mindful of Treasury debt financing in carrying out its
monetary policies. Tacitly, the Fed accepted stability of government
securities prices as an objective of monetary policy. In particular, the
Fed followed a policy known as "even keel," in which it limited fluctu
ations in Treasury bill yields around Treasury issuing dates.
The Bretton Woods agreements of 1944 established the interna
tional monetary regime under which the Fed operated in the postwar
era. 11 From the end of World War II through 1958, international trade
and capital movements took place to the extent permitted by exchange
and capital controls, with international payments settled by means of
bilateral agreements among countries. Early on, European countries
ran large current account deficits, and the world suffered from a "dollar
shortage." American economic strength and stability, along with the
Marshall Plan and other cooperative efforts, caused the dollar to
emerge as the key currency of the international payments system. As
the 1950s progressed, Europe strengthened economically and several
countries ran substantial current account surpluses. The main Western
European currencies became convertible into dollars for current
account transactions in 1959 (various capital controls remained). The
United States, in turn, maintained convertibility of the dollar into gold
at the fixed price of $35 per ounce. Bretton Woods was thus a goldexchange standard, as its inter-war predecessor had been. However,
the mechanism of dollar convertibility under Bretton Woods was fun
damentally different from the mechanism of the pre-Great Depression
gold standard, and the new mechanism explains how the United States
could conduct an inflationary monetary policy while maintaining a
fixed exchange rate between the dollar and gold.
Unlike the gold standard as it existed before 1933, under the Bret
ton Woods System, the balance of payments could exert monetary dis
cipline only to the extent permitted by central banks themselves. This
mechanism reflected a fundamental shift in ideology, from one that
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saw maintaining gold convertibility as paramount for long-run prosper
ity, to an ideology that viewed fixed exchange rates and gold convert
ibility as desirable, but not so important as to sacrifice short-run
economic stability in defense of the international system. Discretion
ary monetary policy—"managed money"—was permitted under Bretton Woods to a degree never before achieved under a gold standard. 12
Under Bretton Woods, American balance of payments deficits (sur
pluses) would be reflected in rising (falling) foreign central bank hold
ings of U.S. dollars unless foreign central banks and the United States
exchanged dollars for gold. Although foreign central banks could
enforce monetary discipline on the United States, in practice they
refrained from doing so until 1965, when the French began large-scale
conversions of dollars into gold in the face of large and persisting
American payments deficits. Throughout the 1960s, dollars held out
side of the United States increased rapidly, while American gold
reserves dwindled (Figure I). 13 The United States' commitment to
gold convertibility thus became less and less credible. Numerous rem
edies other than a substantial tightening of monetary policy were
attempted to improve the U.S. payments deficit. But, without address
ing the fundamental problem, the Bretton Woods System was destined
to collapse, which it did when President Nixon closed the gold window
on August 15, 1971. 14

AMERICAN INFLATION

The Bretton Woods System collapsed because the dollar shortage
of the 1950s was replaced by a dollar glut in the 1960s. The Federal
Reserve pursued a monetary policy that contained inflation throughout
much of the decade following the Fed-Treasury Accord of March 1951.
As illustrated in Figure 2, during the 1950s, the growth rate of Ml
(which consists mainly of commercial bank demand deposits and cur
rency held by the public) generally moved opposite to the rate of infla
tion (as measured here by the Consumer Price Index). 15 Inflation
control was not the sole objective of monetary policy during the 1950s,
but it did generally coincide with the Fed's other objectives of limiting
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fluctuations in national output and employment and preserving the sta
bility of the government securities market.
The money supply growth rate began to accelerate in the early
1960s and, by the mid 1960s, inflation had also begun to rise (Figure
2). The desires of Fed officials to promote full employment and to sta
bilize the yields on government securities explain the initial accelera
tion of money growth. Fed officials remained committed to controlling
inflation, however, and the accelerating inflation rate of the 1960s did
not reflect a substantial change in the taste for inflation among Fed offi
cials. Rather, the Fed stumbled into an inflationary policy as much
because of flaws in its operating strategy as because of a desire to pur
sue objectives other than inflation control.
The operating framework of Federal Reserve policy in the 1950s
and 1960s was much like that which Benjamin Strong had described in
the 1920s. That strategy was flawed because it permitted destabilizing
fluctuations in the supply of money. I believe this helps explain why
Fed officials were able to convince themselves that their policies were
promoting recovery from the Depression when in fact they were per
mitting a contractionary decline in the money stock (Wheelock 1991).
Similarly, the Fed's use of this operating strategy in the 1960s explains
how Fed officials could argue that policy was "leaning against the
wind" of inflation despite accelerating money supply growth.
The Fed's policy strategy of the inter-war era, and its post-Accord
reincarnation, focused on the levels of market interest rates and the net
borrowed, or "free," reserves of commercial banks. Fed officials
engaged in open-market operations to alter the level of free reserves,
which equals the difference between reserves that banks hold in excess
of legal requirements and reserves borrowed from the Fed's discount
window. Through free reserves, the Fed sought to manipulate money
market interest rates (Treasury bill yields in the early 1960s, the federal
funds rate later on). Open-market purchases (sales) tend to add to
(subtract from) the stock of free reserves, and an increase (decrease) in
free reserves was viewed as an easing (tightening) of policy. In Figure
3, the level of free reserves is plotted alongside the rate of inflation for
the period from the Accord (March 1951) through December 1971.
The Fed tended to reduce free reserves to combat increases in inflation
and increase free reserves when inflation was declining. Thus, Fed
officials sought to contract the level of free reserves in response to the
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generally rising rate of inflation of the 1960s. Because market interest
rates tended to rise, Fed officials were further convinced that policy
was tight.
Many economists, especially monetarists, criticized the Fed's pol
icy strategy because of its tendency to exacerbate swings in money
supply growth. 16 As illustrated in Figure 4, money supply growth
accelerated throughout much of the 1960s, even as Fed officials ratch
eted down the level of free reserves. The evidence therefore does not
indicate that Fed officials lacked concern for inflation or failed to
attempt to check the rising price level. Nevertheless, the Fed's policy
permitted the money supply to rise at an inflationary rate.
The Federal Reserve was not powerless to halt the rising inflation,
and Fed officials understood that inflation was contributing to the
American balance of payments deficit and threatening the gold stan
dard. Still, under the Bretton Woods System, U.S. policymakers did
not have to make price stability the sole, or even primary, objective of
monetary policy as long as other countries were willing to hold the
growing supply of dollars available on world markets. Foreign central
banks did forbear for a time, particularly since the dollar was the key
currency of the international payments system. This gave the United
States breathing room—not, as it turned out, to correct its balance of
payments deficit, but to pursue other policy goals while inflation wors
ened and the collapse of Bretton Woods became inevitable.

THE MONETARY POLICY LEGACY OF THE
GREAT DEPRESSION

The Federal Reserve stumbled into an inflationary monetary policy
in the early 1960s because, absent discipline exerted by balance of pay
ments deficits, policymakers were able to pursue other objectives,
namely employment growth and low interest rates on government debt.
With its focus on free reserves and interest rates, the Fed's operating
framework tended to cause money supply growth to accelerate at an
inflationary pace as economic activity expanded. Because the Fed had
used much the same operating framework before the Depression, this
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cause of inflationary policy during the 1960s was not a result of the
Depression having occurred.
Keynesian Macroeconomics and Monetary Policymaking
Much of the "inflationary bias" in monetary policy during the 1960s
can, however, be attributed to changed institutions and economic policy
ideology caused by the Great Depression. Keynesian macroeconomics
and its influence on economic policymaking was an important ideolog
ical product of the Great Depression. The influence of Keynesian eco
nomic ideas on policymaking during the 1960s has received
considerable attention (e.g., DeLong 1995), with Lucas (1980, p. 704)
writing that one of the "main features of the Keynesian Revolution and
the neoclassical synthesis into which it evolved in the United States . . .
[was] the onset of the Great Depression and the consequent shift of
attention from explaining a recurrent pattern of ups and downs to
explaining an economy apparently stuck in an interminable down."
Keynesian-oriented policymakers believed that monetary and fiscal
policy could reliably increase aggregate demand and employment
along a stable Phillips curve. Central to discussions of monetary pol
icy among Federal Reserve officials was the perceived trade-off of
unemployment and inflation. As Federal Reserve Governor Sherman
Maisel explained it, "There is a trade-off between idle men and a more
stable value for the dollar. A conscious decision must be made as to
how much unemployment and loss of output must be made in order to
get smaller price rises" (Maisel 1973, p. 14). Maisel added that "at
least some of the Committee's differences on policy reflected differ
ences in basic value judgments regarding the relative importance of
various conflicting goals—for example, regarding the appropriate
trade-off between employment and price stability" (FOMC Minutes,
October 20, 1970, p. 41). 17
Maisel's views were widely shared among his colleagues, includ
ing Arthur Burns, who became Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board
of Governors in 1970. Burns consistently was among those favoring
an easy monetary policy in 1970 and 1971 and often cited the conse
quences of monetary policy for employment. At an FOMC meeting on
March 9, 1971, for example, Maisel read a New York Times editorial to
the effect that "anyone who was a party to the use of unemployment to
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combat inflation had a moral duty to lead the way, either by relinquish
ing his job or by contributing his income to the support of the involun
tarily unemployed." Burns replied that "he wanted to endorse Mr.
MaiseFs . . . comments," that the ongoing economic recovery was
"fragile" and that "rising [interest] rates could prove fatal to the pros
pects for recovery" (FOMC Minutes, March 9, 1971, pp. 44-49). 18
To avoid confronting the inflation-unemployment trade-off, Burns,
like many of his Fed colleagues, advocated wage and price controls so
that monetary policy could focus on fighting unemployment. More
over, Burns frequently argued that inflation associated with increases
in wages and other production costs, as opposed to excessive monetary
growth, should not be fought with tight monetary policy. At an FOMC
meeting on June 8,1971, for example, he argued that "Monetary policy
could do very little to arrest an inflation that rested so heavily on wagecost pressures ... A much higher rate of unemployment produced by
monetary policy would not moderate such pressures appreciably . . .
He intended to continue to press [the administration] hard for an effec
tive incomes policy" (FOMC Minutes, June 8,1971, p. 51). Burns and
other Fed officials frequently argued that monetary policy could not
effectively control inflation, but that fiscal policy and wage and price
controls could better accomplish the task. Monetary policy, on the
other hand, should prevent interest rates from rising and choking off
economic growth. In arguing against a policy tightening in April 1971,
Burns contended that any increase in long-term interest rates would
slow the economy "and the nation might then enter on a long period of
economic stagnation. The Federal Reserve could not permit that devel
opment" (FOMC Minutes, April 6, 1971, p. 56).
During the 1960s and 1970s, Fed officials believed that policy
actions to push down interest rates could promote output and employ
ment growth. Such action would not necessarily cause inflation, they
argued, and if it did, inflation was an acceptable cost of high employ
ment. Moreover, wage and price controls could limit inflation. It is my
view that Federal Reserve policymakers were no less concerned about
the unemployed and the prospects for economic growth during the
Great Depression. Their views about how monetary policy could be
used to foster growth, however, were almost diametrically opposed to
those of Fed officials in the 1960s and early 1970s.
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During the Depression, a common view among Fed officials was
that pumping liquidity into the economy would only prolong the
Depression by delaying the adjustments to wages and prices that they
saw as necessary for a recovery to begin. One example of this point of
view is evident in the comments of William McChesney Martin, Gov
ernor of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis during the Depression
and father of William McChesney Martin, Jr., the Federal Reserve
Board's Chairman from 1951 to 1970. In early 1930, Martin argued,
I cannot see how the situation can be benefited by putting fifty
millions of dollars, or, in fact, any other amount, into the gen
eral market at this time . . . The reason that more money is not
being used is because it is not needed, and when there is
already sufficient money to meet the expressed needs, it seems
to me unwise artificially to add to the amount already suffi
cient . . . because based on a redundancy of money rather than
on actual needs may be hazardous, (quoted by Chandler 1971,
p. 142)

A similar view was expressed by George Norris, Governor of the Fed
eral Reserve Bank of Philadelphia:
We believe that the correction must come about through
reduced production, reduced inventories, the gradual reduction
of consumer credit, the liquidation of security loans, and the
accumulation of savings through the exercise of thrift . . . We
have been putting out credit in a period of depression, when it
was not wanted and could not be used, (quoted by Chandler
1971, p. 137)

The Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, John
Calkins, also argued against trying to stimulate the economy by lower
ing interest rates: "With credit cheap and redundant we do not believe
that business recovery will be accelerated by making credit cheaper
and more redundant" (quoted by Friedman and Schwartz 1963, p. 372).
The views of Martin, Norris, and Calkins were not atypical among
Federal Reserve officials during the 1930s. Nor was it unusual for gov
ernment officials outside of the Federal Reserve to hold similar views.
Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon, for example, believed that
the best medicine for the Depression was to "liquidate labor, liquidate
stocks, liquidate the fanners, liquidate real estate . .. purge the rotten-
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ness out of the system" (quoted by Eichengreen 1992, p. 251). Such a
prescription could hardly be called "Keynesian."
Political Pressures on the Fed
The macroeconomic model used by Federal Reserve officials dur
ing the 1960s and 1970s was quite different from that used in the early
1930s. So too was the extent to which the Federal Reserve was pressured by other government officials.
Although the Federal Reserve has never been a truly "indepen
dent" central bank, certain institutional changes occurring as a result of
the Great Depression subjected the Fed to greater political pressure,
while at the same time increasing the opportunity for the Fed to mone
tize fiscal deficits. Together these changes added an inflation bias to
monetary policy.
The Glass-Steagall Act of 1932, as noted previously, permitted
U.S. Government securities to serve as partial backing for Federal
Reserve monetary liabilities. Thus monetization of fiscal deficits could
occur even if the Fed held no excess gold or commercial paper
reserves. In the 1930s, special authorities given by Congress to the
President to fix the value of the dollar in terms of gold, to monetize sil
ver, to buy and sell foreign exchange, and even to order the Federal
Reserve to make open-market purchases, all weakened the Fed's abil
ity to conduct an independent monetary policy. In addition, changes to
the structure of the Federal Reserve System itself increased the con
centration of power within the Fed in the hands of government appoin
tees located in Washington.
Although the Fed-Treasury Accord of 1951 returned a measure of
independence to the Fed, the level and stability of government security
yields remained a key focus of monetary policy. Part of the explana
tion for this focus may rest with the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The
Fed had ensured plentiful and inexpensive funding for the Treasury
during the two world wars, and the Fed may have sought to limit
increases in government security yields during the Korean and Vietnam
episodes out of a sense of patriotic duty. 19 A by-product of such a pol
icy, of course, was a faster rate of increase in the supply of money.
New Deal changes to the Fed's internal structure may have also
contributed toward its policy of limiting increases in interest rates. By

158

Wheelock

reducing the role of Federal Reserve Bank presidents in favor of the
Board of Governors, the Banking Act of 1935 subjected the Fed to
greater political influence by concentrating power in the hands of
Washington-based officials who are presidential appointees. Political
influence on monetary policy has been the subject of extensive study
(e.g., Woolley 1984; Havrilesky 1993), and a general conclusion seems
to be that the short, finite horizon of political election cycles gives pol
iticians an incentive to favor more expansionary monetary policies than
does the public as a whole. To the extent that politicians are able to get
the monetary policy they desire, the result is a higher long-run rate of
inflation than would otherwise occur. Thus, countries with less inde
pendent central banks tend to have higher inflation rates than countries
with relatively independent central banks.
An infamous example of Federal Reserve acquiescence to political
pressure came in 1972, when at the request of the administration
Arthur Burns was alleged to have increased the money supply growth
rate to promote President Nixon's reelection (see Wells 1994 for dis
cussion). Whether or not such overt pressure was exerted, it is clear
that under both Burns and Martin political considerations influenced
the setting of monetary policy. With the possible exception of Nixon's
reelection, such pressure was not overtly connected to elections, but
rather to consideration of the administration's or Congress' policy
preferences. To the extent such considerations influenced policy out
comes, they would almost always have done so on the side of promot
ing inflation.20
Monetary Policy and the Balance of Payments

The Fed's operating strategy, desire to promote high employment,
and pressures on the Fed to keep interest rates low all gave monetary
policy a bias toward inflation. By themselves, however, they could not
have resulted in a sustained inflation without an accommodating inter
national monetary regime. Under the classical gold standard, for
example, an inflationary monetary policy could not have been sus
tained. But, under Bretton Woods, sustained inflation was possible as
long as foreign central banks were willing to hold the dollars they
accumulated as a result of the American payments deficit, rather than
demand payment in gold for those dollars.
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Although the Bretton Woods System provided some insulation for
discretionary monetary policy, Federal Reserve officials understood
that the United States could not run a balance of payments deficit
indefinitely. But, Fed officials were also wary of combating a balance
of payments deficit with policies that might interfere with other goals.
On one occasion, President Alfred Hayes of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, argued that "I would think it unwise to let the gold out
flow itself affect our monetary policy directly, i.e., in the way of using
a tightening move directed specifically toward stemming the flow and
unrelated to domestic economic developments" (FOMC Minutes,
November 10, 1958, pp. 14-15). Another time, a Reserve Bank presi
dent expressed concern about the balance of payments deficit but was
reluctant to advocate a tighter policy for fear of disrupting the market
for government securities: "Generally, he felt that the course of mone
tary policy should be moving toward a more restrictive posture. At the
same time, he was quite concerned about the rate picture in the govern
ment securities market and the problems facing the Treasury in the
future" (FOMC Minutes, May 5, 1959, p. 34). This reluctance to face
squarely gold outflows and a balance of payments deficit stands in
marked contrast to the Fed's reaction to gold outflows in 1931. At that
time, Fed officials agreed that maintaining convertibility of the dollar
into gold at a constant price was fundamental to long-run economic
stability, and they were willing to tighten monetary policy in the mid
dle of a depression to preserve the international monetary regime. By
contrast, in the 1950s and 1960s, Fed officials viewed the balance of
payments with concern but were hesitant to make it the sole, or even
the primary, focus of policy. This change in philosophy, attaching less
importance to the gold standard rule and more to discretionary policy,
was an important legacy of the Great Depression.
Although Fed officials were unwilling to tighten sufficiently to
arrest the balance of payments deficit, they did see the deficit as influ
encing their ability to promote domestic economic activity. Chairman
Martin, for example, argued that "If the Federal Reserve got the reputa
tion of following a cheap money policy just for the sake of doing so,
people abroad would be encouraged to think the System was not con
cerned with the balance of payments or the soundness of the dollar"
(FOMC Minutes, December 13, 1960, p. 40). Martin also argued that
"The balance of payments problem . . . was a vital factor in the unem-
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ployment situation. Foreign capital was finding the United States less
and less attractive, there were pressures for movement of capital
abroad, and this was having a deleterious effect on employment in this
country" (FOMC Minutes, March 6, 1962, p. 56).
Fed officials also understood that the balance of payments deficit
stemmed from differences in the macroeconomic policies of different
countries. At an FOMC meeting in 1959, a Fed staff member reported
that "the net result of attempts in this country to validate our wage and
price policies through monetary expansion could succeed only if we
could inflate the whole world." The staff member went on to argue that
expansionary monetary and fiscal policy could "price United States'
goods out of world markets" because officials of other countries, nota
bly Germany and the Netherlands, surely would not permit inflation in
their domestic prices (FOMC Minutes, May 5, 1959, p. 14). The same
official, however, was unwilling to blame monetary policy alone for the
balance of payments deficit. In arguing that gold outflows "call for a
generally restrictive credit policy . . . more effective corrections . . .
would be moves to reduce the budgetary deficit and the checking of
price rises due to wage and other cost increases" (FOMC Minutes,
October 21, 1958).
The Fed's unwillingness to tighten sufficiently to stem the balance
of payments deficit led it to consider other actions it might take. One
of the earliest of the policies intended to restore external balance was
"Operation Twist"—an attempt to raise short-term interest rates high
enough to attract foreign capital while keeping long-term interest rates
low enough to favor domestic expansion.
Other policies intended to correct international payments imbal
ances without slowing domestic activity included agreements with for
eign central banks to forbear from demanding gold, intervention in
foreign exchange markets, the issuance of foreign-currency-denomi
nated U.S. bonds ("Roosa bonds"), requests of early repayment by for
eign governments of debts to the U.S. government, the removal of
interest rate ceilings on U.S. bank time deposits, capital outflow con
straints imposed in the United States, and changes in U.S. tax treat
ment of foreign earnings. Balance of payments deficits continued,
however, and the long-term feasibility of the existing dollar goldexchange standard grew increasingly doubtful.
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THE COLLAPSE OF BRETTON WOODS
When Arthur Burns took over as chairman of the Fed's Board of
Governors in early 1970, the U.S. economy was sliding toward a reces
sion, the inflation rate stood at 6.5 percent (first-quarter average annualized rate of CPI inflation), and the U.S. balance of payments had
been in deficit nearly every year since the late 1950s. At his first meet
ing, Burns announced that "in his judgment, economic developments
had reached a point at which a rethinking of monetary policy was in
order" (FOMC Minutes, February 10, 1970, p. 3). It quickly became
apparent that Burns would make avoidance of a recession his first pri
ority. Against three dissents, the Federal Open Market Committee
voted to ease monetary policy at that meeting. One of the dissenting
votes came from Andrew Brimmer, who expressed the hope that "the
Committee would not lose sight of the highly unfavorable outlook for
the balance of payments and would give the payments balance some
what greater than customary weight in formulating policy over the near
term" (FOMC Minutes, February 10, 1970, p. 59).
Federal Open Market Committee meetings usually begin with
analysis of economic conditions by Fed staff members, and during
1970 and 1971, the staff frequently expressed pessimism about the bal
ance of payments deficit. Following the staff reports, there usually was
a report from a Fed governor, often Dewey Daane, who attended a reg
ular meeting of central bank officials in Europe. The U.S. payments
deficit was a principal topic at those meetings, with the Europeans fre
quently questioning American resolve to control inflation (see, e.g.,
FOMC Minutes, June 23, 1970). The balance of payments seems to
have had limited impact on FOMC deliberations, however, because
after hearing the summary of the European meeting, the Committee
would review domestic economic conditions and discuss the policy
directive, usually with little or no reference to the balance of payments.
At the FOMC meeting of October 20, 1970, the Fed staff gave a
particularly lengthy and pessimistic report on the balance of payment.
Following the report, Burns "said he could add one word of reassur
ance. Work on the balance of payments problem was going forward
actively, and he was confident that adequate measures for grappling
with the problem could be devised" (FOMC Minutes, October 20,
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1970, p. 21). From this comment, it is clear that Burns viewed the bal
ance of payments deficit as a problem that could be controlled effec
tively without monetary policy action. Moreover, the comment reflects
the fact that the Treasury, especially Undersecretary Paul Volcker, was
taking the lead in devising America's international economic policy.
Despite the seeming lack of influence of the balance of payments
deficit on Federal Reserve policy, some of the Fed's staff, as well as the
occasional governor, warned about the worsening payments deficit. At
an FOMC meeting on June 23,1970, the first vice president of the New
York Fed argued that "a convincing and sustained attack on domestic
inflation remains essential for improving our balance of payments and
strengthening confidence in the dollar" (FOMC Minutes, June 23,
1970, p. 57). On another occasion, Alfred Hayes, president of the New
York Fed noted that "a stiff price is being paid for the easing of money
market conditions in the United States . . . International conditions
underline the need for giving high priority to the inflation problem"
(FOMC Minutes, September 15, 1970, pp. 43-44). But, Governor
Maisel replied that
It would be improper to assume that balance of payments con
siderations should be a constraint on [policy]. If the balance of
payments remained unsatisfactory with demand still far below
normal, that would appear to be an indication of basic struc
tural problems in the balance of payments sphere. The Com
mittee should be working to correct those structural imbalances
rather than assuming a posture which traded off losses of
income, output, and jobs in an attempt to offset basic structural
defects in the balance of payments sphere. (FOMC Minutes,
September 15, 1970, p. 46)

Arthur Burns added that "he believed that balance of payments consid
erations should not prevent the Committee from taking the policy
actions it felt required by the domestic economy" (FOMC Minutes,
September 15, 1970, p. 65). Later in the same meeting Burns advo
cated "special measures," presumably capital controls or similar mea
sures, to deal with the balance of payments deficit (FOMC Minutes,
September 15, 1970, p. 81). Burns reiterated this view on February 9,
1971: "Chairman Burns commented that while the System was faced
with international as well as domestic problems, the latter were the
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more pressing. Moreover, special tools were available for dealing with
the former" (FOMC Minutes, February 9, 1971, p. 92).
The balance of payments deficit grew increasingly worse in early
1971, and the Fed staff warnings became stronger. At the March
FOMC meeting, a Fed staff member warned that "Sooner or later—and
he suspected that it would be sooner—the central bank complaints now
being voiced privately [about their build-up of dollar balances] would
become known to the market, which might then decide to protect itself
against the risk of a sudden break in the structure of exchange parities"
(FOMC Minutes, March 9, 1971, p. 22). Another staff member
reported that
1) the balance of payments deficit in the first two months of
this year was enormous; [and] 2) the monetary aggregates have
been growing very rapidly. What connects these two sets of
facts is the very steep decline in short-term interest rates. It is
not surprising, therefore, that the short-term capital outflow has
been extremely large . . . Considerable reluctance has been
built up abroad, especially among financial officials in Europe,
over what they regard as an undermining of their own mone
tary policies resulting from the massive short-term capital out
flows from the United States and from the steep decline in
short-term rates. The impression exists that . . . the United
States has completely ignored the effects its policies are having
on the rest of the world. (FOMC Minutes, March 9, 1970, pp.
28-29)

As the year 1971 progressed, the international payments crisis
worsened. At the FOMC meeting of May 11, New York Fed president
Hayes remarked that "We are ... in the midst of an international mon
etary crisis ... A vote of no confidence in the dollar has been taken by
several central banks" (FOMC Minutes, May 11, 1971, p. 53). Hayes
also reported that the directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York had voted to increase the Bank's discount rate by one-half point,
the same step taken in response to a flight from the dollar in October
1931:
The directors felt in this major international crisis there was
nothing the System could do that would be more useful and
more timely than to give an overt signal of our concern and our
willingness to move quickly toward narrowing the interest rate
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spread which was a major cause of the difficulty .. . While rec
ognizing the risks involved in a general increase in domestic
interest rates, they felt that those risks were outweighed by
international conditions. (FOMC Minutes, May 11, 1971, pp.
55-56)

The Board of Governors turned down the New York Bank's request
for a discount rate increase, citing weakness in the domestic economy,
the adverse effects of higher interest rates on the mortgage market and
the market for state and local government debt, and the likely instabil
ity that a discount rate hike would cause in all financial markets. At the
prior FOMC meeting, Burns seems to have predicted the New York
Bank's request for a discount rate increase when he relayed that "he
had a vivid recollection of developments in 1931, when the Federal
Reserve had raised its discount rate and acted to stiffen short-term rates
because of a balance of payments problem, and an incipient [domestic
economic] recovery had been cut off" (FOMC Minutes, April 6, 1971,
p. 56). For Burns, the lesson of 1931 was to put the domestic economy
first, ahead of the balance of payments and preservation of the gold
standard.

CONCLUSION

The failures of economic policy, especially monetary policy, dur
ing the Great Depression produced several significant institutional and
ideological changes in the monetary policy regime. Not surprisingly,
because monetary policy was associated with deflation and contraction
during the period 1929-1933, the new regime included features that
gave policy an inflation bias. Those features included both a new ave
nue for monetizing government debt and increased political control of
Federal Reserve policy. The Great Depression also put the new eco
nomics of Keynes, with its emphasis on government management of
aggregate demand, into the professional and policy mainstream.
The most fundamental legacy of the Great Depression for mone
tary policy, however, concerned the international gold standard.
Although governments interfered with the operation of the gold stan
dard before 1933, and an unsettled question among economic histori-
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ans is the extent to which a laissez-faire gold standard would have
proved more stable, a key lesson taken from the Great Depression was
that the international monetary system required active management of
government officials. Faith that the gold standard would ensure pros
perity was destroyed, as was any notion that a disaster worse than the
Depression would result if the gold standard was abandoned. Begin
ning in 1933, and continuing at least to the 1970s, the dominant ideol
ogy was that a gold standard and fixed exchange rates are desirable but
not worth sacrificing high employment to maintain. This change in
attitude, and the institutional changes accompanying it, largely
explains the inflationary monetary policy of the 1960s and early 1970s,
as well as the decision to abandon gold and fixed exchange rates in
1971-1973.
Since the 1970s, the pendulum has swung away from inflationary
monetary policy somewhat. The costs of high inflation and the seem
ing inability of aggregate demand policy to maintain full employment
helped promote New Classical macroeconomics and caused a rethink
ing of the appropriate goals of monetary policy among government
officials. Several countries now specify inflation targets for their cen
tral banks and have formally adopted price stability as the paramount
objective for monetary policy. The institutional environment of mone
tary policy in the United States, however, has not changed since 1973,
when fixed exchange rates were abandoned. The legacy of the Great
Depression for monetary policy was in causing an institutional and
ideological shift to a managed, discretionary monetary regime. The
fundamentals of this regime remain in place today.

Notes
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect official positions of the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve System.
1. Calomiris and Wheelock (1997) examine institutional changes to U.S. monetary
policymaking resulting from the Great Depression and argue that those affecting
the gold standard were the most important. That paper focuses on Federal
Reserve policy during 1933-1941 in particular and during the 1950s and 1960s
generally. By contrast, this paper examines in much greater detail the policy
record leading up to suspension of gold payments in 1971 and how it compares
with Federal Reserve policy during the Great Depression.
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2. Wheelock (1991) presents econometric estimates of the Federal Reserve "reaction
function" for 1924—1929. Simulations of this function also illustrate that the Fed
made fewer open-market purchases and cut its discount rate less during 1929—
1931 than it would have done under the pre-1929 reaction function. But, as dis
cussed below, this does not necessarily imply that the policy regime, i.e., the Fed's
objectives or strategy, had changed.
3. The use of open-market operations for objectives other than to secure earning
assets evolved in the early 1920s, but their use to manipulate instruments or oper
ating targets, such as borrowed reserves, evolved only gradually as the Fed gained
experience. Well into the Depression, the directions to the Fed's trading desk
from the Open Market Committee specified the dollar amounts of securities the
desk was authorized to buy or sell. By 1932, however, discussion at Open Market
Committee meetings turned more toward the desired level of excess reserves and
focused less on the specific dollar volume of securities to buy or sell. Later in the
1930s, the Committee targeted yields on Treasury securities, as well as excess
reserves.
4. This refers to the discount rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. By
December, the discount rates of all 12 Reserve Banks were at 3.5 percent or
higher. The Fed also augmented bank reserves by purchasing bankers acceptan
ces from member banks. The Fed purchased all eligible acceptances offered by
banks but, as with its discount rate, the Fed increased the interest rate at which it
made these purchases.
5. Whereas Fed holdings of government securities could not serve as collateral, dis
count-window loans always produced collateral, including those secured by com
mercial bank holdings of government securities.
6. See Eichengreen (1992) or Temin (1989) for detail about the operation of the
international gold standard and its role in the Great Depression.
7. This section draws heavily on Calomiris and Wheelock (1997), where additional
detail can be found.
8. During World War I, the Fed lent reserves to banks against their holdings of U.S.
government securities at a discount rate that guaranteed banks a profit on their
security holdings. This also had the effect of monetizing government debt.
9. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1932 was originally set to expire after one year, but it
was made permanent in 1933. It should not be confused with the Banking Act of
1933 which, among other things, established Federal deposit insurance, separated
commercial and investment banking, and outlawed the payment of interest on
demand deposits. The Banking Act of 1933 is also sometimes referred to as the
Glass-Steagall Act.
10. The Banking Act of 1935 also changed the titles of the chief executive officers of
the Federal Reserve Banks from the more prestigious "Governor" to "President,"
while discontinuing the Federal Reserve Board in favor of the Board of Gover
nors, whose members all held the title "Governor." The Board of Governors was
also authorized to approve the appointments of Federal Reserve Bank presidents
and first vice presidents and to generally supervise Reserve Bank operations.
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11. See Bordo (1993) or Solomon (1977) for a history of the Bretton Woods System,
and Meltzer (1991) for more specific analysis of U.S. economic policy under
Bretton Woods.
12. Redish (1993) argues that Bretton Woods represented just one of a series of steps
away from a gold standard operated solely by private markets, with little or no
government interference, to a fiat monetary regime. As noted above, under the
inter-war gold-exchange standard, the Federal Reserve (and other central banks)
sterilized gold flows and used open-market operations and discount rate policy to
manipulate gold flows.
13. The data sources for Figure 1 are The Role of Gold in the Domestic and Interna
tional Monetary Systems: Report to the Congress of the Commission on the Role
of Gold in the Domestic and International Monetary Systems, Volume 1, Table
SC-10, column 3 (U.S. monetary gold stock) and Table SC-8, columns 1 and 2
(world monetary gold stock), and International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics Supplement, 1972, pp. 2-3, rows 4 and 4a (U.S. external lia
bilities).
14. A system of fixed exchange rates was imposed by the Smithsonian Agreement in
1972, but this system collapsed in 1973, and the dollar has since floated. Since
my interest here concerns the end of dollar convertibility into gold, I treat August
15, 1971, as the date at which the Bretton Woods regime ended.
15. All series in Figures 2 to 4 are smoothed using a centered 13-month moving aver
age filter.
16. Meigs (1962) and Brunner and Meltzer (1964) were among the earliest critics of
the Fed's free reserves strategy.
17. The Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee are not verbatim transcrip
tions of FOMC meetings. They do appear to give a reasonably full account of the
discussion, however, and attribute comments to individuals by name.
18. See Wells (1994) for analysis of Burns' views.
19. Evidence of this is given in Calomiris and Wheelock (1997).
20. Burns had a close relationship with Nixon and clearly understood the monetary
policy desired by the administration. Two examples of the interjection of political
considerations into monetary policy discussions occurred at a meeting of the
FOMC in October 1970 and January 1971. On the first occasion, Burns suggested
that committee members consider the "judgments of members of Congress, senior
officials of the Administration, and others" when attempting to determine how
high they were willing to let the unemployment rate rise in fighting inflation
(FOMC Minutes, October 20, 1970, p. 41). Three meetings later, Burns told the
committee that "the Administration's confidence in the System was weakening as
a result of the shortfalls that had occurred in the rates of money growth . . . The
credibility of the Federal Reserve would be greatly strengthened if it became
apparent that the Committee was seeking to make up the ... shortfall" (FOMC
Minutes, January 12, 1971, p. 37). See Calomiris and Wheelock (1997) for exam
ples of political pressure on the Fed when William Martin was Fed chairman.
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6 Understanding the
Great Depression
Lessons for Current Policy
Stephen G. Cecchetti
Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
Ohio State University, and
National Bureau of Economic Research

Macroeconomists continue to search for an understanding of the
Great Depression of the 1930s. The defining characteristic of this
period is the wholesale collapse of virtually every aspect of the econ
omy. Over the four years beginning in the summer of 1929, financial
markets and institutions, labor markets, and international currency and
goods markets all virtually ceased to function. Throughout this, the
government policymaking apparatus seemed helpless. The complexity
and magnitude of the economic catastrophe during this period make it
extremely difficult to fashion a comprehensive explanation.
Over the nearly 65 years since the cyclical trough in March 1933,
researchers have churned out volumes of work analyzing the 43-month
contraction. EconLit, the CD-ROM index compiled by the Journal of
Economic Literature, lists over 400 articles on the Great Depression
that have appeared since 1969 alone. Where has all of this work gotten
us? What have we learned over the past quarter century that can help
us as we go forward?
One of the things we know is that our economic institutions are
very different today than they were in 1929. Many of the changes are
surely the result of the Depression itself. A few of the more important
things that clearly came out of this period are that the Federal Reserve
System is more centralized, we have deposit insurance and stronger
bank regulation, commercial and investment banking are separated (at
least for now), we have a pure paper money standard, and we have
unemployment insurance and social security.
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Have these changes worked in helping us to avert the onset of
another Great Depression? Clearly, the past 50 years have been charac
terized by a substantially more stable economic environment. Since
1945, the longest recession, from November 1973 to March 1975,
lasted a mere 16 months—just over one-third the length of the Great
Depression. The largest sustained drop in output has been a 2.1 per
cent change in the early 1980s, compared with the decline of nearly 30
percent in the early 1930s. While consumer prices fell 28 percent from
August 1929 to April 1933, in no year since 1949 has the Consumer
Price Index shown a decline. In December of 1982, the civilian unem
ployment rate hit its post-World War II peak of 10.8 percent, while the
estimate of the 1933 peak exceeds 25 percent!
Financial markets and institutions have fared equally well in the
stable environment of the post-World War II economy. From its peak
in mid September of 1929 to its trough in late June 1932, a broad index
of large company stocks (equivalent to the Standard & Poor's 500) fell
by 86 percent. By comparison, the largest sustained drop in the past 50
years is the decline of 52 percent from mid January 1973 to early Octo
ber 1974.
The total collapse of the financial intermediation system was evi
denced by the fact that from the beginning of 1930 to the bank holiday
of 1933, there were an astounding 9,096 commercial bank suspen
sions! The number of suspensions in 1930 alone—1,350—was more
than double the 659 in 1929. By contrast, in the 60 years since 1934
there has been a total of just over 2,000 bank closings.
International goods markets broke down as well. From 1929 to
1932, exports fell from 6.8 percent to 4.5 percent of gross output. In
the 50 years since the end of World War II, exports of goods and ser
vices have grown from 3.5 percent of gross national product to nearly
12 percent.
International financial markets suffered as well during the Great
Depression, with the gradual breakdown of the fixed exchange rate sys
tem administered through the gold-exchange standard. Slowly, over the
decade of the 1930s, all of the countries that followed the recon
structed, post-World War I gold standard left it. The desire to have a
fixed exchange rate system has obviously been very strong, as this was
followed by the Bretton Woods System and then the European Mone
tary System.
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Analyzing all of these events in any detail is clearly too big a task
to undertake in one short essay. Instead, my goal is to point out what I
think are the highlights. My presentation is split into four basic sec
tions. Each begins with what I believe to be one of the major fallacies
contained in the literature on the Great Depression. My purpose is to
examine each of these fallacies to see what lessons we can learn. I
come away with three important lessons that have become my own per
sonal guide to policy analysis.
The four fallacies are as follows:
1. The Great Depression was caused by the stock market crash of
1929.
2.. The banking system of the 1920s was fundamentally unsound.
3. The fact that nominal interest rates were approaching zero
meant that Federal Reserve policy was loose and ineffective.
4. Tariff wars were primarily responsible for the spread and depth
of the Depression.
I will argue that from analysis of these fallacies come the following
lessons for current policy:
1. The central bank's function as the lender of last resort is of pri
mary importance in the short-term stabilization of the financial
system.
2. Deflation is extremely costly.
3. A gold standard is very dangerous.
Finally, I will comment on remaining mysteries. There are two
important aspects of the Depression that we still do not fully under
stand. First, why was it so long? Second, what is the comprehensive
explanation for the entire inter-war period?

THE STOCK MARKET CRASH OF 1929
The crash of October 1929 has played a large role in the lore of the
Great Depression. Over time, however, a number of issues have
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become clear, and we now understand the likely causes of the crash, as
well as its likely consequences.
Let me begin with myths about the causes. In Cecchetti (1992b), I
argue that there is little evidence for the three most commonly
accepted reasons that asset prices fell so precipitously: 1) the bursting
of a speculative bubble; 2) massive fraud and illegal activity; and 3)
margin buying. Regarding the first, I note that, as Dominguez, Fair,
and Shapiro (1988) demonstrate, contemporary data did not reveal any
trends that suggested the drastic downturn that followed. Further
more, it is easy to find statements from contemporary analysts sup
porting the position that the market would rise and statements
supporting the opposite position that the market would fall. In other
words, economic fundamentals were also sound in late 1929.
There are numerous anecdotes that leave one feeling that fraud and
illegal activity are an important explanation. 1 But Bierman (1991) has
carefully examined the evidence and shows that there was probably
very little actual insider trading or illegal manipulation. Instead, a
number of lucky and unlucky investors were pilloried for perfectly
legal actions.
The best evidence we have is that the crash was caused by Federal
Reserve behavior, together with the public statements of numerous
government officials. It has been amply documented, initially by
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and more recently by Hamilton (1987)
and others, that Federal Reserve policy became substantially tighter in
the fall of 1928, almost immediately following the death of Benjamin
Strong, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. While
he was alive, Strong controlled Federal Reserve policy, as the Federal
Reserve Board was not as powerful as it is today. But when Strong
died, Adolph Miller of the Federal Reserve Board was able to take con
trol of policy. Miller believed that speculation was causing share
prices to be too high and that this was damaging the economy.
Together with Herbert Hoover, who had just been elected President, he
set out to bring down stock market prices.
In its attempt to bring equity prices down, the Federal Reserve
sought to keep banks from extending loans that would be used to buy
stock. To this end, the February 1929 Federal Reserve Bulletin con
tained the following policy statement, taken from a February 2, 1929,
letter sent to Federal Reserve banks.
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During the last year or more,... the functioning of the Federal
reserve system has encountered interference by reason of the
excessive amount of the country's credit absorbed in specula
tive security loans. The credit situation since the opening of
the new year indicates that some of the factors which occa
sioned untoward developments during the year 1928 are still at
work. The volume of speculative credits is still growing . . .
The extraordinary absorption of funds in speculative security
loans, which has characterized the credit movement during the
past year or more, in the judgment of the Federal Reserve
Board, deserves particular attention lest it become a decisive
factor working toward a still further firming of money rates to
the prejudice of the country's commercial interests . . .
The Federal Reserve Act does not, in the opinion of the Federal
Reserve Board, contemplate the use of the resources of the
Federal reserve banks for the creation or extension of specula
tive credit. A member bank is not within its reasonable claims
for rediscount facilities at its Federal reserve bank when it bor
rows either for the purpose of making speculative loans or for
the purpose of maintaining speculative loans.
The board has no disposition to assume authority to interfere
with the loan practices of member banks so long as they do not
involve the Federal reserve banks. It has, however, a grave
responsibility whenever there is evidence that member banks
are maintaining speculative security loans with the aid of Fed
eral reserve credit. When such is the case the Federal reserve
bank becomes either a contributing or a sustaining factor in the
current volume of speculative security credit. This is not in
harmony with the intent of the Federal Reserve Act, nor is it
conducive to the wholesome operation of the banking and
credit system of the country. (Board of Governors of the Fed
eral Reserve System 1929, pp. 93-94)

(It is worth noting that the term "speculation" appears to have been
common usage for share purchases that were made with borrowed
money.)
I will simply note that this passage suggests the central bankers did
not understand the difference between transactions that represent port
folio reallocations and those that use real resources. An example will
help to make the point. Consider a case in which a person holding an
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equity share wishes to sell it and purchase a bond. Another person
wishes to purchase the share and incur debt (issue a bond). For sim
plicity, say that the seller is willing to accept the bond issued by the
buyer in payment. Such a transaction is essentially a risk trade and
results in a net increase in the gross quantity of debt outstanding with
no change in the level of equity or anyone's net worth. The portfolios
of the two people do change as one individual goes from holding
equity to holding debt, and the other goes from having no assets ;arid
liabilities to having an equity asset and a bond liability.
The passage from the Federal Reserve Bulletin clearly shows that
the Federal Reserve Board thought the increase in debt somehow used
real resources and reduced the level of real investment. While confu
sion between real and financial investment is common in the popular
press, we can rightly expect more from those people who are in charge
of policymaking.
It is no surprise that following the Federal Reserve Board's pro
nouncement, the interest rate charged on broker loans rose dramati
cally. In fact, this action very nearly generated a crash on March 26,
1929. On that day, call money rates opened at 12 percent and rose to
20 percent by noon. Meanwhile, stock prices fell by nearly 10 percent.
But action by both the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the First
National Bank to provide liquidity to the market in the form of broker
loans stemmed the decline, and prices recovered almost entirely by the
close of the day. Both Charles E. Mitchell, President of First National
Bank, and George Harrison, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, were later criticized for taking these actions. In many ways,
these attempts at expansion of liquidity and the associated criticisms
were a precursor of things to come.
Even after the near crash in March, Federal Reserve policy contin
ued to stifle the market by restricting the ability of member banks to
make broker loans. This policy of "direct action," whereby the Federal
Reserve openly discouraged lending collaterized by stock, did have the
effect of stemming the increase in broker loans that originated from
banks. In fact, broker loans from New York banks fell between March
and May of 1929.
A second important contributor to the crash was likely to have
been the repeated statements by public officials that stock prices were
too high. The main culprit here is President Herbert Hoover, whose
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public comments supported Adolph Miller's attack on speculation.
(See, for example, Hoover 1952, p. 172.)
We do not know why the market crashed exactly when it did. But
it is clear that the actions of the Federal Reserve were very different in
October than they were in March. After many months of warning,
banks were not willing to extend broker loans to stem the decline, and
the Federal Reserve had no desire to provide the liquidity that would
have been necessary for the banks to do so. As a result, once the mar
ket became disorderly and prices began to plummet, matters simply
became worse.
This story suggests that the Federal Reserve could have stopped
the stock market from crashing. The reason it did not is that Adolph
Miller and his colleagues believed that credit extended to brokers for
loans to purchase securities was, in some sense, credit that was
unavailable to the commercial sector, and so raised interest rates and
harmed business activity generally. This position is very difficult to
justify, particularly since Federal Reserve accommodation could have
simply increased total credit outstanding in order to keep interest rates
on commercial loans at a level that was considered desirable. Further
more, there is evidence that Benjamin Strong understood in 1928 that
the solution to high interest rates was looser policy, not artificial
attempts to reduce broker loans.
The consequences of the crash are more difficult to ascertain. The
explanations just cited follow Friedman and Schwartz in viewing the
crash as a by-product of the tight Federal Reserve policy and in ignor
ing any direct effect of the crash on economic activity. But there are at
least four ways in which the stock market decline could have influ
enced consumer spending and therefore output. First, the crash could
have depressed consumer spending by leading people to believe that
the Depression was coming. The work of Dominguez, Fair, and Shapiro (1988) suggests that this is unlikely. Second, the market crash
reduced wealth, and this could have reduced consumer spending. But
this is unlikely to have had a large effect, given that the stock market
throughout 1929 remained above its level at the beginning of 1928.
Third, Mishkin (1978) argues that the crash, together with recently
accumulated consumer debt, served to make households illiquid. He
then estimates that roughly two-thirds of the fall in spending can be
accounted for by the deterioration of household balance sheets.

178

Cecchetti

Finally, Romer (1990) argues that the stock market crash created
immediate income uncertainty, resulting in a decline in the purchase of
consumer durables, for which she provides substantial empirical sup
port. Specifically, Romer shows that there was a dramatic decline in
new automobile registrations and department store sales immediately
in November 1929. Mail-order sales began to fall in January 1930.
This evidence suggests that some of the blame for the contraction can
be traced directly to the stock market crash of 1929 and substantiates
certain aspects of Temin's (1976) original hypothesis that the initial
contraction in output in 1929 resulted from a collapse of consumption
expenditure. Romer's position is bolstered by evidence in Cecchetti
and Karras (1994), who find that there was a very large aggregate
demand shock of nonmonetary origin in November 1929 that is largely
responsible for the downturn of 1930.
There are two important lessons to be taken away from this experi
ence. Both concern the behavior of central bankers. First, I believe
that if central bankers allow the fluctuations in asset market prices to
affect their decisions it may distract them from concentrating on some
combination of output growth and inflation. The focus of the Federal
Reserve on the level of equity prices in 1929 clearly led to a disas
trously contractionary path for policy.
Second, the central bank can operate effectively as a lender of last
resort only if it stands ready to provide immediate liquidity to any bank
that presents assets meeting certain predetermined criteria. That is to
say, if the financial system comes under stress—as it surely will during
a sudden downturn in equity prices—the Federal Reserve must stand
ready to supply reserves to the banking system. Again, the evidence
suggests that, in October 1929, the Federal Reserve's actions served to
exacerbate the problems caused by the crash.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF SOUND FINANCIAL
INTERMEDIARIES
The Financial Crises of the 1930s
The failure of the system of financial intermediation, which culmi
nated in the bank holiday of 1933, strongly suggests that there was
something inherently wrong with the organization of the banking sys
tem prior to the Depression. Why did the banking system collapse?
Was the net worth of banks too low? There is a simple prima facie
case that we can make against such a suggestion. First, there is the fact
that banks entered the Depression with what, by modern standards,
were very high amounts of equity. Book-value bank balance sheets
indicate bank capital was 14 percent of assets at the end of 1929. By
1940, it had fallen to 9 percent. While it has risen to over 7 percent
recently, capital was less than 6 percent of assets for most of the 1980s.
But these are accounting numbers, and they may not be representa
tive of the true economic condition of banks. If we had been able to
compute the market value of bank assets, would they have been less
than the value of bank liabilities? As has been emphasized in the bank
ing literature, banks are maturity transformers. They take short-term
liabilities and turn them into long-term assets. Since these assets are
often not marketable, there is substantial risk involved in such a transi
tion. The main risk comes from nominal interest rate movements. As
nominal interest rates rise, the revenue stream from banks' long-term
assets may be insufficient to service the obligations created by their
short-term liabilities.
Were nominal interest rates rising during this period? The answer,
which we can obtain from Cecchetti (1988b), is clearly no. The data in
Figure 1 and Table 1 clearly show that nominal interest rates fell
throughout the Depression. Three-month U.S. government rates fell
from just over 5 percent in the spring of 1929 to less than one-half of 1
percent by July 1931. While they went up significantly for a few
months in late 1931, around the time when Britain left the gold stan
dard, they quickly returned to very low levels and remained there until
after World War II. Long-term interest rates followed a similar pattern,
falling through most of 1929, 1930, and most of 1931.
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Figure 1 Monthly Nominal Interest Rates, 3-Month and 5-Year Yields,
1929 to 1940
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Table 1 Chronology of Monetary Events during the Depression
1 - October 1929

Stock Market Crash

2 - October 1930

First Banking Crisis

3 - March 1931

Second Banking Crisis

4 - September 1931

Britain Leaves the Gold Standard

5 - January 1933

Last Banking Crisis

6 - March 1933

Bank Holiday

Numbers correspond to vertical lines in the figures.
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An alternative explanation for the banking system collapse is the
debt-deflation hypothesis. First advanced in Irving Fisher's (1933)
paper, and more recently formalized by Ben Bernanke and Mark
Gertler (1989, 1990), the theory is that the 30 percent cumulative defla
tion of 1930-1932 was primarily responsible for the depth of the
Depression. The argument proceeds as follows. Since unanticipated
deflation increases the real burden of nominal debt, it caused debtors to
default on loans, which led to bank failures and the collapse of the
financial system. Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990) examine a formal
model in which deflation lowers borrower net worth, thereby increas
ing leverage and the desire of entrepreneurs to take on risk. This raises
the probability of bankruptcy, lowers the level of investment, and
causes a reduction in both aggregate supply and aggregate demand.
Once again, the problem can be traced to behavior of the Federal
Reserve. Without the deflation, the financial system would not have
disintegrated. Since the deflation is clearly a monetary phenomenon,
we have found the villain.
Unfortunately, we should not stop here. We must look further, as
the banking system crashed in a series of systemic panics. These
waves were surely unnecessary. Their defining characteristic was that
solvent banks were forced into bankruptcy as depositors demanded
convertibility of their deposits into currency, and all the banks had
were nonmarketable assets.
Was there a policy failure here as well? The consensus is that there
was. The job of the lender of last resort is to step in at exactly these
times. Why was the Federal Reserve so reticent to engage in making
discount loans during this period? Figure 2 shows the path of discount
loans during the inter-war period. The most striking feature of this fig
ure is that during the 1920-1922 deflation, Federal Reserve lending
increased substantially, hitting its peak just prior to the trough of the
business cycle.2 This is in stark contrast to the pattern during the initial
phases of the Depression. Beginning with the crash and ending in late
1931, well after the second banking crisis, the level of borrowings fell
and stayed at a very low level.
Data on bank suspensions show that from 1930 to 1932 an average
of 1,699 banks, representing an average of over $1 billion in deposits,
suspended operation each year. Assuming that the volume of loan
defaults is roughly proportional to the level of suspended deposits, one
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Figure 2 Monthly Federal Reserve System Discount Loans, 1919 to 1934
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can infer that as banks were becoming illiquid in 1930, Fed lending
was declining.
In light of the deterioration of bank assets during the early 1930s, it
seems extremely unlikely that the decline in borrowing from the Fed
resulted solely from demand-side factors. 3 Instead, it seems plausible
that the Fed played some role. The Fed's failure to actively encourage
borrowing to meet the short-run liquidity demands of depositors
should not be overlooked. In essence, the Fed failed to perform as the
lender of last resort. Without an ultimate source of short-run cash,
banks were forced to suspend operation. If, on the other hand, the Fed
had actively sought to discount bank assets, the bank panics could have
been averted, and the deflation would not have been as prolonged.
Institutional Responses
The solutions offered during the 1930s had three major compo
nents. They were the provision of added information to potential
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investors, the creation of deposit insurance, and the fragmentation of
the financial system. The last of these has now largely been undone.
The first has been, and I hope will continue to be, emphasized. But,
what should we make of deposit insurance? The purpose of deposit
insurance is to eliminate systemic bank runs. Surely, it has worked.
But deposit insurance creates incentive problems for banks, since
depositors do not have any interest at all in the quality of bank assets.
Bankers are, in essence, able to gamble with government-guaranteed
funds. This leads to powerful arguments against deposit insurance.
The alternative, implicitly advocated by some critics, is that the lender
of last resort will function to keep solvent banks from folding and
allow insolvent ones to close. The problem with such a strategy is that
it requires that the lender of last resort be quick and nimble in its reac
tions. My sense is that we are better off relying on imperfect institu
tions that offer automatic responses than on central bankers, who may
not realize what is needed.

UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTS OF DEFLATION
Past discussions of the Depression have at times been muddled by
the fact that nominal interest rates were extremely low during the entire
period. Once the three-month U.S. Treasury bill rate fell below 3 per
cent in 1930, it did not rise back to this level until after World War II. In
fact, as Figure 1 shows, by modern standards the nominal interest rate
was remarkably low over the entire period from 1929 to 1940.
This fact caused a particularly simple type of confusion. It was
thought by some that since nominal interest rates were low, Federal
Reserve policy must not be contractionary, and so it could not be respon
sible for the Depression. How, people thought, could monetary expan
sion have been efficacious in this circumstance, when the nominal
interest rate was already so low? This argument led to theories of a socalled liquidity trap—the notion that there is some point at which further
changes in the quantity of money have no impact on the interest rate.
This line of reasoning confuses nominal and real interest rates.
During the early 1930s, there was a tremendous deflation. Over a
three-year period, consumer prices fell by nearly 30 percent. Figure 3
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Figure 3 Monthly Changes in Consumer Price Inflation, 1919 to 1940
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shows the pattern of inflation for the entire inter-war period. The main
point to note is that there were two large deflations. In addition to the
1930s, there was the 1920-1922 deflation in which consumer prices
fell by approximately 18 percent.
When people expect prices to keep falling, ex ante real interest
rates will be very high. To see exactly how high they might have been
during the Depression, in Cecchetti (1992b) I estimated real interest
rates for three-month loans. The results are reported in Figure 4. The
most important thing to realize is that the real interest rate during the
entire Depression period was extremely high—the peak in early 1932
exceeded 20 percent! This is high by any standard. At no point since
the end of the Depression have real interest rates exceeded even 10 per
cent. So, while nominal interest rates were low, real interest rates were
very, very high.
The clear cause of these high real interest rates was extraordinarily
tight policy. As was first emphasized by Friedman and Schwartz
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Figure 4 Ex ante Real Interest Rate, 1919 to 1940
(monthly at an annual rate, 3-month horizon)
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(1963) and has been observed by many others since, the monetary
aggregates were shrinking quickly over this period. For example, Ml
went from a high of $26.7 million at the August 1929 cyclical peak to
$19.5 million at the April 1933 cyclical trough, a drop of 27 percent.
M2 followed the same pattern, declining by one-third over the same
nearly four-year period. The Federal Reserve's confusion, of course,
came from the fact that this was all going on at the same time that they
were actively expanding the monetary base. Clearly, policymakers did
not take account of declines in the money multiplier—the ratio of
broad measures of money such as M2 to the monetary base—when
they were evaluating their policy stance.
Once again, the debt-deflation hypothesis is the widely accepted
explanation for how central bank policy created such a disaster. But
the theory requires that deflation be unanticipated. There is some
debate over whether the deflation was actually unanticipated (see
Cecchetti 1992a; Hamilton 1992; Nelson 1991). If not, then theories
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that rely on high ex ante real interest rates, and the resulting collapse
of consumption and investment, might be more relevant than the debtdeflation hypothesis.4
A complementary explanation is that temporary deflation led to
high real interest rates, which in turn caused the decapitalization of the
economy. Such a theory can be constructed from a model used by
Calvo (1985, 1986) to study anticipated temporary changes in money
growth. While his original purpose was to study the impact of disinfla
tion programs in Central and South America, his results can be used
here as well.
If one accepts that the deflation of 1930-1932 was (at least par
tially) anticipated but expected to be temporary, then it is possible to
study the behavior of consumption and capital accumulation using a
monetary version of Calvo's (1985, 1986) model. When the money
growth rate declines, depending on whether the ensuing deflation is
severe enough to cause the nominal interest rate to hit its lower bound,
two things can happen.5
If the money growth rate is negative but the opportunity cost of
money remains positive, then the impact of anticipated temporary
deflation is straightforward. Consumption jumps up and then declines
throughout the temporary policy period. At the same time, the capital
stock falls and then begins to rise slowly. The reason for the transitory
rise in consumption is that the effective cost of consumption is
expected to rise in the future. The severity of the consumption and
investment collapse depends on both the size of the money growth
decline and the length of time it is in place. The larger the fall in the
money growth rate, the more severe the collapse. On the other hand,
increases in the length of time the policy is in place can be either good
or bad. If the policy were in effect for either zero or infinite time, there
would be no change in consumption or the capital stock—the model is
superneutral. This implies that there is some finite value for the time
that the money growth rate is at its low level that maximizes the fall in
consumption and the capital stock. The impact is less severe if the pol
icy is in place for either a longer or shorter time.
In the second case, in which the opportunity cost of holding money
becomes negative, the consumption and investment declines are poten
tially much larger. When cash or other government-issued liquid assets
provide a real rate of return above that available on any physical invest-
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ment, agents will attempt to move their assets into cash. The nature of
money is completely changed. This simultaneously drives down the
value of the in-place capital stock and results in negative net invest
ment. In essence, the economy is decapitalized. The decapitalization
is accompanied by a decline in consumption. The consequences are
clearly catastrophic. Not only does the value of the in-place capital
decline, but the demand for firms' production falls as well. This in turn
decreases the firms' ability to repay loans, making bank deposits less
safe. The deterioration of the quality of bank assets drives individuals
to hold cash.
The main lesson here is clear. We must avoid deflations, even
expected ones. The fact that the nominal interest rate has a natural lower
bound means that deflation can lead to increases in real interest rates that
are extremely damaging. For recent discussions of inflation targeting,
the message is to be wary of targets that imply a significant chance of
deflation. It may therefore be dangerous to target zero inflation.

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE DEPRESSION
The Great Depression was a worldwide phenomenon, affecting
virtually all of the industrialized countries. The pervasiveness of the
economic collapse has led to a study of the manner in which aggregate
fluctuations are transmitted across economies. Both financial and
goods market transactions link the international system. What part did
each of these play in the global collapse and what are the important les
sons we have learned about exchange rate systems and international
trade? The remainder of this short section discusses each of these. I
begin with a description of the gold standard, followed by a short dis
cussion of the tariff system.

The Gold Standard
In the last decade we have made great strides in understanding the
role of the gold standard in the propagation of the Depression.
Numerous people contributed to this understanding, beginning with
Choudhri and Kochin (1980) and followed by Hamilton (1988), Temin
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(1989), and Bernanke (1995). But it is Eichengreen (1992) who is
responsible for consolidating the improvement in our knowledge. 6
The gold standard of the inter-war period was a fixed exchange rate
system, whereby the central banks in all of the major countries of the
world stood ready to exchange their currency for gold at a fixed rate.
The purpose of the system was to stabilize economies through specie
flows. If one country's economy began to shrink, its aggregate price
level would begin to fall. At the fixed gold-currency exchange, it
would then be profitable to import gold into the affected country. This
would increase the stock of money and provide a stabilizing force.
It is important not to confuse this international institutional
arrangement with contemporary calls for the institution of a domestic
gold standard. For one country to adopt a gold standard in isolation
would be to fix the currency price of gold. The result would be that all
fluctuations in the relative price of gold, for whatever reason, would
have to be absorbed by the general price level. For example, if an
increase in political instability somewhere in the world were to drive
up the demand for gold, instead of the currency price of gold rising, the
aggregate price level would have to fall. Needless to say, given the
fluctuations in the real price of gold since the collapse of the Bretton
Woods System 25 years ago, this would create incredible instability.
The gold standard of the inter-war period is more correctly
referred to as a gold-exchange standard, and, as mentioned above, its
primary purpose was to establish and maintain a system of fixed
exchange rates. While central banks were required to hold reserves to
back their monetary base, those reserves could be part monetary gold
and part foreign exchange. Furthermore, requirements generally stated
that the central bank need hold only 30 to 40 percent of the value of the
monetary base as backing. The real problem came with the fact that
countries losing gold (e.g., because they were running current account
deficits) had no choice but to contract their money stocks. But coun
tries gaining reserves could choose whether to sterilize the inflows,
leaving their money stocks unchanged, or allow their monetary base
and money stock to grow.
The United States and France were the major surplus countries
during this period, and so they were beneficiaries of gold inflows. But
both of these countries sterilized the inflows, forcing the world money
stock to decline substantially and rapidly. Once again, we come to the
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conclusion that the Federal Reserve's contractionary policy, beginning
in 1928, is of the utmost importance in understanding the nature of the
Depression.7
The most persuasive case for the causal role of the gold standard
comes from Bernanke and James (1991) and Bernanke (1995). They
show that the depth of the Depression depended critically on when a
country left the gold standard. Those countries that left earliest, such
as Great Britain (in 1931), had shallower contractions than the United
States (1933) and France (1936).
It seems likely that we have learned the most important lesson that
comes from this experience—namely, that the international transmis
sion of shocks depends on the exchange rate regime. Fixed exchange
rates allow transmission of certain types of shocks that are buffered by
the movements in flexible exchange rates. In particular, in a fixed
exchange rate system, central bank policy is unable to buffer distur
bances to the real economy—in effect, one loses control of the size of
one's money stock. Without coordination of central bank policies
among central banks, a fixed exchange rate block is not viable.
The European Monetary Union is an obvious response to this.
European countries have decided to institutionalize fixed exchange
rates and coordinated policy by actually eliminating both individual
currencies and autonomous central banks. Such a setup will surely
eliminate the possibility of the calamitous events of the 1930s.
Tariffs

A commonly held view is that the tariff wars of the 1930s bore sig
nificant responsibility for the wholesale collapse of economic activity.
For example, Meltzer (1976) has argued that the Smoot-Hawley tariff,
instituted in June 1930, was of paramount importance in deepening the
worldwide depression.
This view has been challenged by Crucini (1994), who notes that
most import duties were specific, not ad valorem. This means that they
were stated in fixed dollar amounts per unit of import. As a result, the
main fluctuations in the real value of the tariffs came not with legis
lated changes in the tariff rates themselves, but with movements in the
aggregate price level. Once again, it is the deflation during the 1930s
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that is the villain, raising tariffs by much more than even the SmootHawley tariff.
But this point raises the question of the impact of the tariff
changes. Crucini and Kahn (1996) examine the macroeconomic effect
of these changes. They note that by raising real tariff rates, contrac
tionary central bank policy could have a quantitatively important
impact on output. But while the authors calculate an effect on output
that is large in comparison with what one might expect, it accounts for
at most 10 percent of the peak-to-trough decline in output, or some
thing like a cumulative 3 percent decline.

LESSONS AND REMAINING MYSTERIES
Our collective efforts at understanding the Great Depression have
yielded a number of important lessons for current policy. These fall
into two broad categories: lessons for policymakers and lessons about
the construction of financial institutions. The experience of the
Depression teaches central bankers both about the dangers of deflation
and about the proper operation of the lender of last resort.
Whether or not it is anticipated, deflation clearly devastates an
economy. Extreme aversion to deflation has a number of important
implications for current policymakers. First and foremost, it suggests
that setting a target of zero inflation for central bank policy may be
dangerous. One must assume that, with a competent policymaker in
control, there is an equal chance that resulting inflation will be above
or below the targeted level. But if deflation is a bad outcome, there
should be an extreme aversion to it, and so the initial target level
should be set above zero. It seems to me that a modest amount of per
manent inflation is a small price to pay for significantly reducing the
chances of repeating the catastrophic events of the early 1930s.
The second lesson for central bankers concerns the functioning of
the lender of last resort for the short-term stabilization of the financial
system. If the lender of last resort operates effectively, there is abso
lutely no reason that we should ever again face a systemic collapse of
the banking system of the type seen in the early 1930s.
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Two episodes in the recent financial history of the United States
suggest to me that the most important aspects of this lesson have been
learned. I have in mind the response to the stock market decline of
October 1987 and the collapse of the savings and loan industry begin
ning around the same time. A stock market crash puts the entire finan
cial system at risk for a very short period of time, because some
individuals are inevitably bankrupted and cannot make payments on
debts that are due immediately. In October 1987, the Federal
Reserve's reaction was to offer banks large amounts of discount loans
to enable them to make loans to securities dealers who faced immedi
ate liquidity problems. This is exactly what the lender of last resort
should do, and it worked.
The second success was the fact that the savings and loans collapse
was neutralized. While the difficulties virtually wiped out the savings
and loan industry, the financial system continued to function and
remained sound. The method for containment of the problem was the
deposit insurance system. Deposits in savings and loans were insured,
and while the insurance system itself was bankrupted, the insurance
guarantees were honored by the U.S. government through the issuance
of Treasury securities. It is clear to me that the ultimate guarantor of
these transactions was the Federal Reserve, acting again in its capacity
as lender of last resort.
The lessons for the construction of financial institutions clearly
overlap those for policy makers. I believe the most important involves
deposit insurance. While deposit insurance has clear costs in that it
cuts the link between a bank's depositors and its asset allocation deci
sions, it has one extremely important benefit. Since the central bank is
the ultimate guarantor of the insurance system, deposit insurance
removes any element of discretion about the behavior of policymakers
during a pending financial collapse. Beyond this, it is clear that regula
tory structures need to be in place to ensure that market participants
receive as much information as possible about the riskiness of different
financial instruments.
Finally, I come to the international lessons. There are two. First,
there is the failure of the inter-war gold standard. From this we should
have learned about the difficulty in establishing well-functioning insti
tutions to maintain fixed exchange rates and the implications of this
type of system for the international transmission of business cycles.
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While I believe that we have learned the lesson, it has taken quite a
long time. Second, we have learned that deflation affects international
trade through its impact on the real value of tariffs. This simple lesson
is yet another reason to fear deflation.
We have clearly come a long way in our understanding of the
Depression, but I do not believe we are quite finished. There are still
some remaining mysteries. I will close by listing two, each of which
comes from a comparison of the recession of 1920-1922 with the
Great Depression. First, it is my opinion that our understanding of the
impact of deflation is not quite complete. The logical difficulty is that
the earlier period suffered from a more rapid, but nearly as extreme,
deflation, but the result was a sharp and quick recession. This suggests
that the duration of the deflation is important. But the debt-deflation
hypothesis would actually predict that shorter, sharp deflations should
be worse, not better. Why was there no depression in 1922?
Related to this same point is the apparent change in the nature of
the wage-setting process between 1920 and 1930. Here the point is
that real wages seem to have been much less flexible during the
Depression than immediately following the end of World War I. Why
was this? Without a full understanding of the reason for the slow
adjustment of aggregate supply during the Depression, we will not be
sure that we have learned all that we can.

Notes
I thank Margaret Mary McConnell and Mark Wheeler for comments.
1. This is surely the conclusion that would be drawn by a reader of Galbraith (1954).
2. The increase in borrowing came about despite the increase in the discount rate
from 4 percent to 7 percent.
3. From December 1929 to June 1933, total assets of Federal Reserve System mem
ber banks fell steadily from $48.1 billion to $33.0 billion.
4. Examples of these competing theories can be found in the simple IS-LM theory of
Gordon and Wilcox (1981) and the classical theory in Cecchetti (1988a).
5. This lower bound is difficult to determine. One would expect that it restricts the
nominal interest rate to be nonnegative. If this were true, the short-term interest
rates plotted in Figure 4 would lead one to conclude that this is an irrelevant case
for the 1930-1932 period. But in studying this period, it is important to keep in
mind the existence of postal savings accounts. These effectively increased the
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nominal interest rate floor for individuals to the legislated 2 percent rate paid by
the U.S. government.
6. See Bernanke's (1993) review of Eichengreen's book and his February 1995 arti
cle for concise summaries of Eichengreen's argument.
7. I am leaving out numerous details about the mechanics of the gold-exchange stan
dard and its impact. For example, the sequence of bank panics led central banks
to reduce their foreign exchange holdings, forcing them to contract their money
stocks further.
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